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Gender is among the strongest predictors of crime,1 particularly
violent crime.2 Arrest, self report, and victimization data consistently
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1 SeeJAMES W. MESSERSCHMIDT, MASCULINITIES AND CRIME: CRITIQUE AND RECONCEPTU-
ALIZATION OF THEORY 1 (1993); JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND
HUMAN NATURE 104-05 (1985); David F. Greenberg, The Gendering of Crime in Marxist Theory,
in CRIME AND CAPITALISM: READINGS IN MARxIsT CRIMINOLOGY 405, 405 (David F. Green-
berg ed., 1993); Kenneth E. Moyer, Sex Differences in Aggression, in SEX DIFFERENCES IN BE-
HAVIOR 335, 335 (Richard C. Friedman et al. eds., 1974); Darrell Steffensmeier & Emilie
Allan, Gender, Age, and Crime; in CRIMINOLOGY- A CONTEMPORARY HANDBOOK 67, 67 (Joseph
F. Sheley ed., 1991); June Andrew, Delinquency: Correlating Variables, 10 J. CUN. CHILD
PSYCH. 136, 136-40 (1981). Recent analyses of historical data show, however, that such
gender differences have not always existed. See Greenberg, supra; Helen Boritch, Gender
and Criminal Court Outcomes: An Historical Analysis, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 293 (1992); Malcolm
M. Feeley & Deborah L. Little, The Vanishing Female: The Decline of Women in the Criminal
Process, 1687-1912, 25 L. & Soc'y REv. 719 (1991).
2 See infra notes 21 to 24 and accompanying text; see also MARTIN DALY & MARCO WIL-
SON, HOMICIDE 156-86 (1988); DONNA MARTIN HAMPARIAN ET AL., THE VIOLENT FEw: A
STUDY OF DANGEROUSJUVENILE OFFENDERS 51-87 (1978); Candace Kruttschnitt, Gender and
Interpersonal Violence, in 3. UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES
295, 295-378 (AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr. &Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994); Moyer, supra note 1, at 335;
Deborah R. Baskin & Ira Sommers, Females' Initiation into Violent Street Crime, 10 JUST. Q.
559, 559-60 (1993); Ira Sommers & Deborah R. Baskin, The Situational Context of Violent
Female Offending 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 136, 140, 150-55 (1993); Steffensmeier & Allan,
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show that men and boys commit significantly more crime, both seri-
ous and not, than women and girls.3 This pattern persists despite data
indicating that crimes committed by females may be rising.4 Evidence
also suggests that males are generally more aggressive than females,5
even before the preschool years.6 Yet most theories and explanations
supra note 1, at 67-70.
S See FREDA ADLER ET AL, CRIMINOLOGY 43-45 (1991); 1 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENT-
ING VIOLENCE 5 (AlbertJ. Reiss,Jr. &Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993); RITAJAMES SIMON, WOMEN
AND CRIME 33-47 (1975); Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 298-314; HenryJ. Steadman et al.,
Designing a New Generation of Risk Assessment Research, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER:
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASsESSMENT 297, 309 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds.,
1994); Lynn Kratzer & Sheila Hodgins, Adult Outcomes of Childhood Conduct Problems: A Co-
hort Study (1994) (manuscript submitted for publication); see alsoJohn Monahan et al.,
Ethical and Legal Duties in Conducting Research on Violence: Lessons From the MacArthur Risk
Assessment Study, 8 VIOLENCE AND Vicrnrs 387, 388 (1993) (identifying gender as one of the
risk markers for violence in planning the MacArthur Risk Assessment Study). Official sta-
tistics, however, show a greater gender disparity than self report studies. Whereas official
statistics report male/female juvenile offense ratios as ranging between 3:1 and 7:1, self
report studies show male/female offense ratios as ranging between 1.2:1 and 2.5:1. See
Ronda L. Romanowski, Female Juvenile Offenders: Prevalence, Patterns and Etiology
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University Medical Graduate School).
Therefore, the nature and extent of female delinquency appears to more closely resemble
that of male delinquency than official statistics demonstrate. See Rachelle J. Canter, Family
Correlates of Male and Female Delinquency, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 146, 146-67 (1982). Kruttschnitt
emphasizes that this male-female crime convergence is particularly apparent for less seri-
ous offenses. See Kruttschnitt, supra note 2.
4 See FREDA ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW FEMALE CRIMINAL 5-30, 85-
169 (1975); SIMON, supra note 3, at 19-67; Susan K Datesman & Frank R. Scarpitti, The
Extent and Nature of Female Crime, in WOMEN, CRIME, &JusrcE 1, 8-64 (Susan K. Datesman &
Frank R. Scarpitti eds., 1980); Roy L Austin, Recent Trends in Official Male and Female Crime
Rates: The Convergence Controversy, 21 J. CRiM. JusT. 447 (1993); Deborah Baskin et al., The
Political Economy of Female Violent Street Crime 20 FoRDHm UsRB. LJ. 401, 402-03 (1993). But
see Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 314-17 (concluding that gender patterns are stable, rather
than changing, over time); DarrellJ. Steffensmeier, Sex Differences in Patterns of Adult Crime,
1965-77: A Review and Assessment 58 SocL FORCES 1080 (1980) (questioning whether
female crime is rising); DarrellJ. Steffensmeier, National Trends in Female Arrests, 1960-1990.
Assessment and Recommendations for Research, 9 J. QUANTITATiVE CRIM. 411 (1993) (contend-
ing that the profile of female offenders has not changed over time relative to males and
any changes that have been demonstrated have been in terms of rises in property crimes
only, particularly minor thefts and fraud).
5 See KATHERINE BUCK HOYENGA & KERMIT T. HOYENGA, GENDER-RELATED DIFFERENCES:
ORIGINS AND OUTcOMES 337-56 (1993); GERDA SIANN, ACCOUNTING FOR AGGRESSION: PER-
SPECTIVES ON AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE 33-37 (1985); Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen,
Gender and Aggressive Behavior A Meta-Analytic Review of the Social Psychological Literature, 100
PSYCH. BuLLrlN 309 (1986).
6 See Eleanor Maccoby & Carol Jacklin, Sex Dfferences in Aggression: A Rejoinder & Re-
prise, 51 CHILD DEV. 964,964-80 (1980). But see WiLsON & HERRNSTEN, supra note 1, at 117-
19 (noting that each of the reasons for Maccoby's and Jacklin's conclusion can "with vary-
ing plausibility, be challenged"); Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 330 (contending that, irre-
spective of "a child's inborn or early acquired disposition, parental behaviors appear to
have a strong mediating effect"); Todd Tieger, On the Biological Basis of Sex Differences in
Aggression, 51 CHILD DEv. 943, 945-51 (1980) (contending, among other things, that the
role of hormonal influences on aggressive human behavior is unclear and that cross cul-
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of crime are gender blind. They either bypass the gender issue en-
tirely or focus solely on why females fail to resemble males in their
behavior.' These theories also ignore the possibility that explanations
for the gender disparity in crime may help account for the underlying
correlates of crime in general.8
This Article attempts to explain some of this gender disparity by
analyzing the results of the "Biosocial Study," one of this country's
largest longitudinal studies of biological, psychological, and sociolog-
ical predictors of crime.10 The Biosocial Study followed nearly 1000
Philadelphia residents from birth through early adulthood and ex-
amined numerous variables. The individuals came from families who
participated in the Philadelphia Collaborative Perinatal Project at
Pennsylvania Hospital between 1959 and 1966. Pennsylvania Hospital
was one of twelve medical centers the National Institute of Neurologi-
cal Diseases and Stroke included in an unprecedented, nationwide
study of biological and environmental influences upon the
pregnancies of 60,000 women, as well as the physical, neurological,
and psychological development of their children."
tural studies of children reveal strong social and environmental influences on children's
early behavior).
7 See Meda Chesney-Lind, Women and Crime: The Female Offender, 12 SIGNS 78, 78-96
(1986); Douglas A. Smith & Raymond Paternoster, The Gender Gap in Theories of Deviance:
Issues and Evidenc4 24 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 140, 140-72 (1987); see also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 105, 105 (1990)
("[Ciriminal law, constructed and expounded almost exclusively by males, can fairly be
characterized (descriptively) as 'sexist' or at least 'gendered' (that is, male-oriented) in its
core assumptions."); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988)
(contending that "all of our modern legal theory . .. is essentially and irretrievably
masculine").
8 SeeJudith Allen, Men, Crime, and Criminology: Recasting the Questions, 17 INT'LJ. Soc.
L. 19, 19-39 (1989) (noting that any explanation for the gender disparity in crime "might
be posed as a litmus test for the viability of the discipline" of criminology).
9 A longitudinal study analyzes the same group of individuals over a period of time.
See JOHN M. NE.ALE & ROBERT M. LIEBERT, SCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO
METHODS OF RESEARCH 109 (3d ed. 1986); JULIAN L. SIMON & PAUL BURSTEIN, BASIC RE-
SEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 90 (3d ed. 1985). For a general discussion of the use
of social science research methods in legal contexts, see JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS
WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 31-81 (3d ed. 1994).
10 The Biosocial Study is described in detail in two sources: DEBORAH W. DENNO, BIOL-
OGY AND VIOLENCE: FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD (1990) [hereinafter DENNO, BIOLOGY AND
VIOLENCE]; Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free
Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1988).
11 See KENNETH NISWANDER & MYRON GORDON, THE WOMEN AND THEIR PREGNANCIES
(1972). Examination of the study children from the time of their birth through age seven
continued until 1974, completing a total project cost exceeding 100 million dollars. See
Joseph A. McFalls, Jr., Social Science and the Collaborative Perinatal Project: An Opportunity for
Research, 4 PUBLIC DATA USE 37, 37-47 (1976). Numerous publications have resulted from
examining these data. See, e.g., SARAH BROMAN ET AL., PRESCHOOL IQ PRENATAL AND EARLY
DEVELOPMENTAL CORRELATES (1975);JANET B. HARDY ET AL., THE FIRSTYEAR OF LIFE (1979);
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The Biosocial Study and its data are unique in this country. Few
researchers have conducted longitudinal studies of crime and behav-
ioral disorders,' 2 and no one has been able to intensively analyze a
large sample of individuals both before and after the start of their
criminal careers. Moreover, many studies examine only males or do
not focus on gender differences when they include both males and
females.' 3
As this Article discusses, the results of the Biosocial Study con-
firmed past research which had demonstrated gender differences in
the prevalence of crime. Males engaged in more crime and violence
than females, and they were more likely to repeat their crimes. How-
ever, the Biosocial Study also corresponded with some research and
theory which had indicated gender differences in the prediction of
crime. With some exceptions, biological factors were found to be
more predictive of crime among females, whereas environmental fac-
tors were found to be more predictive of crime among males.' 4 Also,
more factors overall were correlated with crime among females than
males. This Article considers the consequences of these results with
respect to whether there should be a gender-based standard for pun-
ishment or defenses.
This Article uses loose definitions of the terms "biological" and
"environmental" or "sociological," because of their close association
with related terms, and with one another. Generally, "biological" fac-
tors are "nonsocial, nonbehavioral measures of... constitution and
functioning,"15 such as neurological abnormalities. "Environmental"
factors include measures without a biological base, such as family in-
come. Factors comprising "behaviorally-defined characteristics," like
cognitive or intellectual ability and achievement, may have a partial
biological base,' 6 which a certain environment could perpetuate or
alter. The term "sex" refers to the chromosomal constitution of an
individual; the term "gender" refers to the sociological, psychological,
and cultural constructions of male and female differences.' 7 Lastly,
PAUL L. NIcHoLs & TA-CHuAN CHEN, MINiMAL BRAiN DysFUNCTION: A PROSPECTIVE STUDY
(1981).
12 See infra notes 123 to 131 and accompanying text.
13 Although prior research on the Biosocial Study examined gender differences, see
DENNo, BIOLOGy AN VioLENca, supra note 10, it emphasized possible variations in cogni-
tion, such as laterality and verbal and spatial IQ, as well as crime predictors that males and
females shared. It did not focus on gender in the theoretical and legal context discussed
in this Article.
14 See infra Section III.
15 Sarnoff A. Mednick et al., Biology and Vzolnce in CIuMNAL VIOLENCE 21, 22 (Marvin
E. Wolfgang & Neil Alan Weiner eds., 1982).
16 See id.
17 See Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 295-96. As Kruttschnitt notes, a reference to "sex
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the term "defenses" includes three types: (1) "complete" defenses,
such as insanity, which may result in total acquittal; (2) "partial" de-
fenses, such as provocation; and (3) mitigating factors, such as mental
impairment. These latter two defenses may reduce either the charge
(e.g., from murder to manslaughter) or the sentence (e.g., from life
imprisonment to twenty years).
Section II analyzes the literature and research on gender differ-
ences in crime. Section III describes the Biosocial Study and its re-
sults, noting the gender differences in the prevalence and prediction
of crime and the inability of any one factor to be a strong predictor of
crime. Relying on the Biosocial Study's results, this Article proposes a
new gender-based defense which incorporates the finding of gender
variations among predictors of crime. This "gender-variant" defense
recognizes that crime among females may be more strongly linked to
certain biological factors, such as neurological abnormalities, whereas
crime among males may be more strongly linked to certain environ-
mental factors, such as lead poisoning. Such results suggest that gen-
der is a factor in determining whether any particular condition
renders individuals less culpable for their behavior.
Section IV considers whether gender differences warrant dispa-
rate types of punishment or treatment within the criminal justice sys-
tem by analyzing the gender-variant defense within a continuum of
four gender-based defenses. This continuum ranges from biologi-
cally-based defenses to socially or culturally constructed ones: (1)
gender-specific (e.g., post partum depression); (2) gender-dominant
(e.g., high testosterone); (3) gender-variant (e.g., neurological factors
or lead poisoning); and (4) gender-cultural (e.g., battered woman syn-
drome). Commentators have rarely examined or compared these de-
fenses in the aggregate since they typically focus on just one. Yet,
looking at these defenses together, and more broadly, provides a per-
spective on how the criminal justice system views gender and gender-
stereotyping. These defenses have not been widely-used, but they are
rapidly gaining popularity. This Article questions whether they
differences" in any explanation of crime rates would suggest that the differences are bio-
logically-based; a reference to "gender differences," however, would recognize social, psy-
chological, and cultural influences. See id. at 296-97. Deborah Rhode properly discusses
the difficulty with this "sex-gender" distinction, noting for example the interaction and
interdependence between biological and social factors. See Deborah L. Rhode, Theoretical
Perspectives on Sexual Difference, in THEORETICAL PERSPEcrrvES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 1, 2
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990). She also critiques "a historical tradition that ascribed over-
riding importance to biological explanations for differences in the sexes' social roles and
status." Id. at 3. This Article relies on this sex-gender distinction, however, for the very
purpose that Rhode critiques it, i.e., to illustrate how cultural stereotyping can inappropri-
ately amplify biological differences between the genders through the use of certain crimi-
nal law defenses. Similarly, this Article recognizes that the distinction is artificial.
[Vol. 85
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should be accepted.
Next, this section discusses and critiques' the tendency for the
criminal law to view the more biologically-based defenses as manifesta-
tions of gender stereotypes and to explain the more culturally-con-
structed defenses in terms of supposed biological or psychological
gender differences. Even though defendants use stereotypes to make
their defenses more persuasive to ajury, they are frequently irrelevant
and have no basis in fact. Thus, courts should render them inadmissi-
ble. Moreover, gender-stereotyping stifles the criminal justice system's
"greater" goal of gender neutrality.'8 For example, a gender-stereo-
typed defense may appear to win an acquittal, but other factors, such
as severity of the crime, are actually far more influential on case out-
comes. Further, gender-stereotyping can result in personal stigmatiza-
tion, or harm men or women as a group.19 If poorly used, it can ease
conviction. 20 For these reasons, this section concludes that the poten-
tial harm of gender-stereotyping outweighs any perceived benefit.
Section V concludes that gender differences in prevalence and
prediction should not be considered in sentencing. Sentencing deci-
sions based upon generalizations about immutable individual charac-
teristics such as gender offend society's notions of justice. This
constitutes the worst form of stereotyping.
In sum, gender differences in prevalence or prediction or gen-
der-stereotyping should not justify either mitigations in punishment
or the underlying rationales for criminal law defenses, unless the de-
18 But see Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Mons, Battered Women, and Other
Sex-Based Anamolies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REv.
905, 909 (1993) (contending, with respect to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, that "the
lofty goal of gender neutrality has backfired, wreaking havoc in the lives of female offend-
ers and their children who are forgotten by the Sentencing Guidelines structure"); see also
infra notes 397 to 408 and accompanying text.
19 SeeAxLs.N M. DERSHOWrIZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER Cop-ourS, SOB STORIES, AND
EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 3
(1994); infra notes 343 to 353 and accompanying text. Alan Dershowitz includes gender-
stereotyped defenses among those he considers to be "abuse excuses," i.e., legal strategies
"by which criminal defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation."
DERSHOWrrz, supra, at 3. He claims that such excuses can: (1) stigmatize all abuse victims
even though only a very few have ever engaged in violent crime or have used their particu-
lar abuse to justify their conduct, see id. at 6, 29; (2) impair the credibility of sound defenses
that are used appropriately, see id. at 29; (3) "confirm the sexist stereotype of the woman
out of control"; see id. at 30; and hinder civil liberties by promoting vigilantejustice. See id.
at 28.
20 Gender-stereotyping can ease conviction in a particular case if the jury finds it to be
repugnant, see infra notes 267 to 268 and accompanying text, or future cases as a kind of
"backlash." For example, Charles P. Ewing, a psychologist and a law professor, claims that
one jury deadlocked in a substantial battered woman syndrome case as a "backlash" cre-
ated by the media coverage of the Eric and Lyie Menendez and Lorena Bobbitt cases. See
Stephanie B. Goldberg, Fault Lines, 80 A.BA. J. 40, 42 (June 1994).
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fenses are appropriately factually-based. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to discuss the evidentiary issues involved in such a fact-based
determination. At the same time, this Article's account of the Bi-
osocial Study and its critique of gender-based defenses illustrate ways
to make one. Lastly, this Article questions whether differential treat-
ment is warranted for distinguishing among biological factors other
than gender, given the results of the Biosocial Study and the dubious
rationale that the criminal law offers for some biological defenses, but
not others.
II. THE NATURE AND PREVALENCE OF GENDER DIFFERENCES IN CRIME
Males comprised eighty-eight percent of those persons arrested
for violent crime in 199221 and approximately ninety-five percent of
new court commitments for violent offenses in 1991.22 Most conven-
tional theories of crime do not sufficiently explain the overwhelming
domination of males in violent crime.23 Yet, because crime and vio-
lence are associated with maleness, society deems women who engage
in crime to be "doubly deviant"-defying both the law and their gen-
der role.2 4 As the following sections show, this perspective toward fe-
male criminals has remained constant.
A. A HISTORICAL VIEW OF FEMALE CRIME
Historically, commentators have explained women's lesser in-
volvement in crime as an "underachievement"25 attributable to their
biology or sexuality.2 6 Moreover, they have often confused sex with
21 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Table 42 at 234 (1992).
22 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CORRECTIONS REPORTING PROGRAM, 1991
Table 1-8 at 15, Table 5-4 at 57 (1992) (In 1991, males comprised 95% of new court com-
mitments to state prison and 93.1% of new court commitments to federal prison).
23 See MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 2-4. For a review of the literature on the etiology
of female crime, see CAROL SMART, WOMEN, CRIME, AN CRIMINOLOGr. A FEMINIST CRI-
TIQUE, 27-76 (1976); Dorie Klein, The Etiology of Female Crime: A Review of the Literature in
WOMEN, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 70, 70-105 (Susan KY Datesman & Frank R. Scarpitti eds.,
1980); Kathleen Daly & Meda Chesney-Lind, Feminism and Criminology, 5 JuST. Q. 497, 514-
27 (1988).
24 See Baskin, et al., supra note 4, at 402; Coughlin, supra note 19, at 3; Patricia Erickson
& Glenn F. Murray, Sex Differences in Cocaine Use and Experiences: A Double Standard Revived?,
15 AM. J. DRUG ALCOHOL ABUSE 135, 136 (1989). This position for female offenders was
recognized by Cesare Lombroso at the turn of the century. "[T ]he born female criminal is,
so to speak, doubly exceptional, as a woman and as a criminal. For criminals are an excep-
tion among civilised people, and women are an exception among criminals...." CESARE
LOMBROSO & WILLIAM FERRERO, THE FEMALE OFFENDER 151 (1895).
25 Beverly R. Fletcher & Dreama G. Moon, Introduction, in WOMEN PRISONERS: A FOR-
GOTTEN POPULATION 5, 12 (Beverly R. Fletcher et al. eds., 1993).
26 As Carol Smart notes, classical studies of female criminality are based upon a biologi-
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gender, characterizing crime among females as masculine or malelike,
a perspective that remains in current research on female crime.2 7
Cesare Lombroso, an Italian physician, was the first to explain
female crime in this manner.28 Near the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, Lombroso espoused his belief that criminals possess an innate
and "atavistic" predisposition toward crime.2 9 Lombroso and William
Ferrero attributed women's lower crime rate to their "piety, maternity,
want of passion, sexual coldness, weakness, and undeveloped intelli-
gence."30 Women criminals, however, were deficient in such typical
feminine characteristics. Instead, they exhibited "strong passions and
intensely erotic tendencies," as well as high intelligence and physical
strength.3' Still, society believed that women criminals were capable
only of a lower level of criminality because, as women, they lacked the
"combination of intellectual functions" required of more demanding
(i.e., masculine) crimes, such as highway robbery, murder, and
assault.32
Early socialist criminologists, emphasizing the importance of eco-
nomic conditions on crime, criticized Lombroso's theories.33 How-
ever, Willem Bonger, a prominent socialist criminologist, shared
Lombroso's views34 -despite his emphasis on economic conditions.
According to Bonger, women commit fewer crimes because they have
less "strength and courage" than men.3 5 Likewise, women are not in-
volved in "sexual crimes" both because they are physically unable to
cal determinist view that emphasizes a "non-cognitive, physiological" explanation for
crimes committed by women. See SMART, supra note 23, at 27.
27 See id. at 33.
28 For a thorough profile of Lombroso's life and work, see Marvin E. Wolfgang, Cesare
Lombroso, 1835-1909, in PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOcy 232 (Hermann Mannheim ed., 1955; 2d
ed. 1973).
29 See CESARE LOMBROsO, CRIMINAL MAN 135 (1911). According to Lombroso,
"[a]tavism, the reversion to a former state, is the first feeble indication of the reaction
opposed by nature to the perturbing causes which seek to alter her delicate mechanism."
Id.
80 LOMBROSO & FERRERO, supra note 24, at 151.
31 Id. Lombroso describes female offenders as more masculine. "Her maternal sense is
weak because psychologically and anthropologically she belongs more to the male than to
the female sex." Id. at 153.
32 See CESARE LOMBROsO, CRIM: ITs CAusEs AND REMEDIES 185 (1911) ("To conceive an
assassination, to make ready for it, to put it into execution demands, in a great number of
cases at least, not only physical force, but a certain energy and a certain combination of
intellectual functions. In this sort of development women almost always fall short of
men.").
33 See MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 6; see alsoWolfgang, supra note 28, at 257-71, for a
more modern critique of Lombroso's theories and research.
34 See MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 6.
35 WILLEM BONCER, CmMiNA=LrrY AND ECONOMIC CONDITONs 60 (1916).
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commit them,36 and because "the role of women in sexual life (and
thus in the criminal sexual life) is rather passive than active."37 Thus,
Bonger emphasized both the impact of women's biology and their so-
cial conditions and positions in capitalist societies, as the reasons for
their lower crime rate.38 In 1923, W.I. Thomas continued this sexual
nature-nurture theme depicting female criminality as primarily the re-
sult of sexual "demoralization," evidenced by casual sexual relations
and poor socialization.39 Indeed, a 1926 treatise on cocaine addiction
viewed female cocaine users as particularly sexually "insatiable" under
the drug's influence. The authors believed that such sexuality was the
"stimulus" for later addiction and prostitution. 40
Postwar views of female crime further emphasized sexuality and
biological and sociological influences. For example, scholars com-
pare Otto Pollak's book, The Criminality of Women, 41 to the works of
Lombroso, Ferrero, and Thomas, because it takes a similar approach
to the study of female crime.42 Unlike Lombroso and Ferrero, Pollak
did not rely entirely on a biological analysis, yet he did recognize the
significance of biological and physiological foundations to female
crime in the context of social and cultural influences.
According to Pollak, females are inherently manipulative and de-
ceitful, characteristics derived from a number of their physiological
and social attributes. 43 These include their passive roles during sexual
intercourse and their ability to feign arousal, as well as social norms
requiring women to hide menstruation and sexual information from
children.44 Such deceit allows females to conceal their crimes which,
36 See id.
37 Id.
38 See id. at 59-64.
39 See WILLIAM I. THOMAS, THE UNADJUSTED GIR. 98-150 (1923). Correspondingly, in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, middle-class women could be acquitted
for shop-lifting by attributing their behavior to kleptomania, then considered to be a
"mental disorder" caused by "womb disease mania." It was believed that the disease lead to
"larceny and eroticism with hysteria." ELAINE S. ABELSON, WHEN LADIES Go A-THIEVING:
MIDDLE-CLASS SHOPLIFTERS IN THE VICTORIAN DEPARTMENT STORE 173-76 (1989).
40 See ORIANAJossEAU KALANT, MAIER'S COCAINE ADDICTION 82 (1987) (translating DER
KOKAINISMUS (1926)).
41 Oro POLLAK, THE CRIMINALITY OF WOMEN (1950).
42 See SMART, supra note 23, at 46.
43 See POLLAK, supra note 41, at 8-10.
44 See id. at 10. As Pollak explained, a man "must achieve an erection in order to per-
form the sex act and will not be able to hide his failure." Id. For women, however,
lack of orgasm does not prevent her ability to participate in the sex act. It cannot be
denied that this basic physiological difference may well have a great influence on the
degree of confidence which the two sexes have in the possible success of concealment
and thus on their character pattern in this respect.
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if detected, would be similar in frequency to males'. 45 Pollak particu-
larly emphasized the significance of women's "generative" phases-
menstruation, pregnancy, and menopause-as illustrations of the bio-
logical or psychological imbalances leading to crime.46 Like Bonger,
however, Pollak also attributed women's criminality to gender ine-
quality in society.47
Pollak's theory, as well as other earlier theories of female crime,
has been criticized.48 Moreover, researchers have begun to rely more
heavily on sociological explanations of women's lower criminality.
They focus in particular on the propensity for society to more strongly
persuade girls than boys to avoid delinquent behavior4 9 and risk tak-
ing.50 Essentially, society expects girls to follow'biologically and cul-
turally based "gender norms."5 ' Although some researchers maintain
that crime among females has increased as a consequence of growing
gender equality,5 2 others discount this explanation, focusing instead
on the greater formalization of social control. 5  Social control theo-
rists contend that the increase in arrests of female offenders is due to
changes in law enforcement and reporting practices that create more
consistent standards for decision making when an arrest is made.
These changes reduce the effects of gender on the probability of
arrest and the amount of "hidden" female crime.54
45 See id. at 5-6.
46 See id. at 157. "[T]hese generative phases are frequently accompanied by psychologi-
cal disturbances which may upset the need and satisfaction balance of the individual or
weaken her internal inhibitions, and thus become causative factors in female crime." Id.
47 See id. at 2-3.
48 See FRANcEs HEIDENSOHN, WOMEN AND CRIME 120-21 (1985); SMART, supra note 23, at
46-53 (1976).
49 See Greenberg, supra note 1, at 407-09; Ruth Morris, Attitudes Toward Delinquency by
Delinquents, Non-Delinquents, and Their Friends, 5 BRmsH J. CRIMINOLOGY 249, 265 (1965);
Raeder, supra note 18, at 909.
50 SeeJouu HAGAN, STRuCruRAL CRIMINOLOGY 158 (1989); John Hagan & Fiona Kay,
Gender and Delinquency in White-Collar Families: A Power-Control Perspective; 36 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 391, 391-407 (1990).
51 See Darrell Steffensmeier & Emilie Anderson Allan, Sex Differences in Urban Arrest Pat-
terns, 1934-1979, 23 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 37, 37-50 (1981).
52 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
53 For a discussion of this debate, see Steffensmeier (1993), supra note 4, at 411-41;
Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Development and Female Crime: A Cross-National Test of Alternative
Explanations, 68 Socr_. FORCES 262, 262-83 (1989); Darrell Steffensmeier et al., World War
II and Its Effect on the Sex Dfferential in Arrests: An Empirical Test of the Sex-Role Equality and
Crime Proposition, 21 SOCiOLOoICAL Q. 403, 403-06 (1980); Darrell Steffensmeier & Cathy
Streifel, Time-Series Analysis of the Female Percentage of Arrests for Property Crimes, 1960-1985: A
Test of Alternative Explanations, 9 JusT. Q. 77, 77-103 (1992); Darrell Steffensmeier & Cathy
Streifel, Age, Gender, and Crime Across Three Historic Periods: 1935, 1960 and 1985, 69 SocIAL
FORCES, 869, 870-71 (1991).
54 See Steffensmeier & Streifel (1992), supra note 53, at 77-103.
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B. A MODERN VIEW OF FEMALE CRIME
The social-biological approach persists in more recent research
on female crime which has focused on a variety of factors: parental
deprivation and an inability to adjust to "feminine roles;"55 psychiatric
and familial disorders and impaired physical health;56 sexual corrup-
tion;5 7 conduct disorders;58 and premenstrual and menstrual syn-
dromes. 59 Commentators have criticized the methodology of these
studies,60 and their results remain inconclusive.
For example, most research has focused on females who commit
minor offenses such as prostitution or drug use, and therefore may
not vary significantly from nonoffenders. Research results are
stronger when a study compares either nonoffenders or minor offend-
ers to violent or habitual female offenders.
Researchers have linked violence among females to a host of fac-
tors: homosexuality, alcohol abuse, and psychiatric disturbances; 61
neurological abnormalities and problems with impulse control;62 se-
vere maternal loss, parental punishment, and neurological disorders
among relatives;63 and poor medical histories (indicated by injuries
and perinatal and neurological abnormalities).64 Although some re-
search reports lower intelligence and achievement levels among fe-
male delinquents, 65 additional research indicates that other factors
are more important contributors to female crime.66
Familial and environmental factors are more consistently signifi-
cant. For example, considerable evidence shows that a broken home
55 See MABEL RUTH FERNALD ET AL., A STUDY OF WOMEN DELINQUENTS IN NEW YORK
STATE 525-26 (1986); CLYDE B. VEDDER & DORA B. SOMERVILLE, THE DELINQUENT GIRL 49-
50, 153-54 (1970).
56 SeeJOHN COWIE ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN GIRLS 169-79 (1968).
57 See Erickson & Murray, supra note 24, at 137.
58 See Kratzer & Hodgins, supra note 3.
59 See infra notes 269 to 303.
60 See, e.g., SMART, supra note 23, at 54-76 (1976); Denno, supra note 10, at 619-45;
Deborah W. Denno, Sex Differences in Cognition and Crime: Early Developmental, Bio-
logical, and Sociological Correlates 35-73 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania); Erickson & Murray, supra note 24, at 137.
61 See David A. Ward et al., Crimes of Violence by Women, in WOMEN, CRIME, AND JUSTICE
171, 171-91 (Susan K. Datesman & Frank 1. Scarpitti eds., 1980).
62 See Carlos E. Climent et al., Epidemiological Studies of Female Prisoners. IV. Homosexual
Behavior, 164J. NERV. & MENTAL DISEASE 25, 25-29 (1977).
63 See Carlos E. Climent et al., Epidemiological Studies of Women Prisoners. I. Medical and
Psychiatric Variables Related to Violent Behavior, 130 Am. J. PSYCH. 985, 985-90 (1973).
64 See Shelley S. Shanok & Dorothy 0. Lewis, Medical Histories of Female Delinquents:
Clinical and Epidemiological Findings, 38 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCH. 211, 211-13 (1981).
65 See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 116.
66 See Climent et al., supra note 63, at 985-90; David R. Offord & Mary F. Poushinsky,
School Performance, IQ and Female Delinquency, 27 INT'LJ. SOCIAL PSYCH. 53, 53-62 (1982).
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is one of the strongest predictors of delinquency among females. 67
Yet, the research is mixed with respect to whether a broken home or
other negative family experiences have a greater impact on males or
on females. 68 Some researchers contend that the consequences of
family disorganization are more detrimental for females in light of the
greater importance of the family for their supervision and attachment
to conventional norms.69 Others believe that the effects of family life
show either no gender differences"0 or that stressful life events are
more strongly associated with behavioral problems among males than
among females.71 One recent study concluded that the relationship
was more complex, noting that the greater vulnerability of males or
females may depend on the particular risk factor being analyzed (e.g.,
marital stability and change). 72 For example, researchers found a sig-
nificant association between delinquency among females and negative
family events such as marital discord, recent marital disruption, and
living in a single-parent home. They did not find any associations be-
tween those events and delinquency among males. Instead, males
were more likely to appear depressed and anxious in the face of their
parents' marital dissolution.73
Similar to research on the correlates of male delinquency, results
with females may vary according to different samples and method-
ological techniques.74 In general, however, research results show the
following with respect to gender differences in the prediction of
crime: (1) With some exceptions, 75 the factors found to be influential
67 See COwIE ET AL., supra note 56, at 164-65; Susan L Datesman & Frank R. Scarpitti,
Female Delinquency and Broken Homes: A Reassessmen in WoMEN, CRIME, ANDJUSrICE 129, 129
(Susan K Datesman & Frank R. Scarpitti eds., 1980). This finding may be influenced by
the racial composition of the sample. For example, one analysis of female violence showed
no evidence of lower intelligence scores or a higher incidence of broken homes among
offenders, while controlling for race. SeeWard et al., supra note 61, at 171-91. However, in
one study, loss of a father before age 10 was found to be highly correlated with depression
among violent female offenders. See Carlos E. Climent et al., Parental Loss, Depression and
Violence, IfI. Epidemiological Studies of Female Prisoners, 55 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA
261, 261-68 (1977).
68 See Maude Domfeld & Candace Kruttschnitt, Do the Stereotypes Fit? Mapping Gender
Specific Outcomes and Risk Factors, 30 CRIuMINOLOGY 397, 397 (1992).
69 See Datesman & Scarpitti, supra note 67, at 129; Steffensmeier & Allan, supra note 1,
at 73-74.
70 See Canter, supra note 3, at 149-67; Dornfeld & Kruttschnitt, supra note 68, at 397.
71 See Dornfeld & Kruttschnitt, supra note 68, at 397.
72 See ii.
73 See id. at 409-12. Because the sample in this study was young (the great majority of
subjects were under age 16), the authors rightly emphasize that the results of their study
could change if the subjects were older. See id. at 407, 413.
74 See generally DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10.
75 For example, there is some evidence that some minor physical anomalies may be
associated with hyperactive behavior among boys but not with hypoactive behavior among
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in crime among males are also influential in crime among females;76
and (2) because society places stricter cultural constraints on female
behavior,77 females who become delinquent or violent appear to devi-
ate more significantly from the norm-biologically, psychologically,
or sociologically-than their male counterparts. 78 Thus, females who
decide to engage in crime "must traverse a greater moral and psycho-
logical distance than males. '7 9
C. GENDER AND PREVALENCE
Gender differences in the prediction of crime may substantially
girls. The bases for these differences could be attributed to biological factors (e.g., differ-
ent hormonal or central nervous system structures) or socialization processes that accentu-
ate behavioral problems among boys but inhibit them among girls. See Mary F. Waldrop et
al., Minor Physical Anomalies and Inhibited Behavior in Elementary School Girls, 17 J. CHILD Psy-
CHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY & ALLIED DISCIPLINES 113, 113-22 (1976).
76 See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 115-16; Steffensmeier & Allan, supra note
1, at 71; Romanowski, supra note 3, at 204. The research of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck
on both males and females has had comparable results. Compare generally SHELDON
GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, FIVE HUNDRED DELINQUENT WOMEN (1934) with SHELDON
GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, FIVE HUNDRED CRIMINAL CAREERS (1930). According to
Steffensmeier and Allan, supra note 1,
[g]roups or societies that have high male rates of crime also have high female rates,
whereas groups or societies that have low male rates also have low female rates. Over
time, when the male rate rises, declines, or holds steady across a specific historic pe-
riod, the female rate behaves in a similar fashion. This suggests that the rates of both
sexes are influenced by similar social and legal forces, independent of any condition
unique to women.
Id. at 71.
77 Steffensmeier & Allan, supra note 1, at 71.
[I]t is probable that the lower involvement of girls in delinquency continues to be
primarily related to existing socialization patterns, in particular the greater restrictions
placed on the freedom of movement of most girls at the age when their male peers are
"discovering" delinquency.... The realization of a lack of access to illegitimate oppor-
tunity structures for adolescent girls and women is of course a most perceptive insight
into an understanding of female criminality.
SMART, supra note 23, at 68.
78 See COWIE ET ., supra note 56, at 166; C. Robert Cloninger et al., Implications of Sex
Differences in the Prevalences of Antisocial Personality, Alcoholism, and Criminality for Familial
Transmission, 35 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 941, 941-51 (1978); C. Robert Cloninger et al., The
Multfactorial Model of Disease Transmission: II. Sex Differences in the Familial Transmission of
Sociopathy (antisocial personality), 127 BRrrIsHJ. PSYCH. 11, 11-22 (1975).
79 Steffensmeier & Allan, supra note 1, at 71; see also WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note
1, at 117 ("If aggression or its antisocial expression is stronger in the average male than the
average female, then females would be less likely to pass over the threshold into criminal
behavior and, when they did, they would be more atypical, or deviant, among women than
male offenders are among men."). Lombroso drew a similar, albeit more strongly put,
conclusion:
As a double exception [to her gender and to criminality], the criminal woman is conse-
quently a monster. Her normal sister is kept in the paths of virtue by many causes,
such as maternity, piety, weakness, and when these counter influences fail, and a wo-
man commits a crime, we may conclude that her wickedness must have been enor-
mous before it could triumph over so many obstacles.
LoMBROSO & FERRERO, supra note 24, at 152.
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affect differences in prevalence. Gender becomes particularly impor-
tant when assessing the "criminal careers"80 of individual offenders,
because predictive influences may vary depending on an individual's
age and physiological development. An analysis of a criminal career
focuses on two key elements: (1) participation-the difference be-
tween those who do or do not commit a crime; and (2) frequency-the
number of crimes an active offender commits.81 Certain factors, such
as the offender's age at the initiation of a criminal career, the escala-
tion and desistance of the offender's criminal behavior, and the policy
approaches for restraining criminal careers, are influential in deter-
mining the onset and continuation of criminal careers. The most per-
tinent policies include the "three- strikes-and-you're-out" legislation
that Congress has included in the new federal Crime Bill,82 and which
is currently implemented in a number of states. 83
80 A criminal career is the depiction of the number and types of crimes committed by
an individual over a period of time. See 1 C~iMrNAL CAREms Am "CAREER CMmINALs" 12
(Albert Blumstein et a. eds., 1986).
81 See Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 318-19.
82 The federal statute imposing penalties for manufacture or distribution of controlled
substances already contains a provision that if a "person commits a violation... of this title
after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final, such
person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release... "
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b) (1) (A) (West Supp. 1994). In addition, the recently enacted federal
Crime Bill contains a provision that "a person who is convicted in a court of the United
States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if. (A) the person
has been convicted (and those convictions have become final) on separate prior occasions
in a court of the United States or of a State of: (i) 2 or more serious violent felonies; or (ii)
one or more serious violent felonies and one or more serious drug offenses...." H.R. REP.
No. 711, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., title VIII, § 70001, 1994 WL 454841 (1994). Furthermore,
the portion of the Crime Bill allocating federal funding to states in need of prison space
attempts to induce states to enact similar legislation. It requires that, in order to be eligi-
ble for funding, states "shall demonstrate that the State: (1) has in effect laws which re-
quire that persons convicted of violent crimes serve not less than 85 percent of the
sentence imposed; or (2) since 1993: (A) has increased the percentage of convicted violent
offenders sentenced to prison; (B) has increased the average prison time which will be
served in prison by convicted violent offenders sentenced to prison; (C) has increased the
percentage of sentences which will be served in prison by violent offenders sentenced to
prison; and (D) has in effect at the time of application laws requiring that a person who is
convicted of a violent crime shall serve not less than 85 percent of the sentence imposed if:
(i) the person has been convicted on 1 or more prior occasions in a court of the United
States or of a State of a violent crime or a serious drug offense; and (ii) each violent crime
or serious drug offense was committed after the defendant's conviction of the preceding
violent crime or serious drug offense." I& at tit. II, § 20102.
83 For example, Washington places third-time felons and fourth-time fraudulent misde-
meanors in prison for life. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (West 1994). California sets
forth a number of specific violent crimes for which three-time felons receive twenty year
sentences and four-time felons receive life without parole. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.7 (West
1994). Florida sentences those with two prior felony convictions to life, 30 years, or 10
years, depending on the degree of the current felony. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West
1994). Texas sentences third-time felons to "life, or for any term of not more than 99 years
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The limited research that has compared violent male and female
career criminals has found substantial differences: (1) although vio-
lent offenses comprise only a small percentage of all the offenses com-
mitted by offenders in any population, females participate in
substantially less violent crime than males during the course of their
criminal careers;8 4 (2) the careers of violent females both begin and
peak earlier than those of males;8 5 (3) females are far less likely than
males to repeat their violent offenses; and (4) females are far more
likely to desist from further violence.8 6
Other researchers have shown, however, that although females
are far less apt to participate in serious criminal activity than males,
once they do participate, they commit crime at a comparable rate.8 7
These researchers suggest that the large differences reported for
males and females in aggregate crime statistics may be due to the dif-
ferences found in rates of participation, not in frequency of offend-
ing.88 This is a viable suggestion, but the limited amount of research
comparing gender differences in crime rates prevents certainty. The
next section of this Article demonstrates that comparisons between
male and female offenders in the Biosocial Study did not support this
proposal; males had both higher rates of participation in crime, as
well as greater frequency in offending.8 9
or less than 25 years." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West 1994). Alabama adopted a
scheme which sentences second-, third-, and fourth-time felons more harshly based on the
class of the offense, with the result being life without parole or similarly long sentences.
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1977). Arkansas has a similar 'class of the offense' scheme that re-
sults in sentences ranging from three years to life without parole. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-
501 (Michie 1987). Kentucky sentences second-time felons "for the next highest degree
than the offense for which convicted" and third-time felons from ten years to life, without
parole. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1971). Minnesota sentences
third-time sex criminals to life. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.346 (West 1994). Indiana allows
third-time felons to be given sentences three times longer than the presumptive sentence
for the crime, and third-time violent felons to be given life sentences without parole. IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (Bums 1994). Illinois sentences certain third-time felons to "natu-
ral life imprisonment." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 (Michie 1993). Colorado sentences third-time
felons to "three times the maximum of the presumptive range" and fourth-time felons to
four times that, or "at least forty calendar years". COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-13-101 (West
1994). Maryland sentences third-time felons to 25 years and fourth-time felons to life with-
out possibility of parole. MD. CODE ANN. 1957, Art. 27, § 643b.
84 See Neil Alan Weiner, Violent Criminal Careers and Violent Career Criminals, in VIoLETr
CRIME, VIOLErr CRIMINALS 35, 49, 56, 121 (Neil Alan Weiner & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds.,
1989); 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS," supra note 80, at 40.
85 See Weiner, supra note 84, at 102.
86 See id. at 108-09.
87 See 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS," supra note 80, at 67.
88 See id. Kruttschnitt notes that the differences in results among research studies may
be due to the different kinds of data sets that the researchers used. See Kruttschnitt, supra
note 2, at 319-20.
89 See infra notes 133 to 153 and accompanying text.
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Gender differences in the prevalence and seriousness of crime
hold within all ethnic groups, but in different magnitudes. For exam-
ple, there are fewer gender differences in the prevalence of crime
among black offenders relative to white offenders. Further, the dis-
crepancy in crime rates between black females and white females is
considerably greater than the discrepancy between black males and
white males. 90 In some studies, however, black females have demon-
strated a higher incidence of violence than white males,91 a disparity
some have attributed to a differential exposure to poverty.92 In gen-
eral, there has been relatively little crime research on blacks, a limita-
tion that has been roundly criticized.93
The following sections of this Article examine possible gender
differences in crime within a sample of black males and females, rely-
ing on an unusually rich data base of biological, psychological, and
sociological variables. These sections focus on two issues: (1) differ-
ences in prevalence, with a particular emphasis on criminal careers,
and (2) differences in prediction and how it may be interrelated with
prevalence. Prevalence is important in determining the nature and
extent of gender differences in crime and violence and in examining
whether such differences justify gender-based standards of punish-
ment or sentencing. Prediction is important in assessing what factors
may have contributed to criminal acts over various developmental
stages and, more particularly, why there may be some gender differ-
ences in the types of predictors. This approach also enables some in-
vestigation of the suggestion that biological factors can better explain
crime among females, whereas social or environmental factors can
better explain crime among males.94 Whether such differences
should justify differences in punishment, or gender-based defenses, is
addressed in the last part of this Article.
90 See Susan K. Datesman & Frank R. Scarpitti, The Extent and Nature of Female Crime, in
WOMEN, CRIME, AND JusTicE 3, 3-64 (Susan L Datesman & Frank R. Scarpitti eds., 1980);
Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 311-12; Lee H. Bowker, The Incidence of Female Crime and Delin-
quenc--A Comparison of Official and Self-Report Statistics, 1 ITNr'L J. WOMEN'S STUDIES 178,
178-92 (1978).
91 See Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 311-12; Baskin et al., supra note 4; Bowker, supra
note 90, at 178-92; Roland Chilton & Susan K. Datesman, Gender, Race, and Crime: An Anal-
ysis of Urban Arrest Trends, 1960-1980, 1 GENDER & Soc'y 152, 152-71 (1987); Gary D. Hill &
Elizabeth M. Crawford, Women, Race, and Cime, 28 CrIMINOLOGY 601, 601-23 (1990);John
H. Laub & M.Joan McDermott, An Analysis of Serious Crime by Young Black Women, 23 CIuMI-
NOLOGY 81, 81-98 (1985).
92 See Baskin et al., supra note 4.
93 See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
94 See SMART, supra note 23, at 56.
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III. THE BiosocIAL STUDY OF CRIME
The 987 subjects who participated in the Biosocial Study were
born at Philadelphia's Pennsylvania Hospital between 1959 and 1962.
The subjects and their families were originally part of the Collabora-
tive Perinatal Project, one of the largest-medical projects ever con-
ducted in the United States.95 Each one of the subjects was black
because there were too few white subjects to study, and because, at the
time, commentators had complained that little research had been de-
voted to studying crime among black youths.96 The sample was se-
95 In 1957, the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke launched the
Collaborative Perinatal Project, a nationwide study of biological and environmental influ-
ences on pregnancy, and infant and childhood mortality, as well as physical, neurological,
and psychological development in children. Nearly 60,000 pregnant women participated
in the study between 1959 and 1966 in 15 different medical centers. One of these medical
centers was located in Philadelphia. Examination of the children from the time of their
birth through age seven continued until 1974. See NISWANDER & GORDON, supra note 11, at
3-7.
The Philadelphia Perinatal Project comprised the nearly 10,000 pregnant patients
who delivered their children at Pennsylvania Hospital between 1959 and 1965; the chil-
dren were later tested at Children's Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania. See id at 11.
All pregnant women who attended Pennsylvania Hospital during this time were included
in the Philadelphia Perinatal Project if they wanted to be, except for those women who
were unregistered emergency deliveries or who were planning to deliver elsewhere. The
total sample in the Philadelphia Perinatal Project reflects, in part, the characteristics of
families who would be interested in receiving inexpensive maternity care provided by a
public clinic. The sample was comprised predominantly (87%) of black families whose
socioeconomic levels were slightly lower than those of the United States population at the
time. See id. at 10, 475, 498. In 1978, the National Institute ofJustice awarded a grant to
the Sellin Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law at the University of Penn-
sylvania to examine the Philadelphia Perinatal Project children. As part of the grant, pub-
lic school and police record data were collected on all 10,000 youths. For eight years
thereafter, detailed data were organized and analyzed on a subsample consisting of the
nearly 1000 individuals who constituted the subjects for the Biosocial Study. These 1000
subjects were selected from the first four years (1959-62) or from "cohorts" of 2958 black
mothers who participated in the Philadelphia Perinatal Project. A "cohort" is "[a] ny group
that passes through a set of experiences or institutions at the same time." NEALE & LIEB-
ERT, supra note 9, at 309.
96 The Biosocial Study's research on black youths was initiated in 1980 at a time when
black commentators were criticizing the Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion ("Office") for spending most (80%) of its monies researching white youths. See Wil-
liam Raspberry, Youth Crime Funds Go to the Whites, PHiLA. INQUIRER, Apr. 1, 1980, at 9A.
Essentially, commentators accused the Office of using crime statistics on black youths in
order to acquire money, which the Office would then spend on research or rehabilitation
programs for white youths. One result was that a growing number of white youths were
being removed from the criminal justice system through deinstitutionalization and diver-
sion programs, while a growing number of black youths were populating the prisons.
Some commentators claimed that the premise underlying such differential treatment was
that serious black offenders could not be similarly treated through counselling or diver-
sion. See id. Because of these claims, many federal programs providing research funding
on crime today urge grant applicants "to assess carefully the feasibility of including the
broadest possible representation of minority groups" in their samples. Dept. of Health and
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lected according to certain criteria to ensure that all subjects attended
Philadelphia public schools and remained in the city, and thus the
same urban environment, from the time of their birth to age twenty-
two.9 7 To test different theories of crime, the Biosocial Study used, in
addition to urban environment, three primary data sources: (1) the
Collaborative Perinatal Project's data set of early biological and envi-
ronmental factors; (2) public school records; and (3) official police
records for juveniles and adults.
The amount of data available for early biological and environ-
mental factors was extraordinarily comprehensive. Upon registration
for the Perinatal Project, each mother underwent a battery of inter-
views and physical examinations that provided data for each preg-
nancy, including the mother's reproductive history, recent and past
medical history, and labor and delivery events. Data recorded for
each child included information on neurological examinations con-
ducted at birth, throughout the hospital stay, at four months, and at
ages one and seven. Additionally, the children had their speech, lan-
guage, and hearing examined at ages three and eight. Researchers
collected socioeconomic and family data during the mother's registra-
tion and the child's seven-year examination.98
Philadelphia public school records also contained a variety of
Human Services, Public Health Service, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Nat'l Inst. on Alcohol Abuse
and Alcoholism, Program Announcement: Research on Relationships Between Alcohol and Violence
(June 1993). The racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the Biosocial Study's sample
(black and lower-class) limits the extent to which the results of the Study can be genera-
lized to other groups that may comprise individuals of a different race and socioeconomic
status, such as middle-class whites. However, the demographic homogeneity of the Bi-
osocial Study's sample provides built-in "controls" for those racial and socioeconomic fac-
tors that have been strongly linked to crime and its determinants. See generally MARvn E.
WOLFGANG ET AL, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972). Therefore, it can be assumed
that the results of the Biosocial Study are not attributed to racial and socioeconomic varia-
tions among individuals.
97 These subjects were selected according to the following criteria: (1) attended a Phil-
adelphia public school, (2) stayed in Philadelphia from ages 10 through 17, (3) received
selected intelligence tests within six months of age seven and achievement tests at ages 13
and 14, and (4) did not have a sibling in the sample to prevent the possible biases that
could result in examining family members. Comparisons between the final sample of 987
subjects and the excluded sample of 2158 black subjects showed no significant differences
in key variables: total family income, per capita family income, the number of prenatal
examinations attended by the mother, the mother's age, and the distribution of males and
females. In general, the final sample appeared to be representative of the sample from
which it was drawn. See DENNo, BIOLocy AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 30.
98 Data were collected immediately after an event occurred. Highly structured forms
and manuals were used to ensure comprehensiveness and comparability among the coders
who recorded the data. All coders were either medical doctors or psychologists trained to
record data systematically. For descriptions of the numerous procedures used to ensure
reliability in the Project's coding, see NISWANDER & GORDON, supra note 11, at 17-19, 500-
24.
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data about each subject. The Biosocial Study relied predominately on
two types: (1) academic achievement during ages thirteen and four-
teen 99 and (2) evidence of learning or disciplinary problems. 100
In addition, the Biosocial Study collected official police records
for all subjects from ages seven to twenty-two. The Study used three
different measures of juvenile and adult crime: (1) number of of-
fenses; (2) categorization of juvenile offenders according to levels of
the most serious offense recorded (violence, property, and
nonindex);10 1 and (3) seriousness of offenses. 0 2
99 The California Achievement Test measured academic achievement in grades seven
and eight, which were attended during ages 13 and 14. Social scientists have described the
California Achievement Test as an excellent data source for measuring both verbal and
mathematical achievement. See DENNo, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 171-73.
Researchers have found a high correlation between that test and the other tests measuring
achievement that were administered in the Perinatal Project at age seven. Id. at 169.
Moreover, the standardization sample for the California Achievement Test allowed for
.proportionate representation in the national norms of minority group students in the
total school population." Id. at 171 (citation omitted). However, social scientists have
found evidence of test bias in a number of other psychological tests administered in the
Perinatal Project based upon a wide range of possible racial, socioeconomic, and cultural
influences. Id. at 173. Because the individuals in the Biosocial Study were racially and
socioeconomically homogenous, many of the factors most influential in creating test bias
did not exist in the Study's analyses.
100 Learning and disciplinary problems during school were measured, respectively, by
the presence of any record of the child's involvement in special school programs for those
classified as being mentally retarded or as having disciplinary problems. Children with
disciplinary problems were diagnosed as having normal intelligence but some record of
asocial behavior in school, including a history of starting fires, physical aggression toward
teachers, maladjustment to school, and conduct disturbance. The Philadelphia School
Board stated that any school's recommendation of a child to a special school program was
made independently of any knowledge of that child's official delinquency status. See id. at
32, 62-63.
101 See id. at 32. Violent offenders were those individuals who had a record of at least
one violent offense at any time during theirjuvenile criminal career. Violent offenses con-
sisted of murder, assault with intent to kill, aggravated assault, simple assault, rape, robbery
with injury, and any other offense that involved injury to the victim. Property offenders
had a record of at least one property-related offense, but no history of violent offenses.
Property-related offenses included vandalism, burglary, robbery without injury, and auto
theft. Nonindex offenders had a record of at least one nonindex offense, but no history of
violent or property-related offenses. Nonindex offenses comprised truancy, disorderly con-
duct, running away, fraud, and possession of alcohol, marihuana, or hard drugs. See id. at
39.
102 The method of ranking and scoring offense seriousness was based on a widely ac-
cepted and validated system of assigning numerical weights to different components of an
offense that was derived from a national survey of crime severity. See generally MARVIN E.
WOLFGANG ET AL., THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERr= (1985). The different compo-
nents of an offense included the seriousness of personal injury to the victim, the amount of
property theft or damage, the extent to which the victim was intimidated (e.g., through a
threat of gross bodily harm), the number of premises that the offender entered, and the
number of vehicles stolen. Id. at 129-36.
[Vol. 85
1994] GENDER, CIME, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 99
A. BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF CRIME
A multidisciplinary approach to crime is crucial for understand-
ing both why crime occurs and the conditions for any possible gender
differences. This approach also requires some sense of the Biosocial
Study sample's surroundings.
1. Urban, Socioeconomic, and Environmental Factors
When the Biosocial Study's subjects were young children, most
blacks with low incomes were concentrated in Philadelphia's inner
city areas, which were socially and culturally isolated.'03 It is difficult
to measure whether any improvement occured during the Study's
twenty-two year period.10 4 In Philadelphia and other large cities,
other types of problems had increased substantially since the 1960s,
such as homelessness,105 drug abuse,10 6 and the social isolation of the
ghetto.10 7 These factors have been found to be significant contribu-
tors to crime generally, 08 and to the likelihood of criminal behavior
among females in particular. 10 9
103 See CONRAD WEILER, PHILADELPHIA: NEIGHBORHOOD, AuTonR, AND THE URBAN CRT-
sis 181-82 (1974);John F. Bauman et al., Public Housing, Isolation, and the Urban Underclass,
17J. URB. Hisr. 264, 265, 273-86 (1991).
104 See ROGER LANE, WninAm DORSEY'S PHILADELPHIA AND OURS ON THE PAST AND FtrruRE
OF THE BLACK CrIY IN AMERICA 374409 (1991); William J. Wilson, The Ghetto Underclass and
the Social Transformation of the Inner City, in THE BLACK SCHOLAR at 10-11 (May/June 1988);
see generally WILLIAM J. STULL & JANICE FANNING MADDEN, POST-INDusR.L PHILADELPHIA:
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE METRoPoTrrAN ECONOMY (1990).
105 See Elaine R. Fox & Lisa Roth, Homeless Children: Philadelphia as a Case Study, 506
ANNALS AM. AcAD. Poi- & Soc. Sci. 141 (1989).
106 See, e.g., Michael deCourcy Hinds, Pennsylvania City Hopes It's Bouncing Back From the
Bottom, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, at Al4; Tom Morganthau, Children of the Underclass, NEws.
wEEK, Sept. 11, 1989, at 16.
107 See Wilson, supra note 104, at 14-16.
108 Evidence that crime is associated with community and urban factors was first investi-
gated on a large scale by Clifford Shah and Henry McKay in Chicago and other metropoli-
tan areas. See CUFFo.D R. SHAw & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DFUNQUENCY IN URBAN
AREAS (1972). A substantial amount of research since that time has confirmed their con-
clusion that high rates of crime are concentrated in areas where residents are deprived
socioeconomically. See Reiss & Roth, supra note 3, at 131-39; E. Britt Patterson, Poverty,
Income Inequality, and Community Crime Rates, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 755, 755-64 (1991) (reviewing
recent research on poverty and crime). Other researchers contend, however, that social
instability, and not socioeconomic deprivation, accounts for the association between com-
munity characteristics and crime. See Patterson, supra, at 762-63 (noting that although a
considerable amount of research demonstrates a link between poverty and crime, other
research has uncovered additional factors indicating a link between crime and factors asso-
ciated with social instability, including- residential mobility, family disorganization, and
population density); see also Richard Block, Community, Environment, and Violent Cime, 17
CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1979) (emphasizing factors other than poverty).
109 See, e.g., Baskin & Sommers, supra note 2, at 577 (showing that initiation into violent
street crime for the women offenders in their study was "influenced strongly by the neigh-
borhood environment").
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Aside from "controlling," or accounting for the effects of urban
environment, the Biosocial Study examined other kinds of socioeco-
nomic and environmental data, as well as indicators of family instabil-
ity or disorganization. These data included: parents' occupation,
education, and employment history; family income and size; religion;
welfare status; child's residence in a foster home; and number of per-
sons supported in the household. Many of these factors were
interrelated. 110
2. Biological and Psychological Factors
Biological and psychological theories of crime emphasize the
physiological and psychological capacities for individuals to adjust to
their environments and to learn appropriate behavior. Individuals
who show central nervous system disorders, delayed maturation, or
low intelligence test scores, for example, may be more vulnerable to
negative or stressful environments.'' These relationships exist re-
gardless of the racial or socioeconomic characteristics of those individ-
uals, although low income minorities are more likely to be raised in
stressful environments."12
In the Biosocial Study, indicators of developmental or psychologi-
cal theories were grouped very generally into six types: (1) early cen-
tral nervous system development (e.g., prenatal, perinatal, and
pregnancy complications and the Apgar score, which is an accepted
and validated scale of health and development immediately following
birth);113 (2) intelligence and cerebral dominance or laterality (e.g.,
measures of verbal and spatial ability, as well as indicators of cerebral
dominance or laterality, such as the child's hand, eye, and foot prefer-
ence, which are indicative of learning disabilities);114 (3) physical
110 For a description of how these variables were measured and interrelated, see DENNO,
BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 19-24.
111 See id. at 24-28.
112 See id. at 19.
113 The term "prenatal" refers to the period between conception and birth. The term
"perinatal" refers to the period near the time of birth. Considerable research points to
associations among prenatal and perinatal complications and central nervous system dys-
function. Generally, early brain damage, primarily due to hypoxia (a severe lack of oxy-
gen), may be related to later neuropsychiatric disturbances such as impaired intelligence
or achievement, attention-deficit disorder (minimal brain dysfunction), pathological cere-
bral dominance, and reading failure. Directly or indirectly through these disturbances,
pregnancy complication may also lead to general physical or behavioral disorders and de-
linquency. See id.
114 Evidence of anatomic and functional differences in the lateralization of the two (left
and right) hemispheres of the brain provides one explanation for intellectual variation in
the general population. "Lateralization" refers to the "localization of a psychological func-
tion in a single hemisphere." Bonnie Burstein et al., Sex Differences in Cognitive Functioning:
Evidence, Determinants, Implications, 23 HuMAN DEVELOPMENT 289, 204 (1980). Individuals
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growth and development (e.g., measures of height and weight);115 (4)
neurological status (e.g., "soft neurological signs" or lack of coordina-
tion); (5) attention deficit disorder and hyperactivity (e.g., evidence of
disciplinary problems in childhood and adolescence, as well as mixed
indicators of cerebral dominance or laterality and difficulty with left-
right identification); 16 and (6) general physical health (e.g., high
who are more lateralized tend to show greater hemispheric specialization in processing
information relative to less lateralized individuals. For most (right-handed) individuals,
the left cerebral hemisphere specializes in processing verbal stimuli-notably language
functions-in a sequential, analytic, and propositional mode, whereas the right hemi-
sphere specializes in processing nonverbal stimuli-particularly spatial functions-in a
nonlinguistic, holistic, and synthetic manner. WISC Verbal IQ and other verbal measures
are widely used indicators of left-hemispheric abilities; WISC Performance IQ and other
spatial measures are indicators of right-hemispheric abilities. Additional factors have also
been found to be associated with cerebral lateralization, most notably hand preference
and, to a lesser extent, eye and foot preference.
Generally, handedness, gender, and intellectual abilities show three basic interrela-
tionships reported in the literature: (1) a disproportionately higher incidence of males
and left-or-mixed-handers among children with language, reading, or learning disorders;
(2) evidence that the different patterns of hemispheric specialization in males and females
may be related to handedness; and (3) a higher incidence of left-handedness in males
relative to females.
Evidence that some left-handers tend to rely on the "less analytic, more emotional,
more impulsive response modes" associated with the right hemisphere has been used to
explain their greater involvement in delinquency and violence. This tendency may also
explain why left-handers and delinquents experience greater deficits in left hemisphere
tasks such as reading and language. Some investigators suggest a greater left hemisphere
deficit among both delinquents and poor readers irrespective of their lateral preference.
Other research points to a right hemisphere deficit among delinquents or evidence of
other symptoms of cerebral disorder, such as attention deficit disorder or what the earlier
literature labeled as minimal brain dysfunction. See DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, SUpra
note 10, at 13-15.
115 Physical growth, even at an early age, is one of several indicators of subsequent
health and development and physical maturation during adolescence. Relationships
among indicators of physical development and central nervous system and behavioral dis-
orders, however, are inconsistent. See DENNo, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 16.
116 The terminology for such conditions has changed over time. Today, the condition is
known as "attention deficit hyperactivity disorder." This Article will refer to the terms at-
tention deficit disorder and hyperactivity separately, however, (as is still done) because this
Article is based on older data that have been collected and analyzed with these particular
conditions in mind. Attention deficit disorder (ADD), or what much of the earlier litera-
ture termed minimal brain dysfunction, and hyperactivity are noted correlates of school
failure and delinquency. The term hyperactivity, in particular, describes the heterogenous
behaviors of children who show one or more of the following: overactivity, perceptual-
motor impairments, impulsivity, emotional lability, attention deficits, minor disturbances
of speech, intellectual defects (e.g., learning disabilities), clumsiness, and antisocial re-
sponses. By definition, children with below normal intelligence or very severe neurological
problems are excluded. Explanations for the causes of ADD include prenatal or birth
trauma, neurodevelopmental lag, psychogenic factors, minor physical anomalies, genetic
transmission, and poor living environment.
Generally, children with ADD indicate certain learning or behavioral deficiencies asso-
ciated with central nervous system dysfunctioning. Problem behaviors among ADD chil-
dren appear to correspond with age. For example, young children (ages 2 to 6 years) may
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blood pressure, pica, lead poisoning, and anemia)." 7
This research suggests that both biological and environmental in-
fluences, as well as gender, interact and cumulate as risk factors pre-
dictive of later mental and behavioral disorders. For example, males
"appear to be more vulnerable to all manner of environmental insult
and developmental difficulty."" 8 Overall, they experience a higher
incidence of prenatal and perinatal mortality and complications,
childhood diseases, reading and learning disorders, mental retarda-
tion," 9 as well as left-handedness and left hemisphere deficits. 120 The
incidence for most of these disorders is highest in socioeconomically
deprived or "stressed" circumstances.12' Likewise, researchers found a
disproportionate number of delinquents and criminals among indi-
viduals with cognitive and developmental difficulties.' 22
B. CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AT DIFFERENT AGES
Few studies have examined criminal behavior over a person's life
span.' 23 Uniform Crime Report data show, however, considerable dif-
ferences in the types and frequencies of arrests reported according to
age. In general, juveniles (ages ten to eighteen) are more likely than
young adults to have a police contact for property offenses and rela-
tively less serious crimes, whereas young adults (ages nineteen to
twenty-five) are more likely than juveniles to have a police contact for
exhibit lack of discipline and hyperactivity; older children (during elementary school and
adolescence) may demonstrate reading and learning disorders, academic underachieve-
ment, and delinquent or aggressive behaviors. Whereas central nervous system dysfunc-
tion may underlie some childhood disorders, evidence suggests that behavioral deviations
can result from developmental or maturational lags many children eventually do not out-
grow. Longitudinal follow-up studies indicate that children who do not outgrow behav-
ioral disorders may retain antisocial conduct into adulthood. See id. at 15-16.
117 See id. at 37-39.
118 June Machover Reinisch et al., Prenatal Influences on Cognitive Abilities: Data From Ex-
perimental Animals and Human Genetic and Endocrine Syndromes, in SEx-REAx-nD DIFFERENCES
IN CoGNrIvE FUNCTIONING: DEVELOPMENTAL IssuEs 215, 220 (Michele Andrisin Wittig &
Anne C. Petersen eds., 1979).
119 See id.
120 See Louise Carter-Salzman, Patterns of Cognitive Functioning in Relation to Handedness
and Sex-Related Differences, in SEx-RELATED DIFFERENCES IN COGNrrIVE FUNCTIONING: DEVEL-
OPMENTAL ISSUES 189, 204-09 (Michele Andrisin Wittig & Anne C. Petersen eds., 1979).
121 KATHERINE BUCK HOYENGA & KERMIT T. HOYENGA, THE QUESTION OF SEX DIFFER-
ENCES: PSYCHOLOGICAL, CULTURAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 236-37 (1979); DENNIS HERBERT
STOTT, STUDIES OF TROUBLESOME CHILDREN 9-61 (1966).
122 For a review of the literature, see DENNo, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10;
Terrie E. Moffitt, The Neuropsychology ofJuvenile Delinquency: A Critical Review, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVwEW OF RESEARCH 99 (Norval Morris & Michael Tonry eds., 1990);
Terrie E. Moffitt & Bill Henry, Neuropsychological Studies ofJuvenile Delinquency and Juvenile
Violence, in NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF AGGRESSION 67 (J. S. Milner ed., 1991).
123 See Marvin E. Wolfgang et al., Preface, in FROM Boy TO MAN, FROM DELINQUENCY TO
CRIME xiii (Marvin E. Wolfgang et al. eds., 1987).
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violent and serious crimes.124 Moreover, juveniles who evidence rela-
tively more aggressive childhood behavior or delinquent offenses are
more likely to be adult offenders than their less delinquent or nonde-
linquent counterparts. 125
Among both juveniles and adults, however, research shows that a
small percentage of individuals is responsible for the majority of po-
lice contacts. 126 For example, a longitudinal study of nearly 10,000
boys born in 1945, and living in Philadelphia from ages ten to eight-
een,127 determined that chronic offenders (those who have five or
more offenses) constituted only 6% of the entire cohort of boys and
18% of the offenders. However, chronic offenders were responsible
for over half (52%) of all police contacts in the cohort. 128 A subse-
quent study, of a cohort of Philadelphia boys born in 1958,129 showed
an increase in the number of offenses committed by chronic delin-
quents. Chronic delinquents comprised 7.5% of the cohort and 23%
of the offenders, yet they were responsible for 61% of all police con-
tacts in the cohort. 30 Research has also shown that a small group of
adult offenders is responsible for most adult offenses. 1 1
The behaviors and characteristics of chronic offenders are impor-
tant with respect to both social policy and criminal responsibility. For
example, "there is excellent evidence that some biological factors are
especially useful in distinguishing chronic offenders."' 32 Yet, only a
limited amount of research has examined gender distinctions among
124 See Frank E. Zimring, American Youth Violence: Issues and Trends, in CRIME AND JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REVIEWV OF RESEARCH 67, 72-86 (Norval Morris ed., 1979); see also Marvin E.
Wolfgang et al., Juvenile and Adult Criminal Careers, in FROM Boy TO MAN, FROM DELIN-
QUENCY TO CRIME 20, 32 (Marvin E. Wolfgang et al. eds., 1987) (noting that when criminal
careers are analyzed up to age 30, "the data clearly indicate that, regardless of offense type,
the offenses committed later in an individual's career were, on the average, much more
serious than those he committed earlier").
125 See DONALD J. WEsr & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, WHO BECOMES DELINQUENT? 11-14
(1973); David. Magnusson, et al., Aggression and Criminality in a Longitudinal Perspective in
PROSPECTIVE STUDIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 277, 277-301 (Sarnoff A. Mednick & Kath-
erine Van Dusen eds., 1983).
126 See HAmPAAN T m L., supra note 2; PAUL E. TRACY ET AL., DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN
Two BIRTH COHORTs 81-83 (1990); David Farrington, OffendingFrom 10 to 25 Years of Age in
PROSPECTIVE STUDIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 17, 17-37 (Sarnoff A. Mednick & Kathe-
rine Van Dusen eds., 1983); Lyle Shannon, A Longitudinal Study of Delinquency and Crime in
QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY 121, 121-46 (Charles Wellford ed., 1978).
127 See WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 96.
128 Id. at 247-48.
129 TRACY" Er AL., supra note 126.
130 Rd. at 83.
131 SeeJamesJ. Collins, The Disposition of Adult Arrests: Legal and Extralegal Determinants of
Outcomes, in FROM BOy TO MAN, FROM DELINQUENCY TO CRIME 68 (Marvin E. Wolfgang et al.
eds., 1987); Farrington, supra note 126, at 25.
132 Mednick et al., supra note 15, at 3.
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these individuals, or what may be the basis for these distinctions.
The following sections examine data on crime and violence in
the Biosocial Study sample to determine the nature and extent of gen-
der differences. Distributions of delinquency are outlined first, fol-
lowed by distributions of crime during young adulthood. The
discussion and illustrations for Figures 1-4 (Appendix C) pertain to
the distributions of data provided in Table 1 (Appendix C).
1. Juvenile Delinquency
Nearly 22% of the 987 youths had at least one police 'contact
prior to age eighteen. Thirty-three percent of the males had a police
contact, while only 14% of the females had one.133
As Figure 1 shows for both genders, the less serious nonindex
offenders predominate. More than 40% of the males, and nearly one
half of the females, were nonindex offenders. However, more females
(39%) were property offenders than males (34%).134 As expected,
gender disparities were greater for crimes of violence. Of the 151
males who became offenders by age eighteen, 36 (nearly 1/4) had a
police contact for at least one offense that involved violence or injury
to one or more persons. In contrast, only 8 (12%) of the 69 female
offenders had been involved in a violent or injury-related offense.'3 5
Overall, most of the delinquent behavior of both males and females
was nonviolent, although the amount of violent behavior was sizable-
especially among males.
a. Repeat and Chronic Delinquent Offenders
The number of offenses committed by these juveniles reflects
their repeat or chronic patterns of delinquency. The number ranged
133 See DENNO, BIoLocY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 40. The proportion of police
contacts, particularly for males, was somewhat lower in comparison to the proportion
found for other nonwhites raised in Philadelphia at a similar time. In a study of a cohort
of males and females who were born in 1958 and lived in Philadelphia, see TRACY ET AL.,
supra note 126, 41% of the nonwhite males and 18% of the nonwhite females experienced
a police contact prior to age 18. The generally lower prevalence of offense behavior
among the Perinatal Project youths may be due to several factors: (1) Perinatal Project
youths participated in a medical study for the first seven years of their lives and therefore
may have received certain physical and psychological benefits; (2) mothers of the Perinatal
Project youths, who were interested enough to participate in a study for seven years, may
have had a greater concern about the welfare of their offspring, (3) participation in the
Perinatal Project itself may have had a positive effect on youths; and (4) the sample of
nonwhites in the study in TRACY ET AL. may have comprised ethnic groups with higher
crime rates than blacks and thus rates for the group as a whole were inflated. See DENNO,
BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 40-41.
134 See DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 41-42.
135 See ida at 41.
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from 1 to a maximum of 27 offenses across ages seven to seventeen.
Consistent with past research, Figure 2 (Appendix C) shows that con-
siderably more females than males were one-time offenders: nearly
two-thirds of the female offenders, but less than one-half (45%) of the
male offenders, had only one police contact. Further, 38% of the
males and 25% of the females were nonchronic repeat offenders.' 36
As mentioned, one of the most important results reported in de-
linquency research' is the finding that chronic offenders are responsi-
ble for a highly disproportionate share of the total number of
offenses.' 37 The domination of chronic offenders in the amount of
crime, particularly serious crime, was striking in the present study.' 38
The 25 male chronic offenders represented 5% of the total male
sample, and 17% of all male delinquents. These chronic offenders,
however, accounted for 51% of the offenses committed by males.
Chronic female offenders represented only 1% of the female sample,
and 10% of the female delinquents. However, they accounted for
41% of the offenses committed by females. 39
Chronic offenders also committed a highly disproportionate
share of violent crimes. Among males the results were striking:
chronic offenders were responsible for 61% of the violent offenses
committed by males, 55% of the property offenses, and 46% of the
nonindex offenses. Chronic female offenders accounted for 40% of
the violent offenses committed by females, 30% of the property of-
fenses, and 48% of the nonindex offenses. Thus, although both male
and female chronic offenders dominated the amount of offense be-
havior, female chronics committed fewer and less severe crimes than
their male counterparts.
b. Incidence and Seriousness of Delinquency
Gender differences in the incidence and seriousness of delin-
quency.are also important considerations. Altogether, the sample of
987 youths committed 588 offenses between the ages of seven and sev-
enteen. Males were responsible for 443, or three quarters of those
offenses; females were responsible for 145, or one quarter. 40
Males committed relatively more violent offenses: 64 (14%) in-
volved violence or injury; 155 (35%) involved property theft or dam-
age; and 224 (51%) were nonindex offenses. In contrast, among
females, 10 (7%) of the offenses involved violence; 51 (35%) involved
136 See id at 42-43.
137 See TaCY Er AL., supra note 126; WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 127.
138 See DENNO, BIOLOGv AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 43.
139 See id at 43-44.
140 See id at 43.
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property theft or damage; and 84 (58%) were nonindex offenses.141
Gender differences were even more significant for offense seri-
ousness. For male offenders, seriousness scores ranged from .3 to 158,
with a mean score of 17. For females, they ranged from .3 to 58, with
a mean score of 7. Thus, the mean level for males was nearly 2.5 times
greater than the mean level for females. 142
Seriousness levels also differed according to groups of offenders.
Among males, the mean seriousness score for one-time offenders was
3, for nonchronic repeat offenders it was 15, and for chronic offend-
ers, 58. Among females, one-time offenders had a mean score of 2,
nonchronic repeat offenders a score of 11, and chronic offenders a
score of 30. Clearly, chronic offenders deviated from the other
groups in terms of the severity of their offenses.' 43
c. Age
The age at which ajuvenile begins a delinquent career is strongly
related to future offense behavior. In general, juveniles who commit
offenses at a young age tend to commit more offenses overall. 44
Percentages of the age at which juveniles commit their first of-
fense are shown in Figure 3 (Appendix C) and Table 1. The highest
percentage ofjuveniles had a police contact by age thirteen (17%) or
fourteen (19%). The lowest percentages occurred at both ends of the
distribution, ages eleven (6%) and seventeen (7%).145
Gender differences exist with these percentages. For instance,
the highest percentage of females became offenders at age thirteen
(23%); the highest percentage of males became offenders at age four-
teen (20%). Cumulatively, nearly half of the juveniles (46%) became
offenders before age fourteen. More than three quarters of both the
males (79%) and the females (81%) became offenders before age six-
teen. Although the peak age of offending occurred one year earlier




144 SeeWOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 127. Moreover, age of onset of violent crime among
females may determine a female offender's pattern of criminal activity. One study of vio-
lent female offenders, for example, found that
[e]arly initiation into violent crime was accompanied by participation in a wide variety
of other offending behaviors and deviant lifestyles. In contrast, those women who began
their violent offending later in life did so in the context of a criminal career which, until
the beginning of substance abuse, was more specialized and focused on typically nonvio-
lent, gender-congruent activities such as prostitution and shoplifting.
See Baskin & Sommers, supra note 2, at 577.
145 See DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 44.
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for both genders at ages fourteen and sixteen. 146 This result also con-
firms prior research indicating minor gender differences in the peak
ages of criminal activity.' 47
An examination of the mean ages of the onset of delinquency for
different offender groups confirms that both nonchronic offenders
and chronic repeat offenders start younger. The Biosocial Study ex-
amined offender group differences using analysis of variance, a statis-
tical test which determines whether differences are statistically
significant at the .05 level.148
Mean ages for nonchronic and chronic male offenders (13.5 and
12.9 years, respectively) were significantly lower than the mean age for
male one-time offenders (14.6 years) (F[2,148] = 7.51; p < .001). Simi-
larly, mean ages for property and violent male offenders (13.6 and
13.3 years, respectively) were significantly lower than the mean age for
male nonindex offenders (14.6 years) (F [2,148] = 5.72; p < .005).
Also, female offenders with two or more offenses were significantly
younger (12.8 years) than female one-time offenders (14.9 years)
(F [1,67] = 24.31; p < .001). No significant differences appeared
among the mean ages for types of female offenders. 149
2. Young Adult Crime
Four categories of individuals are used to compare offense behav-
ior between the juvenile and young adult years: (1) those who never
experience either ajuvenile or an adult police contact; (2) those who
experience at least one juvenile contact but no adult contact; (3)
those who experience at least one adult contact but no juvenile con-
tact; and (4) those who experience at least one adult and one juvenile
contact. The Biosocial Study focused mainly on the last two groups,
* which were combined in analyses of young adult crime.'50
Distributions for males and females according to the four groups
of possible juvenile or adult offense combinations are presented in
Figure 4 (Appendix C) and Table 1. Altogether, 109 (22%) male of-
fenders experienced an adult arrest. Of these, 53 had experienced a
juvenile arrest. Of the total sample of 500 female offenders, 24 (5%)
experienced an adult arrest. Of these, 8 had previously experienced a
146 See id. at 44.
147 See Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 300.
.148 "Statistical significance" refers to the probability that a particular result occurred by
chance. The standard significance level for social science research is .05. Therefore, 5
times out of 100, a factor that appeared to be significant would really not be; the apparent
significance would only occur by chance. See MONAHAN & WLKER, supra note 9, at 80-81.
149 See DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 45.
150 See id at 46.
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juvenile arrest.15 1
Of the 109 males who had an adult arrest, 55 had one offense,
and 15 were chronic offenders. Of the 24 adult females in this group,
15 had only one offense and 2 were chronic offenders. Altogether,
then, the data show that males are considerably more likely than fe-
males to: engage in crimes during adulthood, continue crimes into
adulthood if they had been delinquents, and commit more than one
crime as an adult.152
This section is consistent with prior research showing gender dif-
ferences in the prevalence of crime. Males commit more violent
crime; and more offenses, during both the juvenile and the adult
years. Contrary to a suggestion in past research, 53 the greater
number of offenses for males is a reflection of both their greater par-
ticipation in crime, and their more frequent offending once they do
participate.
The next section considers whether or not comparable differ-
ences exist in the prediction of crime by examining three main theo-
ries: (1) the biological, psychological, and sociological factors
predicting crime among males and females are similar and they inter-
relate; (2) biological factors are relatively stronger predictors of crime
among females, given the greater social and familial constraints on
female behavior; and (3) environmental factors are relatively stronger
predictors of crime among males, as research indicates that males are
somewhat more vulnerable to environmental stressors throughout
their lives.
C. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE PREDICTION OF CRIME
Most researchers have limited their studies of gender differences
to the examination of only one or a few factors. The Biosocial Study,
however, determined interrelated associations among many factors at
different stages of an individual's development.
This required several steps. The first step involved a statistical
screening of several hundred variables to obtain the select predictors
of violent and chronic delinquent behavior listed in Appendix A. Va-
riable screening was conducted with three types of regression equa-
tions, 154 using two dependent variables: number of offenses and
151 See id
152 See id.
153 See 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS," supra note 80. See also, supra notes
87 to 88 and accompanying text.
154 The three types of regression equations were: the forward selection technique, the
backward elimination technique, and the stepwise regression-forward and backward.
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seriousness of offenses. 155
Those variables found to be significant predictors at the p < .05
level for either gender with either of the two dependent variables are
listed in Appendix B. Appendix B also contains six variables that were
not significant predictors in the regression screening but were in-
cluded in analyses for theoretical reasons, and because they were sig-
nificant predictors in past delinquency research. 156 Altogether, then,
the Biosocial Study examined a total of eight "dependent" variables,
designated by the letter "Y," and twenty-two "independent" variables,
designated by the letter "X," that predicted the dependent
variables. 157
The Study analyzed these variables in two ways. First, it con-
structed structural equation models to assess the direct and indirect
effects of the twenty-two independent variables across different time
periods to determine their simultaneous impact on the eight depen-
dent variables. Second, it examined these structural equation models
in their "reduced form," which combines the total impact of direct
and indirect effects.
1. Direct and Indirect Effects on Number of Adult Offenses
Structural equation models, which combine features of factor
analysis and regression analysis, are useful in many areas of the social
and behavioral sciences.' 58 Unlike other techniques, such as ordinary
least squares regression, where each equation represents an empirical
association, the models are appropriate for analyzing longitudinal
panel data because each equation represents a "causal link." 59 Thus,
155 See DENNO, BIOLOGY AN VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 70.
156 These variables were: Stanford-Binet, WISC Verbal and Performance IQ, pregnancy
and delivery complications, and family income at birth and at age 7. One variable,
"otoscopic (hearing) exam," was eventually not included in analyses. Although it demon-
strated a highly significant effect on delinquency, the statistical association was unreliably
inflated because only two serious delinquents had an abnormal hearing exam. See id.
157 See id. at 71. A dependent variable "is that quantity or aspect of nature whose change
or different states the researcher wants to understand or explain or predict. In cause-and-
effect investigations, the effect variable is the dependent variable." MONAHAN & WAMLER,
supra note 9, at 38. The Biosocial Study was unusual because it had more than one depen-
dent variable. An independent variable "is a variable whose effect upon the dependent variable
you are tying to understand." Id.
158 See generally Karl G. J6reskog, A General Method for Estimating A Linear Structural Equa-
tion Systemn, in STRUruRAL EQUATION MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 85 (Arthur S. Gold-
berger & Otis Dudley Duncan eds., 1973); AnvANCES IN FACTOR ANALYSIS AND STRucruRAL
EQUATION MODELS (Karl G.J~reskog & Ddg Sorbom eds., 1979).
159 See Arthur S. Goldberger, Structural Equation Models in the Social Sciences, 40
EcoNomnUc, 979, 979-1001 (1972); Arthur S. Goldberger, Structural Equation Models: An
Overview, in STRucruRAL EQUATION MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 2 (Arthur S. Goldberg
& Otis Dudley Duncan eds., 1973).
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"causal terminology" such as "effect on" is appropriate in an analysis
of structural equation models, even though it is not intended to sug-
gest that direct or perfect causation exists.
In general, models tested direct and indirect relationships among
variables across five different points in time: birth, age four, age
seven, ages thirteen through fourteen, and ages seven through twenty-
two. Results of model testing for both males and females for number
of adult offenses, the final dependent variable, are shown in Tables 2
and 3 (Appendix C), and illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 (Appendix
C).160 Table 4 (Appendix C) isolates those predictors that were statis-
tically significant for the four primary behavioral problem variables:
number of adult offenses, number of juvenile offenses, disciplinary
problem in school, and language achievement.
In the tables, coefficients can be interpreted in the same way as
ordinary least squares regression. The letter "X" represents the effects
of independent variables upon dependent variables. The letter '"
represents the effects of dependent variables upon other dependent
variables.
2. Effects on Male Offenders
Five factors showed significant effects on the number of adult of-
fenses for males. The strongest factors were the number of juvenile
offenses, mother's low educational level, and seriousness of juvenile
offenses. The other two factors were father's high educational level
and subject's low language achievement. The relationship between
the number and seriousness of juvenile offenses and crime at adult-
hood was predictable, because past criminality is a strong predictor of
future behavior. The finding of an expected negative effect of
mother's educational level, but an unexpected positive effect of fa-
ther's educational level, may simply be an artifact because father's ed-
ucational level was highly related to mother's educational level. These
results indicate that parental characteristics have an important effect
on adult male crime, perhaps suggesting that lesser educated parents
may not provide the kind of social control that is needed in early years
to prevent crime in later years. The effect of low language achieve-
ment was also predictable in light of past research demonstrating as-
sociations between low verbal ability and crime. 16' Indeed, there is
160 Although in the initial model, number of offenses and seriousness of offenses were
used as separate, dependent measures for delinquency, only those findings for number of
offenses are reported for the final models in Figures 5 and 6 because the results were
similar for both measures. Likewise, only number of offenses was used as the dependent
measure for young adult crime.
161 See DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 10-12.
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substantial research indicating evidence of reading or learning disabil-
ities among delinquents and violent offenders. 162
The effects on juvenile crime are important because of their indi-
rect effects on adult crime, and because they may have a large influ-
ence on initiating and perpetuating a youth's involvement in crime.
Altogether, in decreasing order of significance, six factors showed sig-
nificant effects on the number ofjuvenile offenses for males: number
of disciplinary problems in school; amount of time the father was un-
employed; evidence of lead intoxication; low language achievement;
number of household moves; and abnormal speech.
Evidence of disciplinary problems in school shows the most
highly significant association with juvenile offenses for males. This as-
sociation demonstrates that, not unexpectedly, school-related aggres-
sion and behavioral disturbance are strong predictors of future
behavioral disorders. Moreover, it appears that delinquents evidence
fewer attachments and commitments to conforming and normative
behavior, at least in the school setting.
The amount of time the father was unemployed, in addition to
number of household moves, are indicators of familial and environ-
mental instability. When combined with lead intoxication, a precur-
sor of physiological and neurological instability,163 these factors can
create the kind of internal and external vulnerability that increases
the likelihood of criminal behavior. Evidence of abnormal speech
and low language achievement are additional factors that can lead to
further instability in school. They also support research suggesting
that delinquents have poor communication skills and rely on physical
aggression to compensate for what they lack verbally.
Five factors significantly predicted whether males evidenced a dis-
ciplinary problem in school: evidence of lead intoxication; anemia;
number of household moves; left hand preference; and lack of foster
parents. These findings suggest that behavioral problems reflect dis-
orders of the central nervous system and an unstable environment,
162 See id. at 12.
163 The key source of lead intoxication is lead-based paint, which children ingest by
eating paint chips or by swallowing dust derived from the lead paint which settles on walls,
windows, and floors. Other sources of lead toxicity are drinking water, soil, food, gasoline,
and industry. See Deborah W. Denno, Considering Lead Poisoning As A Criminal Defense, 22
ForDHAM U.L.J. 377, 392 (1993). Lead exposure can produce devasting physiological and
neurobehavioral disorders among young children, including- learning disabilities, delayed
nervous system development, deficits in visual motor function, hyperactivity, hypoactivity,
and abnormal social and aggressive behavior. See id. at 392-93. Although children of all
socioeconomic classes are vulnerable to the effects of lead, urban-dwelling black children
appear to be most vulnerable. Furthermore, race appears to be a stronger risk factor for
lead intoxication than poverty. See id. at 390-91.
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both of which are precursors of attention deficit disorder and hyper-
activity. For example, number of household moves, and lack of foster
parents are two of a number of indicators of family instability.164 Pre-
sumably, foster parents provided a relatively more intact, problem-free
home than a number of the biological parents with whom children
lived.
Placement in a disciplinary program is strongly linked to three
variables which, even though they are environmentally created, are
typically associated with biological effects: lead intoxication; anemia
(which allows for greater lead absorption); and left hand preference.
Previous research has shown that left hand preference is one indicator
of dominance of the right cerebral hemisphere. It has been associ-
ated with a number of behavioral and intellectual disorders, including
impulsivity and lack of control.165 Also, researchers have found con-
siderable evidence of high lead levels among hyperactive and behav-
iorally disordered children. 166
Although lead intoxication is generally ignored in crime re-
search, the Biosocial Study showed a significant association between
lead intoxication and the number of delinquent offenses committed
by males. Similarly, researchers have ignored the effect of iron defi-
ciency anemia on behavioral problems, although the Biosocial Study
found that anemia was related to disciplinary problems. Moreover,
iron deficiency anemia is one of several factors that increases suscepti-
bility to lead intoxication. 167
Surprisingly, disciplinary problems in school were not highly cor-
related with school achievement in language, which showed a signifi-
cant, direct effect on delinquency. Thus, it appears that behavioral
disturbance has a direct effect on delinquency, rather than an indirect
or impeding effect through school achievement.
Not surprisingly, prior intelligence test scores were associated
with language achievement. Both WISC Verbal IQ and WISC Per-
formance IQ have highly significant direct effects. However, contrary
to some past research, early intelligence scores showed no direct ef-
fect on delinquency. Thus, the link between intelligence and delin-
quency is indirect, and mediated through language achievement. In
addition, the more dominant effect of Verbal IQ on achievement
among males confirms past evidence that poor verbal ability (one in-
dicator of a left hemisphere deficit) is an important factor in aca-
164 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 114 and accompanying text; DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra
note 10, at 12-14.
166 See Denno, supra note 163.
167 See id. at 392.
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demic underachievement.168
Early predictors of Verbal and Performance IQ point to other in-
direct links to delinquency. Not surprisingly, Stanford-Binet at age
four had a strong impact on Verbal IQ Performance IQ and place-
ment in a program for the mentally retarded during adolescence.
The status of having foster parents directly impacted on Performance
IQ indicating that some familial factors contribute to early test scores.
Physicians' clinical impressions of the intellectual status of the Bi-
osocial Study children at age seven also predicted Verbal IQ and Per-
formance IQ at age seven, as well as evidence of mental retardation
during adolescence. These associations validate physicians' capabili-
ties to determine intellectual performance independent of intelli-
gence tests and to predict intellectual capacity later in life. However,
evidence of an abnormal intellectual status at age seven, or of mental
retardation during adolescence, does not have a significant direct ef-
fect on delinquency. 169
Importantly, a physician's clinical assessment that a child had ab-
normal speech at age seven had a significant effect on delinquency.
The impact of speech is particularly telling in light of the finding that,
of all the tests of adolescent achievement examined as predictors of
delinquency at ages thirteen and fourteen, only language ability was
significantly associated. In turn, evidence of abnormal speech early in
life, in addition to abnormal intellectual status and low Stanford-
Binet, predicted placement in a program for the mentally retarded
during adolescence.'70
Contrary to past research, the Biosocial Study did not find a di-
rect link between delinquency and total family income either at the
time of the child's birth, or at age seven. It appears, however, that the
associations between socioeconomic status and delinquency found in
prior research reflected an underlying relationship between factors
that were tied to low income, but which have not been examined in-
tensively in delinquency research (e.g., lead intoxication, or detailed
familial and parental characteristics). In the Biosocial Study, the
number of times the family household moved between the child's
birth and seventh birthday demonstrated a significant direct effect on
delinquency. The length of time the father was unemployed showed
the most highly significant impact, second only to disciplinary
problems in school. Thus, patterns of familial instability and disor-
ganization appear to be more important than the amount of income a
168 See DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 85.
169 Se id.
170 See id. at 85-86.
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family earns.
Overall, both biological and environmental factors predict crime
and violence among males, although environmental factors, such as
lead poisoning, appeared to have more impact. The next section dis-
cusses the relatively stronger biological effects on crime and violence
among females.
3. Effects on Female Offenders
Four factors showed direct effects on the number of adult of-
fenses among females: seriousness ofjuvenile offenses; number of dis-
ciplinary problems in school; low number of juvenile offenses; and
father's low educational level. As with males, the seriousness of delin-
quent offenses was significant; however, unlike males, those most apt
to continue to commit crime during adulthood were not always those
who committed the most crime during their youth. This result is not
surprising, however, since females commit a relatively larger number
of petty or status offenses, like shoplifting. Therefore, unlike males,
chronic female offenders were not always the most serious offend-
ers-an association that has important distinguishing consequences in
terms of social policy. Yet, disciplinary problems in school did show
an effect, demonstrating that early problem behavior is predictive of
problems in adulthood.171
Altogether, nine factors showed direct effects on the number of
juvenile offenses among females: disciplinary problems in school;
lack of foster parents; abnormal movement; neurological abnormali-
ties; left foot preference; father absence; low language achievement;
normal intellectual status; and right eye preference. The strong effect
of a disciplinary status is not surprising, given its importance in pre-
dicting number of adult offenses. Moreover, the link between delin-
quency and low language achievement could be expected in light of a
comparable link among males. However, the status of not being
placed in foster care was a more surprising finding, because it sug-
gested that foster care had a more positive effect on behavior than
keeping a child with her own family.172
Many of the children who were placed in foster care in the Bi-
osocial Study came from disruptive and abusive homes where at least
one parent was absent. Although the children were placed in foster
care at any time between infancy and age seven, it appears that their
early family experiences had a significant effect on their later delin-
quency. This conclusion is confirmed by the significant association
171 See id. at 86-87.
172 See id. at 87.
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found between father absence and delinquency.
Other indicators of number of juvenile offenses-abnormal
movements, number of neurological abnormalities, right eye prefer-
ence, and left foot preference-confirmed prior research indicating
that female delinquents have a greater degree of neurological dys-
function than male delinquents. 173 The Biosocial Study assessed ab-
normal movements during standard tests of coordination, or while
observing the child's spontaneous activity. For example, the research-
ers would ask a test child to hold out both arms horizontally for thirty
seconds to ease the detection of abnormal posture, chorea (rapid in-
voluntary jerks), and athetosis (slow, spasmodic repetitions). They re-
corded many different types of abnormal movements, including
fasciculation, tremors, tics, and mirror movements. 174 Also, they
asked medical examiners to report, as neurological abnormalities,
"conditions, which may not in themselves be neurological but are
often related to [central nervous system] disorders, such as abnormali-
ties of skull size and shape, spinal anomalies, and primary muscle
disease."175
Two factors predicted number of disciplinary problems in school:
abnormal movements, which was highly significant, and abnormal vi-
sion. Physicians assessed whether a child's vision was abnormal by
conducting a visual screening examination. Visual acuity was deter-
mined to be abnormal if any one of the following three conditions
existed: (1) visual acuity was less than 20:30 (with or without glasses);
(2) there was hyperopia test failure; or (3) there was muscle balance
test failure.
Eight factors predicted language achievement. Similar to males,
WISC Verbal IQ and Performance IQ were the strongest positive
predictors. However, in contrast to males, whose language achieve-
ment was predicted only by these two factors, six other factors also
showed significant effects: lesser number of persons supported; left
foot preference; Stanford-Binet; father presence; family income; and
mother's education. Thus, socioeconomic factors, such as income, a
smaller number of persons in the household to support, father's pres-
ence, and mother's education, appeared to have a strong effect on
achievement, in addition to indicators of past intellectual ability as
measured by the standardized WISC and Stanford-Binet tests. Nota-
bly, however, left foot preference was the second strongest predictor.
Other factors showed highly significant effects on both Verbal
173 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
174 DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 87.
175 Id. at 88.
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IQ and Performance IQ most particularly the Stanford-Binet, a lack
of neurological abnormalities, and mother's education. Although
mother's education had no effect on ability and behavior among juve-
nile delinquent males, it showed significant effects on Verbal IQ and
Performance IQ among females.
The number of times a child entered a program for the mentally
retarded showed three effects. Similar to males, a clinician's assess-
ment of abnormal intellectual status had the strongest effect, followed
by the amount of time the father was unemployed and number of
pregnancy and delivery complications, which are considered to be
early predictors of central nervous system dysfunction.
It appears, then, that for both males and females, delinquency
and violence are associated with learning difficulties and low achieve-
ment, but not with the more debilitating types of mental impairment
characteristic of mental retardation or abnormal intellectual status.
This finding is consistent with other analyses of these offenders' classi-
fications, which indicated generally that the more violent and chronic
delinquents had lower achievement test scores, but that they were not
significantly represented in programs for the mentally retarded.1 76
Predictors of female delinquency and violence comprised both
biological and environmental effects. Biological factors, however,
played a considerably greater role in the delinquency of females than
they did in males. Although disciplinary problems and the lack of
foster care showed the most highly significant effects on delinquency,
neurological abnormalities and factors associated with attention defi-
cit disorder were also important. Those factors-number of neuro-
logical abnormalities, mixed cerebral dominance as indicated by left-
footedness and right-eyedness, and abnormal movements-influ-
enced language achievement, which had a direct negative impact on
delinquency.
Overall, there were two significant effects on delinquency for
both genders: disciplinary problems in school-the strongest predic-
tor for males and among the strongest predictors for females-and
low language achievement. This finding accords with research 177
which found problems with conduct and academic achievement to be
among the principal predictors of delinquency. Apart from academic
achievement, however, other factors showed a highly significant im-
pact on delinquency for both genders.
176 See id.
177 See R. Loeber & T. Dishion, Early Predictors of Male Delinquency: A Review, 94 PSYCH.
BULtIN 68, 68-99 (1983). See also DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, for a
review of the research.
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4. Total Impact of Effects on Number of Adult Offenses
An examination of the total impact of independent and depen-
dent variables through the summation of direct and indirect effects
provides another way of predicting juvenile and adult offenses, as seen
in Tables 5 and 6 (Appendix C). This approach can answer questions
relating to the combination of independent effects on intervening
variables as they influence crime. For example, this method can de-
termine the total effect of lead intoxication on adult male crime,
given that lead has a direct effect on delinquency as well as an indirect
effect through disciplinary problems. It can also determine the total
effect of left hand preference, given that it has only an indirect effect
on delinquency through its impact on disciplinary problems.
In both equations, the strength of the coefficients for reduced
form equations is determined by comparisons with other coefficients
in the equations. For males in Table 5, the number of adult offenses
is most strongly influenced by four factors: mother's high and father's
low educational levels; lead intoxication; the amount of time the fa-
ther was unemployed; and the number of household moves. Number
of juvenile offenses was most strongly associated with three factors:
the amount of time the father was unemployed; lead intoxication; and
number of household moves.
For females in Table 6, the number of adult offenses is most
strongly influenced by five factors: father's low educational level;
lower number of neurological abnormalities; lack of foster parents;
number of abnormal movements; and abnormal vision. Number of
Juvenile offenses was most strongly associated with lack of foster par-
ents, abnormal movements, left foot preference, father absence,
number of neurological abnormalities, and right eye preference.
In general, then, factors found to be important in the direct and
indirect effects were also important in the reduced form models,
although the relative strength of their impact shifted somewhat. Yet,
the results of the reduced form equations still support the proposition
that biological factors (such as abnormal movements, left-foot and
right-eye preference, and neurological abnormalities) are more signif-
icant predictors of crime among females; whereas environmental fac-
tors (such as lead intoxication, father's employment status, and
number of household moves) are more significant predictors of crime
among males. Indicators of family stability were important for both
males and females-the lack of foster parents and father absence were
important for females, and father's employment and household
moves were important for males.
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5. Summary of Results
Overall, the results of the Biosocial Study showed that direct, indi-
rect, and total biological, psychological, and sociological influences
on juvenile and adult crime were significant for both genders. Similar
to past research, regression models demonstrated that some of the
same factors that influenced crime among males also influenced
crime among females. For example, seriousness of delinquent of-
fenses was a key predictor of adult crime for both males and females,
whereas the number of a child's disciplinary problems and low lan-
guage achievement in school were key shared predictors of juvenile
crime. Not surprisingly, WISC Verbal IQ and WISC Performance IQ
were the primary predictors of language achievement for both gen-
ders. These results confirm prior research that highlighted the im-
portance of past behavior and verbal ability in predicting future
crime.
Most significant, however, were the numbers and kinds of
predictors that the genders did not share. In general, the Biosocial
Study confirmed past proposals suggesting that biological factors have
relatively more impact among females, and environmental factors
have relatively more impact among males. For example, a comparison
among disciplinary problems, juvenile crime, and adult crime shows
an interesting gender difference. Among females, the only two factors
predicting disciplinary problems-abnormal movements and neuro-
logical abnormalities-were also strong predictors of their crime as
juveniles, and, in the reduced form equations, their crime as adults.
Among males, lead intoxication, the strongest predictor of discipli-
nary problems, was also a strong predictor of their crime as juveniles,
and, in the reduced form equation, their crime as adults. Although
lead intoxication results in neurological and physiological impair-
ment,178 its origins are environmental. The fact that females ap-
peared to be unaffected by lead, even though they were raised in the
same or similar environment as males, suggests that males may be rela-
tively more vulnerable to certain kinds of environmental stressors.
Similarly, abnormal movements or neurological abnormalities had no
effect on ability or behavior among males.
This conclusion warrants some qualification. First, as Figures 5
and 6 illustrate, more factors appeared to influence crime and behav-
ior among females than among males. Moreover, the interrelation-
ships among these factors were more complex. Second, certain
biological factors, such as left-handedness, contributed indirectly to
crime among males by contributing to disciplinary problems. More-
178 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 85
1994] GENDER, CRIME, AND THE CRIMINAL LAWDEENSES 119
over, some environmental factors, such as lack of foster parents, or
father absence, contributed directly to juvenile crime among females.
Noticeably, however, the few biological predictors of disciplinary
problems or crime for males (e.g., left-handedness and perhaps abnor-
mal speech) were not predictors for females, and only one family fac-
tor-lack of foster parents-that was significant in predicting juvenile
crime for females was also significant in predicting disciplinary
problems for males. Thus, more often than not, the genders do not
share the same predictors of crime and behavior. This result suggests
that researchers must assess different kinds of factors to determine the
correlates of gender differences in crime.
Results of the Biosocial Study did not confirm past findings of
direct relationships between delinquency and early intelligence,
mental retardation, socioeconomic status, or early central nervous sys-
tem dysfunction as measured by the number of pregnancy complica-
tions. The lack of strong, significant associations among these
variables may be due to the cultural and demographic characteristics
and homogeneity of the sample; the infrequent occurrence of some of
the independent variables (for example, particular types of pregnancy
and delivery complications), which could mask true associations; or
the simultaneous analyses of both biological and environmental vari-
ables, which could negate more "traditional" findings. Because much
of the research analyzing biological factors and crime has not con-
trolled adequately for social, demographic, and environmental influ-
ences, some past findings of biological links to intelligence or to crime
may be artifacts of environmental effects. Further, longstanding as-
sociations between environmental factors and crime may disguise the
significance of biological effects, because researchers rarely incorpo-
rate them into delinquency research. Other variables, such as discipli-
nary problems, may be an outcome of both biological and
environmental precursors, although most delinquency research offers
only sociological explanations.
Overall, however, the Biosocial Study suggests that delinquency is
related to family instability and, most importantly, to a lack of behav-
ioral control associated with neurological and later central nervous
system disorders. It appears that attention deficit disorder and hyper-
activity, which are part of disciplinary problems, are associated with
the learning and behavioral disorders evidenced in some members of
the Biosocial Study sample. These disorders would considerably in-
hibit the ability of young children to create social bonds even before
the school experience. Academic failure would perpetuate miscon-
duct and impede attempts at future social bonding. Indeed, a sizable
amount of research shows that children who evidence attention deficit
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disorder and hyperactivity are significantly more likely to retain antiso-
cial tendencies during adulthood, a time when most individuals start
to show commitments to socially desirable behavior.179
In determining whether gender differences in crime justify a gen-
der-based standard for punishment, the next section first discusses
briefly the different theories of punishment. It then examines how
the criminal law has applied gender-based defenses. Although such
defenses are generally viewed unfavorably by the courts, their popular-
ity is growing. Moreover, defenses for women are somewhat more ac-
ceptable than those for men. Next, the section considers whether this
gender distinction is based on factors other than gender. It concludes
by discussing whether attempts to use gender-based defenses are legit-
imate, or whether those defenses that are more culturally constructed
merely reinforce the gender-related stereotypes of crime that were es-
poused historically.
IV. GENDER DIFFERENCES AND PREDICTION
A. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT AND DEFENSES
Commentators have discussed the different theories of punish-
ment and criminal law defenses in great detail, is0 and they are
presented only briefly here. Apart from some exceptions, the general
presumption in the criminal law is that individuals are responsible ac-
tors and that their behavior results from free will.' 18 The principles of
retributivism and utilitarianism, which differ considerably from one
another, provide the theoretical basis for the punishment of criminal
behavior. According to retribution theory, offenders deserve to be
punished in proportion to the crimes they commit, because they
made the choice to engage in social harm. 8 2 In contrast, utilitarian
theory does not view punishment as an end in itself, but instead con-
siders whether it would provide any future social benefit, most particu-
larly in terms of crime prevention. The theory presumes that human
actors behave rationally; they will avoid engaging in crime if they be-
179 See DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 94.
180 SeeJOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw (1987); GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILTY (1968);
C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION (1987); Paul
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 199 (1982);
LLoyd L. Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, 49 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 47 (1986).
181 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968); Richard
C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245, 2246
(1992); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 257, 282 (1987); Stephen J.
Morse, Culpability and Contro4 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1587, 1592-1605 (1994).
182 See Weinreb, supra note 180, at 47.
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lieve that the potential pain of punishment is greater than the poten-
tial pleasure reaped from the crime.' 8 3
Major types of utilitarian theory include general deterrence, spe-
cific deterrence, and rehabilitation. General deterrence presumes
that the punishment of a particular defendant will prevent others
from engaging in similar conduct because they will be aware of, and
fear, the consequences.18 4 Specific deterrence purports to deter the
future misconduct of the particular defendant being punished, irre-
spective of the effect such punishment may have on the misconduct
engaged in by others.'8 5 Lastly, rehabilitation attempts to diminish
crime by reforming the defendant's behavior.'8 6
Despite the conflict between the principles of retributivism and
utilitarianism, criminal law scholars generally agree that not all indi-
viduals should be subject to criminal punishment. 8 7 Thus, the avail-
able defenses' serve two functions: (1) they allow defendants who
lack the capacity for rational self control to avoid punishment; and (2)
they help clarify the dimensions of the responsible actor by reinforc-
ing the assumption that culpability is based on an actor's ability to
control current mental states and physical conduct.'8 9 Although
Robinson has pinpointed five categories of available defenses, 90 for
the purposes of evaluating possible gender differences in punishment,
this section focuses on two-justifications and excuses.
Typically, justifications and excuses apply to any offense, even
though every element of the offense at issue has been satisfied.191 A
justification defense, such as self defense, claims that conduct that
would otherwise be criminal is, under the circumstances, socially ac-
ceptable or, at least, not wrong. The defense emphasizes the ac-
183 DRnssxR, supra note 180, § 2.03 at 4.
184 See id. § 2.05 at 5.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 180, at 50 (noting that the result is about the same
irrespective of the theory because criminal law focuses on intentional conduct: "[s]ince
desert attaches most easily to such conduct, which also can be deterred by the threat of
punishment, desert and utility coincide"); Stephen Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal
Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. Rxv. 971, 974 (1982) (arguing that the
law must accept some notion of subjective mental states when considering appropriate
punishment despite the overall presumption of free will in the criminal justice system).
188 See Robinson, supra note 180, at 203. The term "defense" has been defined as "any
set of identifiable conditions or circumstances which may prevent a conviction for an of-
fense." Id
189 See Coughlin, supra note 19, at 12-13.
190 See Robinson, supra note 180, at 203. Robinson terms these defenses: failure of
proof defenses, offense modification defenses, justifications, excuses, and nonexculpatory
public policy defenses. Id.
191 Id. at 221.
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cused's act or conduct. For example, even though killing a human
being constitutes criminal conduct, that conduct is justified if the ac-
cused killed in self defense (i.e., because the victim was about to use
deadly force against the accused for no lawful reason). Thus, even
though the accused satisfied all the elements of the crime of homi-
cide, the act was permissible under the circumstances. 192
An excuse defense, such as insanity or duress, admits that the
conduct may be wrong, but claims that the accused should not be
responsible because of certain "excusing conditions." 93 The defense
emphasizes the accused's personal characteristics to determine the ev-
idence for responsibility.' 94 For example, if a woman strikes another
person with a deadly weapon, thinking that person wants to control
her body by surgically implanting a radio receiver into it, she will have
satisfied all of the elements of aggravated assault. She may be excused
for this unjustified act, however, if she has a condition (e.g., paranoid
delusion) which suggests that she is morally blameless because she
had not acted as a result of free will.195
192 See DRESSLER, supra note 180, § 16.03 at 176-77; FLETCHER, supra note 180, at § 10.1;
HART, supra note 180, at 13-14; George Fletcher, The RightDeed for the WrongReason: A Reply
to Mr. Robinson, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 293 (1975); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of
Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1897 (1984); Paul Robinson, A Theoy ofJustifica-
tion: Social Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 U.C.LA. L. REv. 266 (1975).
193 LLOYD L. WEINREB, OEDIPUS AT FENWAY PARK: WHAT RIGHTS ARE AND WHY THERE ARE
ANy 50 (1994) ("For the most part, we regard as excuses conditions that have a recognized,
identifiable etiology and place a person outside the endless variety of the normal."). See
also DRESSLER, supra note 180, § 16.03 at 177; FLETCHER, supra note 180, at § 10.03; HART,
supra note 180, at 28-53; Kadish, supra note 181; Robinson, supra note 180, at 221. There
are five major tests for determining whether a defendant is insane so as to excuse the
conduct. The first is the M'Naghten test, announced by the British House of Lords in
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Under this test, defendants are insane if, at the
time of their criminal act, they suffered from a disease of the mind that caused them not to
know either the nature and quality of their act or that their act was wrong. The second test
is the "irresistible impulse test," under which defendants are insane if, as a result of a
mental disease or defect, -they acted unlawfully due to an irresistible and uncontrollable
impulse. The third test is the "product" or Durham test brought to national attention by
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). This test, which is no longer valid,
states that defendants are not guilty if their unlawful act was the result or product of a
mental disease or defect. The fourth test is § 4.01 of the Model Penal Code. It states that
defendants are not responsible for their conduct if, at the time of the criminal act, as the
result of a mental disease or defect, they lacked the substantial capacity either to appreci-
ate the criminality (or wrongfulness) of their actions or to conform their conduct to the
law. The fifth and most recent test is the Federal insanity test, 18 U.S.C. § 20(a). Adopted
by Congress in 1984, this test excuses defendants only if they prove that, at the time of the
crime, as the result of a "severe mental disease or defect," they were unable to appreciate
the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of their conduct.
194 See generally DRESSLER, supra note 180, § 16.03 at 177; FLETCHER, supra note 180, at
§ 10.03; HART, supra note 180, at 28-30; Kadish, supra note 181; Robinson, supra note 180,
at 221.
195 Robinson, supra note 180, at 221.
[Vol. 85
1994] GENDER, CRTME, AND THE CR!MINAL LAWDEFENSES 123
The law allows excuses for actors who demonstrate a "disability"
that causes an excusing condition. The disability (an abnormal condi-
tion when the offense occurred) may be: (1) permanent, such as
brain damage, or temporary, such as intoxication or automatism; (2)
internally-caused, such as insanity, or externally-caused, such as du-
ress; (3) a defect in cognition, because the actor does not realize she is
violating the law, or a defect in volition, because the actor cannot stop
herself from violating the law. 196
Similar sorts of conditions may contribute to "failure of proof'
defenses, which differ from excuses because the State cannot prove all
the elements of an offense, most particularly the element of intent.
For example, mental illness can negate the element of intent in a par-
ticular crime without constituting the defense of insanity. The "fail-
ure of proof' defense for a mentally ill defendant may be called
"diminished capacity" or "partial responsibility" in those cases where
the defendant was still guilty of a lesser included offense. In turn, the
mental illness may prevent conviction altogether if there is no lesser
included offense, or if the mental illness also negates the elements of
the lesser included offenses. 197
The next section considers whether these defenses could or
should vary according to a gender-based standard. The next section
also notes how such differences are explicable in terms of the differ-
ent theories of punishment.
B. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN PREDICrION AND GENDER-BASED DEFENSES
A gender-based standard for punishment or defenses would most
likely incorporate gender differences in the prevalence or prediction
of crime. The results of the Biosocial Study presented in this Article
help illustrate this point.
First, even though some of the same factors in the Biosocial Study
predicted crime among both males and females, most predictors were
196 Id. at 221-24, 229-30.
197 See iL-, at 204-06. The defense of "diminished capacity" is an alternative to the in-
sanity defense. With it, defendants claim that even though they suffer from a mental disa-
bility that does not constitute insanity, that disability still prevents them from forming the
requisite mens rea for the offense. Logically, defendants should be excused for any crime
for which they lack the requisite mens rea (this is the approach taken by Model Penal Code
§ 4.02(1)), but commonly judges only allow evidence of diminished capacity, if at all, to
negate the specific intent of a specific-intent offense. A modified version of this defense is
"partial responsibility," a defense based on the premise that mental health is a matter of
gradations and thus defendants should be held culpable only to the extent that they are
mentally healthy. The Model Penal Code § 210.3(1) (b) provides, for example, that a
homicide that would be murder only constitutes manslaughter if the defendant can prove
that the actions were the result of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (b).
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different. Yet, similar components to the differences did exist. For
example, even though the sources of disciplinary problems varied be-
tween the genders, the results were comparable. Both neurological
deviations (such as abnormal movements and neurological abnormali-
ties), which were important predictors for females, and lead intoxica-
tion, an important predictor for males, resulted in difficulties with
impulse control, hyperactivity, and attention deficit disorder-all of
which were strong predictors of crime for both genders. Whether
some of these predictors are more amenable to an individual's control
appears impossible to determine scientifically.198
Notably, the Biosocial Study examined only factors that, theoreti-
cally, could influence the behaviors of both genders. For example,
although lead intoxication did not appear to affect females, it could
have. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that females were
raised in relatively more lead-free environments, because all subjects
were raised in the same types of neighborhoods. Either female chil-
dren are not as attracted to ingesting lead particles, or such ingestion
does not have as strong of an effect on their behavior. In turn, neuro-
logical abnormalities among males appeared to have no effect on
their behavior. Either the delinquent or criminal behavior of males is
predominately influenced by environmental factors, or they are not as
affected by certain biological disorders. Thus, the question is whether
such "gender-variant" differences in choice or physiology should make
a difference in punishment or the use of defenses.1 99
One way of attempting to answer this question is to examine it in
the context of how the law has dealt with (albeit inadvertently) a re-
lated, but perhaps more problematic, issue-the weighing of potential
influences that are gender-based either due to biological or culturally-
created conditions. This section discusses four overlapping types of
gender-based defenses that represent a continuum ranging from
those that are more biologically-based and those that are more cultur-
ally-created: (1) gender-specific; (2) gender-dominant; (3) gender-va-
riant; and (4) gender-cultural.
"Gender-specific" defenses rely on conditions that are biologically
198 See Denno, supra note 10, at 669.
199 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, TheJurisprudence of Genetics,
45 VAND. L. REv. 313 (1992) (analyzing the impact of genetic research on traditional legal
doctrine and our culture's perception of personhood); Lisabeth Fisher DiLalla & Irving I.
Gottesman, Biological and Genetic Contributors to Volence-Widom's Untold Tale, 109 PSYCH.
BULLETIN 125 (1991) (emphasizing the need to examine the relevant biological and ge-
netic literature on the intergenerational transmission of violent behavior); Sandra Scarr,
Three Cheersfor Behavior Genetics: Winning the War and Losing Our Indentity, 17 BEHAV. GENET-
ics 219 (1987) (discussing psychology's current acceptance and former rejection of theo-
ries of genetic diversity in behavior).
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or genetically applicable to only one gender. These defenses recog-
nize that gender is one of the few distinguishing characteristics in the
criminal law that allows some individuals to have defenses that others
could never have.200 No female could attempt the XYY chromosome
defense and no male could claim a defense based on premenstrual
syndrome (PMS) or postpartum depression.20'
"Gender-dominant" defenses predominantly apply to one gender
for biological reasons, but theoretically could also apply to the other.
For example, only males have relied on high testosterone level de-
fenses, such as the use of anabolic steroids, yet in theory, females
could also use these defenses since they too have varying levels of tes-
tosterone that appear to be related to aggression. 202 For females,
however, defense attorneys typically apply a gender-specific defense
for hormonal disorders, such as PMS.
"Gender-variant" defenses are similar to gender-dominant de-
fenses except that, for reasons of biology or culture, the conditions at
issue are more applicable to either gender. The results of the Bi-
osocial Study illustrate how a defendant may use a gender-variant de-
fense. For instance, an attorney could defend a male client using a
lead intoxication defense by arguing that males are particularly sus-
ceptible to lead and its effects on behavior. Similarly, the attorney
could defend a female client by relying on her history of neurological
disorders.203
Lastly, "gender-cultural" defenses primarily pertain to one gender
rather than another for psychological, sociological, or cultural rea-
sons. For example, although males have used the battered spouse syn-
drome,20 4 it is typically used by females under the better-known
rubric, "battered woman syndrome."205
Although courts have begun to accept gender-based defenses for
females, they have been largely unsuccessful for both males20 6 and fe-
males, 20 7 in the United States.208 The reasons for the greater flexibil-
ity for females are unclear, particularly since the criminal law has
200 Although because of their youth, juveniles are also allowed differential treatment or
defenses relative to adults, every one at some point is entitled to rely on ajuvenile defense.
201 See infra notes 211 to 310 and accompanying text.
202 See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
203 See infra note 354 and accompanying notes.
204 See Suzanne K. Steinmetz, The Battered Husband Syndrome, 2 VIarIMoLoGY 499, 499-509
(1977-78).
205 See infra notes 355 to 377 and accompanying text.
206 See infra notes 211 to 268 and accompanying text.
207 See infra notes 279 to 328 and accompanying text.
208 Defenses based on PMS, postpartum depression, and battered woman syndrome, are
examples. See infra notes 279 to 328 and accompanying text.
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dabbled with a broad range of new defenses. 20 9 Some scholars fear
that a different standard for females may reinforce the historical, bio-
logically-driven stereotypes of women and their criminal counter-
parts210 without providing comparable excuses for men.
The following sections examine a selected number of these de-
fenses to determine how attorneys have used them, why some have
had greater success than others, and whether the application of any of
these defenses is justified. Because these defenses are still seldomly
used, the discussion is primarily theoretical due to the narrow pool of
cases available for analysis.
1. Gender-Specific Defenses for Males: XYY Chromosome Syndrome
The XYY chromosome syndrome is perhaps the most widely
known attempt at a gender-specific defense for males. Genetically
normal individuals have one pair of sex chromosomes, typed XX for
the normal female, and XY for the normal male.211 Although a
number of different chromosomal deviations can occur,21 2 research-
ers have examined the XYY chromosomal abnormality most exten-
sively in relation to crime because the extra Y chromosome "suggested
the possibility of exaggerated maleness, aggressiveness, and vio-
lence."213 Initially, there was some evidence for this conclusion.
Although the first discovered XYY male was not a criminal nor abnor-
mally aggressive, 214 subsequent research reported a disproportionate
number of XYY males in maximum security institutions in the United
States and other countries.215
Regardless of these early results, the XYY defense was not success-
ful in the four major XY cases in the United States in the 19 7 0s.21 6
209 See DERSHOWrrz, supra note 19; Denno, supra note 10; Goldberg, supra note 20, at 40;
Margot Slade, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at B20.
210 With respect to views on the battered woman syndrome, see Coughlin, supra note 19;
StephenJ. Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 116.
211 HOYENGA & HOYENGA, supra note 5, at 53.
212 See Michael Craft, The Current Status of XYY and XXY Syndromes: A Review of Treatment
Implications, in BIOLOGY, CRIME, AND ETics: A STUDY OF BIOLOGrCAL EXPLANATIONS FOR
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 113, 113-15 (Frank H. Marsh &Janet Katz eds., 1985) (discussing the
frequency and characteristics of a variety of chromosomal abnormalities, including XXY,
YXX, XO, XXX, and XYY).
213 Sarnoff Mednick, Biological Factors in Crime Causation: The Reactions of Social Scientists,
Introduction to THE CAUSES OF CRIME: NEw BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES 1, 2 (SarnoffMednick
et al. eds., 1987).
214 See A.A. Sandberg et al., An XYY Human Male, [1961] 2 LANCEr 488, 488-89.
215 See Susan Horan, Comment, The XYY Supermale and the Criminal Justice System: A
Square Peg in a Round Hole, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1343, 1347-53 (1992); Herman A. Witkin et
al., Criminality in XYY and XXYMen, 193 ScIENcE 547, 547-55 (1976); Note, The XYY Chromo-
some Defense, 57 GEo. LJ. 892, 892-93 (1969).
216 See People v. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656, 657-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (discussing the
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Primarily, the courts rejected the defense because there was insuffi-
cient evidence to show a causal link between the XYY chromosome
disorder and criminal conduct.2 17 In People v. Yukl,2 18 for example,
the trial court denied Yukl's request that a chromosome test be con-
ducted and offered at trial, noting that previous cases had held that
XYY evidence failed to meet reasonable standards of a "medical cer-
tainty."219 The trial court set forth a new standard, clarifying that an
insanity defense relying on chromosome abnormality "should be pos-
sible only if one establishes with a high degree of medical certainty an
etiological relationship between the defendant's mental capacity and
the genetic syndrome." 220 Moreover, the syndrome's effect on the de-
fendant's thought processes must be so significant that it interferes
"substantially with the defendant's cognitive capacity or with his ability
to understand or appreciate the basic moral code of his society."221
A number of factors complicate arguments suggesting a direct
link between the XYY chromosome abnormality and crime.222 First,
evidence that some XYY individuals have impaired intellectual and
physiological functioning,223 or developmental difficulties, such as
court's rejection of a causal link between the XYY chromosome disorder and aggressive
behavior, or any argument that the extra Y chromosome contributes to legal insanity, de-
spite the testimony of two expert witness geneticists stating that their research and that of
others demonstrated a causal link); Millard v. State, 261 A.2d 227, 231-32 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1970) (upholding the trial court's refusal to submit the issue of the XYY defendant's
insanity to the jury because the expert witness's failed to relate the chromosomal defi-
ciency to a lack of substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct); People
v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (denying defendant's request that a
chromosome test be conducted and offered as evidence at trial noting that XYY evidence
failed to meet reasonable standards of a "medical certainty"); State v. Roberts, 544 P.2d
754, 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (discussing the appellate court's affirmance of a lower
court's denial of the defendant's request for a chromosome test by concluding that the
"available medical evidence is unable to establish a reasonably certain causal connection
between the XYY defect and criminal conduct"); see also Note, The XYY Syndrome: A Chal-
lenge to Our System of CriminalResponsibility, 16 N.Y.L.F. 232, 246 (1970) (discussing the trial
ofJohn Farley, who unsuccessfully attempted to defend himself in New York on charges of
committing a brutal murder and rape based upon an XYY genetic defense).
217 See supra note 216.
218 372 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
219 See id. at 318-20 (citing People v. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) and
Millard v. State, 261 A.2d 227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970)).
220 Yuk 372 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
221 1&
222 See, e.g., LAWRENCE TAYLOR, BORN TO CRIME: THE GENETIC CAUSES OF CRIMINAL BE-
HAVIOR 79 (1984) (arguing that "the evidence seems to point very clearly to the simple fact
that the criminal behavior of the super males was genetically caused, with relatively little
effect from social or familial influences").
223 See WILsON & HER.NSTEN, supra note 1, at 100-02; Witkin et al., supra note 215, at
547-55; Horan, supra note 215, at 1351-53; Note, Chromosome Defense, supra note 215, at 899-
901.
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speech, learning, or attention disorders, 224 suggests that these inter-
vening factors, and not "supermaleness" alone, may be associated with
crime.225 Second, severe sample size and methodological limitations
may lead to inconsistent results in many XYY studies. 226 Third, a large
and methodologically sophisticated study conducted on the relation-
ship between the XYY disorder and crime reported that XYY males did
exhibit a higher rate of criminality that was not explained by their
subnormal intelligence; however, these males showed no dispropor-
tionate tendency toward violence.2 27 In light of the extremely low in-
cidence of the XYY syndrome 228 and other kinds of genetic
abnormalities229 in the general population, as well as the inconsistent
links between these conditions and crime, it is questionable whether
there is a true association between the XYY chromosome abnormality
and crime. Moreover, the legal community has dismissed considera-
tion of the XYY syndrome as a criminal law defense, including the
insanity defense.2 30
2. Gender-Dominant Defenses for Males: High Testosterone Level
The gender-dominant defenses relying on high testosterone
levels, while not entirely successful, have been influential in some
cases. Moreover, unlike the XYY syndrome, the courts have not totally
dismissed them.
224 See Arthur Robinson et al., Summary of Clinical Findings in Children and Young Adults
with Sex Chromosome Abnormalities, 26 BIRTH DEFECTS: ORIGINAL ARTICLE SERIES 225, 227
(1991).
225 See WILSON & HERRNSrE1N, supra note 1, at 100-02; Witkin et al., supra note 215, at
547-55; Horan, supra note 215, at 1351-53; Note, Chromosome Defense, supra note 215, at 899-
901.
226 See Seymour Kessler & Rudolf H. Moos, The XYYKarotype and Criminality: A Review, 7
J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 153, 160-67 (1970) (identifying several methodological problems associ-
ated with XY"Y studies, including the limited number of XYY males tested so far); Theodore
R. Sarbin & Jeffrey E. Miller, Demonism Revisited: The XYY Chromosomal Anomaly, 5 IssuEs IN
CRIMINOLOGY 195, 198-200 (1970) (noting, for example, the heavy reliance on single case
reports, which could create a sampling bias in most of the studies of the relationship be-
tween XYY karyotype and criminal behavior).
227 See Witkin et al., supra note 215, at 553-54.
228 See id. at 550; Note, Chromosome Defense, supra note 215, at 898-99.
229 See Craft, supra note 212, at 115-18.
230 See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusrN W. SCOrrJR., 1 CRIMINAL LAw 379-82 (2d student ed.
1986) (reviewing cases and literature on the XYY as a criminal law defense). Some scholars
nonetheless maintain that the XYY disorder should be considered relevant as a defense to
criminal conduct. See Peter T. Farrell, The XYY Syndrome in Criminal Law: An Introduction,
44 ST.JoHN's L. Rav. 217, 218 (1969) (arguing that the relevance of the XYY "as part of an
insanity defense should not be opened to serious dispute"); David Skeen, The Genetically
Defective Offender, 9 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 217, 263-65 (1983) (concluding that the courts
should be more open to genetic defenses in the future if trial attorneys are more knowl-
edgeable and prepared).
[Vol. 85
1994] GENDER, CRIME, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 129
High testosterone level defenses focus on the association between
circulating hormones and aggression. Evidence of an association be-
tween androgen levels and aggression in human males is complex and
inconclusive.23 ' Some research suggests that hormone levels influ-
ence behavior indirectly, through their effect on cognitive structure
during prenatal and early adolescent development, such as the degree
of lateralization of the cerebral cortex.23 2 Other research points to a
more direct effect on behavior. For example, researchers have associ-
ated the behavioral traits of dominance and aggression in the human
male with levels or rates of testosterone production.23 3
Research on more direct associations between androgen levels,
primarily testosterone, and criminality shows somewhat conflicting re-
sults, possibly because of the different types of hormone measures
used, the effect of the prison environment on those subjects who are
tested, or the differences among the types of offenders examined.2 34
In one study of aggression in a sample of young males, researchers
found no differences in plasma testosterone levels between groups of
nonoffenders and prisoners.235 However, they found that prisoners
with histories of more violent crimes in adolescence had significantly
higher levels of testosterone than prisoners without violent histo-
ries.23 6 Another study showed that imprisoned rapists and child mo-
lesters did not have significantly different testosterone levels than
normal men. However, the most violent rapists had significantly
higher levels than the other subjects.2 3 7 Moreover, recent research on
a sample of fifteen- to seventeen-year-old boys showed a "substantial
correlation" between testosterone level and self-reports of both verbal
231 See Kingsley R. Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of Biologi-
cal Sex Differences, 38 Sw. LJ. 617, 645 (1984).
232 SeeJune Machover Reinisch, Prenatal Exposure to Synthetic Progestins Increases Potential
for Aggression in Humans, 211 SCIENCE 1171, 1171-73 (1981).
233 See Moyer, supra note 1, at 335; Alan Booth & D. Wayne Osgood, The Influence of
Testosterone on Deviance in Adulthood: Assessing and Explaining the Relationship, 31 CRiMIOL-
oov 93 (1993); Dan Olweus et al., Testosterone, Aggression, Physical, and Personality Dimensions
in Normal Adolescent Males, 42 PsYcHosoM. MED. 253 (1980). Evidence also suggests that
these rates are linked to age. For example, in one study, the average testosterone produc-
tion rate of older men (31-66 years old) was half that of younger men (17-28 years old). See
Harold Persky et al., Relation of Psychologic Measures of Aggression and Hostility to Testosterone
Production in Man, 33 PsycHosoM. MED. 265, 267 (1971).
234 See DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 627.
235 See Leo E. Kreus & Robert M. Rose, Assessment of Aggressive Behavior and Plasma Testos-
terone in a Young Criminal Population, 34 PSYCHOSOM. MED. 321, 327-28 (1972).
236 See id. at 327.
237 See Richard T. Rada et al., Plasma Testosterone Levels in the Rapis 38 PSYCHOSOM. MED.
257, 263, 265 (1976); see alsoJerald Bain et al., Sex Hormones in Murderers and Assaulters, 5
BEHAviORAL Sci. & L. 95, 98-100 (1987) (failing to find any demonstrable differences in
hormone levels among murderers, assaulters, and a control group, but noting that the
study was not definitive).
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and physical aggression. 238 Additional research reporting a signifi-
cant relationship between testosterone level and adult deviance em-
phasizes that this link is mediated by the effect of testosterone on
social integration and history of juvenile delinquency.23 9
Attempts to use testosterone level as a defense or mitigating fac-
tor have either been limited, or discouraged. In People v. Moore,240 for
example, a prisoner unsuccessfully claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel after his attorney pursued a "testosterone defense" rather
than the traditional insanity defense.241 The attorney claimed that the
psychiatrists he approached to use as expert witnesses were not willing
to testify about a testosterone defense, and employees of the circuit
court's Psychiatric Institute also "did not favor" the defense.2 42
Although some courts have acknowledged a link between testos-
terone and criminal behavior,243 there is a range in opinion concern-
ing the association's strength. In People v. Rennert,244 for example, the
court noted, with respect to the defendant's pursuit of an insanity de-
fense, that other characteristics of the defendant may have contrib-
uted to his sexual attack, irrespective of the evidence of defendant's
"slightly higher than normal" testosterone levels.245 Doctors testified
that the defendant still suffered from a mental disease or defect even
after his treatment with progesterone lowered his level of testosterone
to that of a female.2 46 According to the court, "[t]he function of tes-
tosterone is to immediate sexual and aggressive drives in the body, but
there is no clear evidence that the level of testosterone affects individ-
ual personalities."247
Other courts have not found testosterone evidence to be persua-
sive, 248 suggesting, as one court concluded, that the "testosterone the-
238 See Dan Olweus, Testosterone and Adrenaline: Aggressive Antisocial Behavior in Normal
Adolescent Males, in THE CAUSES OF CRIME: NEW BIoLocIcAL APPROACHES 263, 264-65 (Sar-
noff Mednick et al. eds., 1987).
239 See Booth & Osgood, supra note 233, at 93.
240 498 N.E.2d 701 (Il. App. Ct. 1986).
241 See id. at 706.
242 See id.
243 See, e.g., Parr v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health and Human Serv., No. 90-1324V,
1993 U.S. Claims LEXIS 37, at *8 (Cl. Ct. Apr. 26, 1993) (noting that "[m]ales with organic
personality disorder are more likely to become violent than females because of the produc-
tion of testosterone").
244 364 N.E.2d 506 (111. App. Ct. 1977).
245 See id. at 508-09.
246 See id. at 508.
247 Id.
248 See e.g., In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 838 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992). In this case, a 13-year-old boy was found to have sexually molested a 3-year-old girl.
Id. at 1366. Testimony during his trial noted that "pubescent males undergo a biological
change, including a surge in the production of testosterone, and become very interested in
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ory" has failed to gain "general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community."249 Yet, courts have recognized the beneficial effects of
Depo-Provera on the behavior of those using it to lower their testoster-
one level.250 Thus, although courts do not accept testosterone level as
a defense to criminal culpability, they may recognize its rehabilitative
qualities.
A somewhat different issue concerns courts' perspectives on the
culpability of those individuals who inject or ingest anabolic ster-
oids.251 Anabolic steroids are the synthetic analogues of testosterone
that mimic the effects of testosterone on the body.252 Initially, ster-
oids were expected to treat a variety of medical conditions. However,
their primary use today is to enhance athletic performance. 253 Ster-
oids have a number of well known side effects, including increased
aggression. When used in large doses, however, they can create severe
toxic psychosis, a condition that some attorneys have attempted to use
to negate criminal responsibility.254
sexual matters." Id. at 1369. The court stated that it did "not believe such expert testimony
is necessary to the adjudication of delinquency in this case." Id.
249 State v. Brand, 842' P.2d 470, 472 (Wash. 1992) (denying a convicted murderer's
request for a new trial based upon his discovery of evidence concerning the psychiatric
effect of the testosterone treatment he had been receiving prior to the murder); cf State v.
Krieger, 471 N.W.2d 599 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). In Krieger, the defendant had entered a plea
of no contest to eleven counts of sexual exploitation of children. Id. at 600. After convic-
tion he sought to withdraw this plea based on the testimony of Fred S. Berlin, Co-Director
of the Sexual Disorders Clinic at the John Hopkins Hospital. Berlin testified that Krieger
suffered "from pedophilia, which made it impossible for Krieger to be responsible for his
criminal conduct.... Krieger satisfied both the cognitive component (he did not appreci-
ate the wrongful nature of his acts) and the volitional component (his pedophilia signifi-
cantly impaired his capacity to conform his behavior to statutory requirements)." Id. at
601. Krieger was seeking Depo-Provera treatment to lower his testosterone level and
claimed that failure of the trial court to allow him to modify his plea constituted manifest
injustice. Id. The court rejected these arguments, saying that prior to the plea there had
been voluminous evidence of Krieger's mental state available to his counsel, and thus the
testimony of Berlin did not constitute new evidence so as to warrant the plea modification.
Id. at 604.
250 See, e.g., Paoli v. ally, 812 F.2d 1489, 1491 (4th Cir. 1987) (commenting on the
"beneficial effect" of Depo-Provera treatment and how the prisoner's appearance and be-
havior have improved dramatically as a result of using it); Commonwealth v. DiVincenzo,
523 A.2d 758, 765 (Pa. Super. 1987) (noting that Depo-Provera "resulted in reductions in
erotic fantasies, sexual urges, and related sexual behaviors in all cases. In addition to the
sexual inhibitory effects, the drug also had an unmistakable general tranquilizing action.").
251 See Martin T. Bidwill & David L. Katz, Injecting New Life into an Old Defense: Anabolic
Steroid-Induced Psychosis as a Paradigm of Involuntary Intoxication, 7 ETr. & SPORTS L. REv. 1
(1989).
252 See Herbert A. Haupt & George G. Rovere, Anabolic Steroids: A Review of the Literature,
12 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 469, 469 (1984).
253 See Bidwill & Katz, supra note 251, at 6-7.
254 Id. at 5; Harrison G. Pope & David L. Katz, Homicide and Near-Homicide by Anabolic
Steroid Users, 51 J. CuN. PsvcmATR" 28, 28 (1990).
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In general, courts have not accepted the use of steroids as a de-
fense, either to sexual molestation, 255 violent attacks,256 or in the con-
text of an insanity defense to first-degree murder.257 However, steroid
use appears to have had some mitigating effect at sentencing in some
cases, including cases for attempted murder,258 and aggravated as-
sault.259 Moreover, a medical doctor testifying in a major first-degree
murder trial stated that the defendant presenting a steroid defense
may have been spared the death penalty because of the testimony on
the effects of steroids, even though the jury rejected this evidence as a
basis for acquittal.260 A steroid defense may also have more influence
in cases where no physical injury occurred. For example, an accused,
charged with three counts of arson not involving personal injury, suc-
cessfully used a defense of steroid-induced insanity.26'
Others have attempted to use, with mixed results, a variation on
the "testosterone theory" in what has been termed the "boys will be
boys" defense. 262 The general thesis of this defense is that because of
255 See, e.g., United States v. Seymour, ACM No. 28331, 1991 CMR LEXIS 741
(A.F.C.M.R. Apr. 19, 1991). In this case, an airman claimed that his molestation of his 12-
year-old foster daughter was a result of his treatment with methyl testosterone, an anabolic
steroid he was taking to increase his fertility. Id. The United States Air Force Court of
Military Review noted that a psychiatrist had "testified that the appellant's methyl testoster-
one therapy may have resulted in a toxic psychosis which would limit his ability to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law." Id. Two sanity boards disagreed, and the trial
judge denied any further pursuit of that defense.
256 See Bidwill & Katz, supra note 251, at 4 n.10; Pope & Katz, supra note 254, at 28.
257 See Judgment, State v. Horace Williams, No. 86-9257 CF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 7,
1988), affd, 573 So.2d 875 (1990). The defendant Williams was convicted of first-degree
murder despite his contention that he was insane on the night he brutally killed the victim
because of his excessive use of anabolic steroids. See Bidwell & Katz, supra note 251, at 3-4
& nn.7-8 and accompanying text; Defense in Slaying Case Cites Steroid Addiction, N.Y. TIMES,
May 30, 1988, at 20. At trial, the defense attempted to introduce ajury instruction main-
taining that Williams was insane on the night of the killing due to his use of steroids. The
trial judge rejected such an instruction. However, even though the judge did not mention
anabolic steroids or the potential influence of any drugs, he did provide an instruction to
the jury regarding the defense of voluntary intoxication. See Bidwell & Katz, supra note
251, at 4-5 & n.11.
258 See Debra Cassens Moss, And Now the Steroid Defense?, 74 A.B.A.J. 22, 22 (Oct. 1988).
259 See Slade, supra note 209, at B20.
260 See Bidwill & Katz, supra note 251, at 5 n.12
261 See State v. Williams, No. C-5630/5631/5634 (Circuit Court for St. Mary's County,
Md. filed April 3, 1986). In this case, the defendant Williams had been engaging in the
excessive use of steroids as part of his regimen for bodybuilding. The court found Williams
guilty, but not criminally responsible, concluding that he "was indeed suffering from an
organic personality syndrome caused by the toxic levels of anabolic steroids... and that
this disorder substantially impaired his ability to appreciate the criminality of his acts and
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." See Opinion and Order, State v.
Williams.
262 See MYRIAM MIEDZIAN, Boys WILL BE Boys: BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN MASCULINITY
AND VIoLENcE 39 (1991); ELIZABETH A. STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS 9-11 (1985).
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the effects of testosterone, males have "developed highly aggressive
and territorial drives that are unalterable."26 3 This defense was per-
haps most vividly illustrated in the Glen Ridge, NewJersey, rape case,
which involved the sexual assault of a mentally defective seventeen-
year-old girl by four neighborhood acquaintances. 264 In that case, de-
fense attorneys contended that the victim, who had engaged in sexual
intercourse at an early age, was an aggressive temptress who "craved"
sex and "had and still has emotional and physical needs." 265 As a re-
sult, the defendants would respond in the way that "any boy would."
As one attorney contended, "Boys... have the same emotional and
physical needs ... Boys will be boys. Pranksters. Fool-arounds. Do
crazy things. Experiment with life, and disregard their parents."2 66
The "boys will be boys" tactic in the Glen Ridge rape case, which was
ridiculed and eventually backfired,2 67 relied solely on the "hormonal
263 See MiEDzLAN, supra note 262, at 39.
264 See In re B.G., 589 A.2d 637, 640 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); see also PETER
LAUFER, A QUESTION OF CONSENT. INNOcENCE AND COMPUCrIY IN THE GLEN RIDGE RAPE
CASE (1994). In the Glen Ridge case, the victim, considered to be mentally defective, (she
had an IQ of 64 and the social capacity of an eight-year-old), was lead by one of the defend-
ants to a basement with the promise that she could have a date with one of the other
defendants, who would be there. In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 640-41. He was there, along with
approximately twelve other boys. Ik at 646. The girl was asked to lay down on a couch and
disrobe. Id. at 641. At this point several of the boys started to leave. Id. The girl was then
asked to masturbate one boy. Thereafter, others proceeded to insert into her vagina a
fungo bat, broomstick, and stick, all of which were wrapped in plastic bags and coated with
vaseline (except for the stick). Id. There was also mention of a drumstick being inserted
into her rectum, but it appears that this evidence was hearsay and thus inadmissible. Id. at
640. The victim testified that she was told that, if she failed to cooperate or if she told
anyone what was happening, her mother would be told and she would have to leave school.
Id. at 644. She later discussed the incident with her swimming teacher. Id. at 640-41. At
this time she sought advice on how to say 'no' in the event of a reoccurrence. See Robert
Hanley, Woman in Sex-Abuse Tial Sought Advice On How to Say 'No, N.Y. TimEs, January 7,
1993, at All. After talking to her teacher but before a criminal investigation began, the
victim refused a subsequent request to go back to the basement for a similar performance,
which would be videotaped. See In re B.G., 589 A.2d at 645. At the trial, defense attorneys
(especially Michael Querques) placed reliance on the "boys will be boys" and "Lolita" de-
fenses. See LAUFER, supra, at 51-72.
265 LAUFER, supra note 264, at 67.
266 Id. at 69. As the attorney emphasized,
You think people are going to forget about the girls they knew in high school who
were loose and the boys who took? Are men going to forget, Hey, I got a girl who is
loose, do you want to join me? Go ahead, forget about it if you want, and then, when
you go to bed at night, ask your conscience, Am I being fair to this kid?
Id. at 70.
267 See id. at 183-85; Tracy Schroth, "Lolita"Defense Risky in Glen Ridge Sex Tia NJ.LJ.,
Nov. 2, 1992, at 1. Four defendants (Bryant Grober, Christopher Archer, and Kevin and
Kyle Scherzer) were found guilty by a jury, which also found that the victim was legally
mentally defective. LAUFER, supra note 264, at 149-50. Bryant Grober was convicted only
of conspiracy (in the third-degree) to commit aggravated sexual assault and aggravated
sexual contact. Id. at 150. Christopher Archer and Kevin and Kyle Scherzer were each
convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault due to the use of force or coercion, and
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stereotypes" of men. Yet, it has been used in other cases, such as the
"Spur Posse" incident, with varying degrees of success. 268
In general, then, the viability of the gender-dominant "testoster-
one theory" defense for males appears to depend on how, and in what
context, it is used. Notably, the outcome of such a defense seems
most risky when it relies on extreme gender stereotyping, rather than
a depiction of a biological transformation gone astray. As the next
section shows, such defenses have been slightly more successful for
females in the gender-specific context, although this disparity may be
the result of circumstances other than gender.
of conspiracy (in the second-degree) to commit aggravated sexual assault and aggravated
sexual contact. Id. Christopher Archer and Kevin Scherzer were also convicted of first-
degree aggravated sexual assault due to penetration of a mentally defective person with
foreign objects, while Kyle Scherzer's guilt on this charge was gauged by the jury to be a
second-degree offense. Id. All four defendants were acquitted on the charges of forced
fellatio, fellatio performed by a mentally defective person, improper touching of the vic-
tim's breasts, and forced masturbation, by the victim, of the defendants. Id. All four de-
fendants were also allowed to remain free on no more than $2,500 bail pending their
appeal. Id. at 151.
268 For example, in Lakewood, California, a group of nine high-schoolers calling them-
selves the "Spur Posse," were charged with molesting and raping neighborhood girls as
young as ten years old. See LAUFER, supra note 264, at 186. The leader of the group
claimed 66 conquests, and was called a "virile specimen" by his father. Id. Only one of the
boys was prosecuted, and he was sent to ajuvenile facility for less than a year for molesting
a 10-year-old. Id. at 187. Charges against the rest of the boys were dropped because the
prosecutors believed that the evidence was insufficient to establish lack of consent or forci-
ble rape. See Veronica T. Jennings & Stephen Buckley, Montgomery Teens Accused of Rape:
School Superintendent's Son Is Among Fwe Facing Charges, WASH. PoST, Oct. 30, 1993, at Al;
Judy Mann, Lessons From the Montgomery Seven, WASH. PosT, Dec. 1, 1993, at E19. A similar
incident occured in Maryland, where two 14-year-old girls were allegedly gang-raped by a
group of youths calling themselves the "Chronics." The group's objective was to have sex
with as many girls as possible. Jennings and Buckley, supra. Five boys were charged, as
adults, with first-degree rape in two separate attacks. Id. The charges were dropped, how-
ever, when the defense produced sworn affidavits from 14 people who provided details that
suggested the sex was consensual. Mann, supra. Also in Maryland, 16- and 17-year-old
brothers were prosecuted for raping an unconscious party-goer. Their father expressed
shock at the prosecution and explained that he thought it was "a mutual thing." LAUFER,
supra note 264, at 187. Yet again in Maryland, ajudge handed out a sentence of probation
to a middle-aged man who raped his unconscious former employee, a teenage girl. Id. at
188. The judge explained that the girl was "contributorily negligent" in the incident, and
noted that intercourse with an unconscious partner was "the dream of quite a lot of males,
quite honestly." Id. at 188-89. In Montclair, NewJersey, which is immediately adjacent to
Glen Ridge, members of a gang calling itself the "Hardhedz Posse" were arrested for mo-
lesting a seventh-grade girl on three separate occasions, the incidents spanning a period of
several weeks. Id. at 190-91. In North Carolina, five teenagers were charged with rape and
violation with a foreign object of a mentally handicapped woman whom one of the five had
previously dated. Id. at 191. The woman was raped and penetrated with a broomstick on
New Year's Eve, and raped on videotape at a construction site the following day. Id. The
defendants in all of these cases appeared to rely heavily on a "boys will be boys" theory for
explaining their behavior.
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3. Gender-Specific or Gender-Dominant Defenses for Females
A considerable amount of research has been conducted on fluc-
tuating hormonal levels and their relationship to crime among fe-
males. Research on the association between testosterone level and
human female behavior, however, is scarce. In one study, significantly
higher testosterone levels were found among violent female outpa-
tients than among the nonviolent ones, whose levels were similar to
those reported for normal females.269 This study also reported in-
creased irritability among violent patients dur'ing menstruation,270 a
finding consistent with other research showing associations between
criminality and symptoms of both premenstrual and menstrual
periods.271
According to Katharina Dalton, who has conducted much of the
initial research in this area,272 the symptoms of PMS273 vary considera-
bly, although they can include increased aggression, irritability, head-
aches, edema, psychiatric symptoms, and suicide attempts.274 These
symptoms may be due to a decrease in the level of progesterone, and
a relatively greater increase of estrogen in the estrogen-progesterone
ratio, 275 although recent research suggests that these fluctuations are
269 See C. L Ehlers et al., A Possible Relationship Between Plasma Testosterone and Aggressive
Behavior in a Female Outpatient Population, in IAMBiC EPILEPSY AND THE DYSCONTROL SYN-
DROME 183, 190-93 (M. Girgis & L. Kiloh eds., 1980); see alsoJames Dabbs et al., Saliva
Testosterone and Criminal Violence Among Women, 9 PERSONALrIY AND INDmVIDUAL DIFERsNCFS
269, 269-75 (1988) (reporting a link between testosterone and violent criminal acts).
270 See Ehlers et. al., supra note 269, at 190-91.
271 See Browne, supra note 231, at 646-49 (reviewing studies showing that a dispropor-
tionate number of violent crimes are committed by women who were menstruating or
during the premenstrual week).
272 Some of Dalton's key publications include: KATHARINA DALTON, THE PREMENSTRUAL
SYNDROME (1964); Katharina Dalton, Menstruation and Crime, 2 BRr. MED.J. 1752 (1961);
Katharina Dalton, Menstruation and Examinations, [1968] 2 LANCET 1386; Katharina Dalton,
Cyclical Criminal Acts in Premenstrual Syndrome, [1980] 2 LANCET 1070.
273 PMS has been defined as "the recurrence of symptoms in the premenstruum
[premenstruation period] with absence of symptoms in the postmenstruum." KAuuNA
DALTON, THE PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME AND PROGESmRONE THERAPY 3 (2d ed. 1984). The
premenstrual syndrome should be distinguished from incidences of "menstrual distress,"
which Dalton defines as "the presence of intermittent or continuous symptoms present
throughout the menstrual cycle which increase in severity during the premenstruum or
menstruation." Id. at 6.
274 See Katharina Dalton, Premenstrual Syndrome, 9 HAMUNE L. REv. 143, 148-51 (1986).
Dalton examines nine risk factors to diagnose PMS: time of onset, time of increased sever-
ity, painless menstruation, increased libido in the premenstruum, intolerance of the pill,
adult weight swings beyond twenty-eight pounds, inability to go for long periods without
food, impact of pregnancy, and varying inability to tolerate alcohol. See id.; see also
HOYENGA & HOYENGA, supra note 5, at 193-95; KENNETH MOYER, VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSION
49-50 (1987); William P, Keye,Jr. & Eric Trunnell, Premenstrual Syndrome: A Medical Perspec-
tive, 9 HAmrMNE L. Rrv. 165, 165-67 & n.6 (1986).
275 See MOYER, supra note 274, at 49-53.
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more complex.2 76 Reviews of PMS-crime research indicate, however,
that "there is an extremely limited and somewhat inconsistent under-
standing of the relationship between menstrual symptoms, behavior,
and endocrine fluctuations."277 Moreover, PMS-crime research is
fraught with serious methodological difficulties. These include varia-
tions in measures of cycle duration, post-hoc correlations that incor-
rectly imply causation, use of retrospective self-report data, anecdotal
methods, small samples, and lack of appropriate control samples or
controls for external influences, such as stress.278
Whether or not hormonal disorders should provide a criminal
defense is a different issue. Although PMS distress has been used suc-
cessfully as a defense in England, 279 with one recent exception,280 it
has not been accepted as a defense in the United States. In 1982,
People v. Santos28l marked the first criminal case in the United States to
attempt the defense.282 Shirley Santos, who faced a charge of first-
degree assault against her four-year-old daughter, admitted that she
beat her child.28 3 At a pre-trial hearing on the defense's motion to
dismiss, Santos' lawyer raised the claim that, because of her premen-
strual syndrome, Santos was not responsible for her actions. 284 Yet,
the defense provided no evidence that Santos had PMS at the time of
276 See HOYENGA & HOYENGA, supra note 5 at 193-95.
277 Bruce Harry & Charlotte M. Balcer, Menstruation and Crime: A Critical Review of the
Literature from the Clinical Criminology Perspective, 5 BEHAvioRAL Sci. & L. 307, 317 (1987)
(arguing that there is insufficient evidence to know whether there is a link between any
phase of the menstrual cycle and crime); see also MOYER, supra note 274, at 49-53 (reviewing
evidence of the link between crime and premenstrual syndrome, but noting that the un-
derlying physiology is obscure); SIANN, supra note 5, at 38 (noting that "[w]hether or not
this syndrome is directly associated with hormonal changes has not been established");
Julie Homey, Menstrual Cycles and Criminal Responsibility, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 29-33
(1978) (raising several critical questions regarding interpretations of research on menstru-
ation and crime).
278 See Harry & Balcer, supra note 277.
279 See Candy Pahl-Smith, Comment, Premenstrual Syndrome as a CriminalDefense: The Need
for a Medico-Legal Understanding, 15 N.C. CENT. L.J. 246, 246 (1985).
280 See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
281 No. 1K046299 (Kings County, N.Y. Crim. Ct. Nov. 3, 1982).
282 Prior to Santos, the symptoms of PMS had been discussed in a few civil cases. See, e.g.,
Hoffman-LaRoche v. Kleindiest, 478 F.2d 1, 9 (3d Cir. 1973); Crockett v. Cohen, 299 F.
Supp. 739, 741 (W.D. Va. 1969); Tingen v. Tingen, 446 P.2d 185, 186 (Or. 1968); Reid v.
Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 188 So.2d 846, 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
283 See Christina L. Hosp, Note, Has the PMS Defense Gained a Legitimate Toehold in Virginia
Criminal Law?, 14 GEO. MASON U.L. REv. 427 (1991); Pahl-Smith, supra note 279, at 256.
284 See Robert Mark Carney & Brian D. Williams, Note, Criminal Law-Premenstrual Syn-
drome: A Criminal Defense 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 253, 262 (1983);Joann D'Emilio, Note,
Battered Woman's Syndrome and Premenstrual Syndrome: A Comparison of Their Possible Use as
Defenses to Criminal Liability, 59 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 558, 570 (1985) (citing defense press
release); Elizabeth Holtzman, Letter to the Editor, Premenstrual Symptoms: No Legal Defense,
60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 712, 713-14 (1986); Nora Mulligan, Note, Premenstrual Syndrome, 6
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 222-23 (1983); Pahl-Smith, supra, note 279, at 256.
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the act or that she had previously experienced PMS.28 5 Because a plea
bargain allowed Santos to plead guilty to the lesser included charge of
harassment, a misdemeanor, the court never officially ruled on the
admissibility of PMS testimony.286 The court did, however, rhetori-
cally question why such evidence should not be admissible when
courts regularly admitted similar kinds of psychological evidence. 287
Santos lost custody of her child, and was required to participate
in a counselling program. 288 The claim made by Santos' attorney and
others that the PMS defense was valid because the felony charges were
dropped,28 9 was countered in a strong rebuttal by the prosecutor who
claimed that PMS had no influence in prompting a plea bargain.290
Indeed, Santos herself later stated in a television interview that
premenstrual syndrome was never the reason why she hit her child.291
The PMS defense was rejected in a subsequent case where the
court concluded that the defense lacked scientific support.292 There-
after, courts accepted PMS evidence, but not as a defense. Courts con-
tinued to deny its legitimacy as a defense either because they
considered that the defendant knew right from wrong irrespective of
her PMS experiences,293 or because the defendant lacked a sufficient
medical diagnosis.294 Yet in Commonwealth v. Richter,295 the first case to
accept the PMS defense, the court's conclusion that the defendant
was not guilty of driving while intoxicated, was based in part on her
285 See Pahl-Smith, supra at 279.
286 See Carney & Williams, supra note 284, at 262; D'Emilio, supra note 284, at 570; Holtz-
man, supra note 284, at 714 (citing the minutes of the pre-trial hearing); Mulligan, supra
note 284, at 222; Pahl-Smith, supra note 279, at 257.
287 See Carney & Williams, supra note 284, at 262; D'Emilio, supra note 284, at 570; Holtz-
man, supra note 284, at 714 (citing the minutes of the pre-trial hearing); Mulligan, supra
note 284, at 222; Pahl-Smith, supra note 279, at 257.
288 See Hosp, supra note 283, at 430.
289 Id. at 430-31; D'Emilio, supra note 284; Mulligan, supra note 284.
290 See Holtzman, supra note 284.
291 See id. at 713 (citing television broadcast); Pahl-Smith, supra note 279, at 257.
292 See In re Irvin, 31 B.R. 251, 260 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (victim of aggravated assault
seeking civil suit against defendant for personal injuries in which the court denied defend-
ant's claim that her conduct was uncontrollable because of PMS).
293 See State v. Lashwood, 384 N.W.2d 319, 321 (S.D. 1986) (affirming defendant's con-
viction for three counts of forgery and concluding that although the defendant suffered
from premenstrual syndrome and "significant memory loss," she "knew right from wrong
and had the ability to help in her own defense").
294 See Commonwealth v. Grass, 141 Pa. Cmwlth. 455 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991). In Grass,
the court considered insufficient the defendant's medical evidence supporting her claim
that PMS rendered her incapable of making a knowing and conscious decision to take a
breathalyzer test following her arrest for driving while intoxicated. See id. at 457. Because
the defendant offered PMS evidence based only on her own statements and those of her
gynecologist and husband, see id. at 459, she failed to show a "necessary causal nexus"
between her PMS and her conduct. Id. at 460.
295 No. T90-215256 (Fairfax County Gen. Dist. Ct. June 4, 1991) (unreported case).
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use of PMS to explain her assaultive and abusive behavior toward po-
lice.2 9 6 Police had pulled the defendant off the road for weaving
across both lanes of a two-lane highway while driving her three young
children.2 97 At trial, the defendant stated that the results of her
breathalyzer test, which indicated she was intoxicated, were skewed,
and that her PMS, which was moderate, made her abusive when she
learned that her children would be put in protective services for the
night after her arrest.298 Considering the "totality of the evidence,"29 9
the court concluded that either intoxication or PMS could have
caused the defendant's behavior-raising a "reasonable doubt" con-
cerning her guilt.300
It is unclear whether Richter is an isolated case, or important as
precedent. No other court has cited it. Moreover, the court applied
the PMS defense in an odd way. Because Virginia has rejected the
diminished capacity defense,30' the most common vehicle for intro-
ducing PMS, the court used PMS in an effort to explain why the de-
fendant's behavior occurred, rather than to demonstrate the absence
of specific intent.302 Also, the court applied the defense to a well edu-
cated, middle class defendant, accused of committing a nonviolent of-
fense, who, as the judge noted, was able to garner "sufficient
resources" unavailable to "[y]our average man in the street."303 Be-
cause Richter may be an anomaly, this section also examines the post-
partum depression defense. Cases relying on that defense provide a
broader range of circumstances from which to draw conclusions about
the importance of gender-related defenses.
Postpartum psychosis is a temporary condition that occurs to wo-
men in about one out of 1000 births.30 4 The most severe of the three
296 Hosp, supra note 283, at 427.
297 See id. at 430-33. State troopers reported that the defendant smelled strongly of alco-
hol, that she freely used profanity toward them, that she refused various field sobriety tests,
and that she tried to kick one of the troopers in the groin when he asked her to put her
hand on top of her head. She was eventually placed in leg restraints so that she could take
the breathalyzer test. See id. at 433-34. The defendant showed 0.13% blood alcohol level,
more than the legal limit, and admitted to drinking four glasses of wine over a six hour
period. See id. at 434-36.
298 Id. at 435. The expert gynecologist's testimony suggested that the defendant was not
being treated for PMS at the time of her arrest, nor that the defendant even knew that she
had PMS prior to her examination by the expert. See hi.
299 Id. at 427.
300 Id. at 436-37.
301 See Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 1985).
302 Hosp, supra note 283, at 439.
303 Id. at 436-37.
304 See Terra Ziporyn, "Rip van Winkle Period" Ends for Puerperal Psychiatric Problems, 251
J.A.M.A 2061, 2061-62 (1984); Amy L. Nelson, Comment, Postpartum Psychosis: A New De-
fense?, 95 DiCK. L. REv. 625, 625 (1991).
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types of postpartum disorders,30 5 it can involve loss of sense of reality,
delusions, extreme agitation, feelings of persecution, or hallucina-
tions.306 Typically, it affects women who have no prior criminal rec-
ord or history of serious mental illness.307
Some researchers consider postpartum disorders to be caused by
a number of different factors, both internal and external to the indi-
vidual, which result from the hormonal, psychological, and social
changes linked to childbirth.30 Other researchers believe that nonp-
sychotic postpartum depression results from social factors, whereas
postpartum psychosis is more closely linked to a genetic
predisposition.30 9
Women who have attempted to use postpartum psychosis as a
criminal defense to infanticide have had varying degrees of success.310
This section examines thirteen major cases that have relied on post-
partum psychosis evidence; seven resulted in an acquittal,3 1' and six in
305 In general, experts posit three types of postpartum disorders: postpartum blues,
postpartum depression, and postpartum psychosis. The postpartum blues is a temporary
period of depression, usually evidenced by crying, which lasts 24 to 48 hours; it occurs in
50% to 60% of new mothers. Postpartum depression, which shares symptoms similar to
other kinds of depression, lasts 6-to-8 weeks and occurs in 20% of postpartum women. It is
most strongly associated with a previous psychiatric history, as well as self-reported stressful
life events and degree of social support. Postpartum psychosis is clinically comparable to
nonpospartum depressive psychosis and occurs in only one or two mothers per thousand.
See Dyanne D. Affonso & George Domino, Postpartum Depression: A Reiew, 11 BmT 231,
232-35 (1984); Barry S. Zuckerman & William R. Beardslee, Matenal Depression: A Concern
forPediatricians, 79 PEDIATRICS 110 (1987); see also CAROL Dix, THE NEv MOTHER SYNDROME:
COPING w1TH POSTPARTUM STREss AND DEPRESSION 9-11 (1985) (offering advice with
symptoms).
306 See Affonso & Domino, supra note 305; Ziporyn, supra note 304, at 2061;Jennifer L.
Grossman, Note, Postpartum Psychosis-A Defense to Criminal Responsibiliy orJust Another Gim-
mick?, 67 U. DET. L. REv. 311, 325 (1990).
307 See Nelson, supra note 304, at 625.
308 For example, there are vast hormonal changes that a woman experiences following
birth. Although directly prior to delivery, a woman's estrogen and progesterone levels are
50 times higher than they are before pregnancy, hours after birth these levels drop to what
they were prior to pregnancy. Other internal changes, such as those required to prepare
for milk production, in addition to the external pressures resulting from child birth, such
as loss of sleep, can create severe depression or psychosis. See id. at 628 n.36; see also Zi-
poryn, supra note 304; Grossman, supra note 306, at 325-26.
309 Nelson, supra note 304, at 628-29.
310 See id. at 629-33.
311 See People v. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (trial judge substituted
his own finding of insanity for the jury's finding of sanity, entered a reduced verdict of
voluntary manslaughter, and ordered the defendant, who had placed her infant son under
the tire of her car and driven over him, to participate in outpatient treatment program);
State v. White, 456 P.2d 797 (Idaho 1969) (a woman who threw her three-month-old
daughter on the floor and then placed her in the crib, where she died of blood clotting
caused by a skull fracture, was found not guilty of voluntary manslaughter by reason of
insanity); People v. Skeoch, 96 N.E.2d 473 (I1. 1951) (conviction for murder of a woman
who asphyxiated her infant son was reversed due to the prosecution's failure to rebut the
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a conviction. 3 12
The defense was first used in 1951 in Peaple v. Skeoch,313 where the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for the
murder of her six-day-old child.3 1 4 The court held that a psychiatrist's
expert testimony that the defendant was suffering from postpartum
psychosis, in addition to the defendant's husband's testimony con-
cerning stressful external circumstances that the defendant was exper-
iencing (such as a theft and his job loss), were sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's insanity at the time she asphyxi-
ated her baby.3 1 5 Although the Idaho Supreme Court allowed a com-
parable use of the defense nearly twenty years later,3 16 another decade
passed before the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the defense in af-
firming the attempted murder conviction of the defendant's
daughter.31 7
presumption of insanity that the defense established at trial); People v. Thompson (a wo-
man who drowned her nine-month-old son in a bathtub and was charged with manslaugh-
ter and felony child abuse was found not guilty by reason of insanity) (described in Ann
Japenga, Ordeal of Postpartum Psychosis, Illness Can Have Tragic Consequences for New Mothers,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1987, Part VI, at 1); State v. Bartek (a woman who drowned her eight-
day-old daughter in the kitchen sink was acquitted of first-degree murder, spending four
days in jail and one month in a mental hospital) (described in Anastasia Toufexis, Why
Mothers Kill Their Babies, TIMEJune 20, 1988, at 81); People v. Green (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (a
woman who killed her first two children and attempted to kill her third was acquitted of
murder because the prosecution could not convince the jury that she was sane) (described in
Nancy Zeldis, Post-Partum Psychosis-A Rare Insanity Defense, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 19, 1988, at 1, and
in Laura Masnerus, Postpartum Puzzle; When Do New Mom's 'Blues' Become Serious Illness?, CHI.
TRIB., February 19, 1989, Section 6, at 9).
312 See Clark v. State, 588 P.2d 1027 (Nevada 1979) (a woman who wrapped her two-
week-old baby in a blanket and left it on the side of a desert road for three days was con-
victed of attempted murder); State v. Householder (a woman who pleaded guilty to invol-
untary manslaughter after she killed her infant daughter by throwing a rock at her, was
sentenced to 22 months in jail) (described in Dan Trigoboff, Postpartum Blues: Cases Test Use
as MurderDefense, L.A. DAILYJ., Dec. 16, 1987, at 1); Commonwealth v. Dacri (a woman who
left her infant son in a bathtub that was filling was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment) (described in Susan Caba, Dacri is Sentenced to Life Term,
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 14, 1989, at IA); Commonwealth v. Weisensale (a woman who
drowned her two-month-old daughter was found guilty but mentally ill of third-degree
murder, given a suspended five year sentence, and ordered to undergo psychiatric treat-
ment) (described in Judy Pehrson, The Darkest Side of Postpartum Depression, YoRK (PA) SUN-
DAY NEWS, May 31, 1987, at E3); Commonwealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987) (a woman who pleaded guilty but mentally ill to third-degree murder after dropping
her one-month-old son into a stream was sentenced to eight to 20 years in prison); Com-
monwealth v. Smith, No. 1775 Crim. Action 1984 (C.P. York County Ct. May 17, 1985) (a
woman who drowned her three-week-old daughter was convicted of third-degree murder
and sentenced to probation).
313 96 N.E.2d 473 (Ill. 1951).
314 See id. at 475-76.
315 See id. at 474-76.
316 State v. White, 456 P.2d 797 (Idaho 1969).
317 See Clark v. State, 588 P.2d 1027 (Nevada 1979).
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The defense has been used more frequently in the last fifteen
years, and with varying results, perhaps attributable in part to the kind
of insanity defense that is applied,31 8 or evidence of the extent of the
psychosis. For example, in one insanity acquittal, the defendant
claimed that she thought her nine-month-old son, whom she
drowned, was the devil, adding that her postpartum psychosis in an
earlier pregnancy ended with a suicide attempt.3 19 In another acquit-
tal, the court declared that the defendant, who experienced serious
disorders after her child's birth, was insane when she drove her car
over her son after unsuccessfully attempting to throw him in front of a
moving car.3 2 0 Ann Green's case was perhaps the most controversial.
A former pediatric nurse, she was found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity for the murder of her first two children, whom she suffocated
soon after their birth, and the attempted murder of a third.321 One
year later she was an outpatient receiving psychiatric treatment.3 22
For convictions, however, there was a wide span of charges, rang-
ing from involuntary manslaughter 323 to first-degree murder,32 4 and a
318 See Nelson, supra note 304.
319 SeeJapenga, supra note 311.
320 People v. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). The People's appeal of the
court's overturning of the jury decision in Massip was unsuccessful. Even though the trial
court abused its discretion and authority in substituting its own finding of insanity for the
jury's finding of sanity, the Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Division 3, found that a new
trial on the sanity issue would subject the defendant to the danger of a finding of sanity
and, therefore, ajail sentence. I. at 872. This result would impermissibly conflict with the
rule of People v. Superior Court of Marin County, 446 P.2d 138 (Cal. 1968), which "pro-
hibits review by mandate at the request of the People where... there is a danger of further
trial or retrial." Id. at 147. Furthermore, the court held that the trial court could properly
enter a reduced verdict of voluntary manslaughter, rather than the jury's verdict of second-
degree murder, based on its finding that "malice actually did not exist." Massip, 271 Cal.
Rptr. at 874.
This decision, however, was ordered vacated and reconsidered in light of People v.
Saille, 820 P.2d 588 (Cal. 1991) (setting forth new guidelines in light of legislative abolition
of diminished capacity defense). See People v. Massip, 824 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
Even when it is reconsidered in light of Saille, the People's appeal will most likely be only
partially successful. Saille makes clear that the change in California law abolishes the de-
fense of diminished capacity, and thus evidence concerning a defendant's capacity to form
a requisite mental state is no longer admissible. Saill; 820 P.2d at 593. However, Saille also
states that a defendant remains "free to show that because of his mental illness or voluntary
intoxication, he did not in fact form the intent unlawfully to kill... if this evidence is
believed, the only supportable verdict would be involuntary manslaughter or an acquittal."
Id. On reconsideration of Massip in light of Saille, the Court of Appeals most likely will still
find it probative that the trial court found that "malice actually did not exist." Massip, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 873.
321 People v. Green, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); Mother Wins Acquit-
tal in 2 Postpartum Killings, Mman HERALD, Oct. 2, 1988, at 18A.
322 Grossman, supra note 306 at 328.
323 See Trigoboff, supra note 312, at 24.
324 See Caba, supra note 312, at 1A.
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gap in sentences, spanning from a suspended sentence 325 to life im-
prisonment.326 Yet, apart from the reasons mentioned, such as the
reliance on different tests of insanity, there is no clear indication of
how these cases differ from acquittals, or how harsher charges and
sentences differ from lighter ones. The court in Commonwealth v.
Dacri327 conceded that the young defendant, with no prior criminal
record, was psychotic when she drowned her son, yet charged her with
first-degree murder and sentenced her to life imprisonment.3 2
In general, then, although gender-specific defenses for women
have been slightly more successful than those for men, their use and
effect are variable. Of all the defenses, courts have viewed postpartum
psychosis as the most acceptable. Yet, it is unclear whether the influ-
ential factor is gender, particularly with the limited number of de-
fenses available to analyze. The following sections attempt to identify
factors that may be most significant.
C. IS GENDER THE CRITICAL FACTOR IN GENDER-BASED DEFENSES?
1. Gender-specific and Gender-dominant Defenses
A number of factors other than gender may be driving the appar-
ent differences in courts' willingness to accept certain defenses over
others. Three factors seem particularly critical: (1) the permanence
of the disorder evidenced, (2) the degree of dangerousness associated
with it, and (3) the causal link between the disorder and the crime. A
comparison between attempts to argue insanity by applying the XYY
chromosome syndrome defense for men, and the postpartum psycho-
sis defense for women, is illustrative:
(1) The XXY syndrome is a life-long genetic condition. In con-
trast, postpartum psychosis occurs only after childbirth, and even then
it is unusual. Most cases last less than a few months, although the
more serious cases can last longer.
(2) If XYY is indeed a criminogenic condition, presumably it can
be influential at any time. This circumstance raises an awkward pre-
dicament for the defendant. He has to contend that the condition
caused the crime while, at the same time, concede that he is perpetu-
ally dangerous to others. In contrast, women who have evidenced
postpartum psychosis are not considered to be dangerous people
when they do not have the condition. It is only pregnancy-related. 329
325 See Pehrson, supra note 312, at E3.
326 See Caba, supra note 312, at 1A.
327 See id.
328 See id.
329 See e.g., Ziporyn, supra note 304.
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Moreover, even when they do have it, they are potentially dangerous
only to themselves or their children. Most likely, the court considered
that Ann Green, who killed two of her children and attempted to kill a
third,330 was not a danger to anyone after her decision to undergo
voluntary sterilization, because she was a psychiatric outpatient one
year later.331
(3) Because a condition like XYY is permanent, it is more difficult
to prove that it is causally linked to criminal conduct. Once again, a
defendant would need to argue that he is either continually danger-
ous, that he commits a crime only when he has an opportunity, or he
engages in crime when other circumstances in addition to XYY are
present. In contrast, women who experience postpartum psychosis
typically evidence symptoms that can be more directly linked to their
criminal conduct. Furthermore, witnesses routinely report behavioral
changes in postpartum psychosis defendants soon or immediately af-
ter the birth of their child.332
The postpartum psychosis defense is unique. The only defend-
ants are women; the only victims are infants. The defendant's period
of dangerousness is temporary, and the disorder is initiated by only
one condition-pregnancy, which is often exacerbated by other per-
sonal or situational factors. Even though the exact cause of the psy-
chosis remains unclear,333 the condition initiating it is not.
In light of this comparison, it is more understandable why PMS
and testosterone defenses have achieved relatively little success in the
United States. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the evi-
dentiary problems associated with these disorders,3 34 but it appears
that their sources and symptoms are relatively more amorphous than
those detected for a disorder such as postpartum psychosis. Yet, even
if these conditions were clearly detectable and scientifically reliable,
there would also be other differences to consider. Defendants with
PMS and high testosterone evidence potentially recurring disorders
and their victims can, and have, included anyone. Likewise, defend-
ants can be a recurring danger to society. Thus, it is not surprising
that these defenses have been primarily successful for conduct where
330 See supra notes 321 to 322 and accompanying text.
331 See Zeldis, supra note 311, at 1.
332 See supra notes 304 to 312.
333 See supra notes 308 to 309 and accompanying text.
334 Presumably, the Federal Rules of Evidence standard affirmed in Daubert v. Merrill
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), would make the admissibility of such evi-
dence more likely compared to the relatively stricter standard espoused in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See, e.g., In reIrvin, 31 B.R. 251 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983)
(rejecting the admissibility of PMS evidence under the Frye test).
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no individual was harmed.335
An alternative approach is to compare postpartum psychosis with
steroid-induced disorder. First, steroid-induced disorder, like postpar-
tum psychosis, is a temporary condition that ceases when the individ-
ual stops using steroids. Second, many of the individuals who have
introduced a steroid defense are not considered to be dangerous peo-
ple either before or after their use of steroids. For example, Pope and
Katz, in their case study of three men who committed violent crimes
with steroids, reported that the men had no prior history of psychiat-
ric disorder, antisocial personality, or violence, yet their behavior
changed dramatically when they started using steroids.3 36 Unlike wo-
men with postpartum psychosis, however, those with steroid-induced
disorder show indiscriminant violence that can last as long as the
"rage." Third, similar to postpartum psychosis, a causal link between
steroid use and crime can often be substantiated, yet perhaps not as
clearly. Homicides induced by postpartum psychosis show characteris-
tics not shared by those induced by steroids.
Foreseeability and sympathy may also be factors. Most individuals
who use steroids know that one of the potential consequences will be
increased aggression. In contrast, it can be presumed that more sym-
pathy will be invoked for a woman who chooses to have a child, with-
out knowing or even realizing that one of the consequences may be
the child's death related to her psychosis. Repeat postpartum psycho-
sis offenders contend that the condition and its consequences may not
be clearly foreseeable. Ann Green stated that she did not realize that
she had a disorder until a month after the death of her first child and,
even then, she "shielded herself from the reality" of this death after a
medical examiner attributed it to a narrowing of the aorta.33 7
Yet a disparity in success between these two defenses may simply
be a matter of time and sophistication. For example, the first defense
of steroid-induced insanity was used in 1988, several decades later
than the first case involving postpartum psychosis.3 38 In a 1985 trial in
which the use of steroids was simply submitted as evidence, it ap-
peared to have little effect on judgment or sentencing, because at that
time "virtually no scientific reports on the psychiatric effects of ster-
oids were available."3 39 In contrast, in Commonwealth v. Richte7 40 the
court seemed particularly swayed by the extent of the evidence the
335 See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
336 Pope & Katz, supra note 254.
337 See Zeldis, supra note 311, at 2.
338 See Moss, supra note 258, at 22.
339 Pope & Katz, supra note 254, at 29.
340 No. T90-215256 (Fairfax County Gen. Dist. Ct. June 4, 1991) (unreported case).
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defendant submitted on PMS, a defense that had not yet been
successful.3 41
Overall, then, an apparent asymmetry in the acceptance of gen-
der-specific or gender-dominant defenses by the courts may be attrib-
utable to factors associated with the gender-related condition, or
degree of evidence available, rather than a "societal glossing" or favor-
ing of the genetic or biological conditions of one gender over the
other. With some exceptions, courts and attorneys also did not ap-
pear to emphasize gender per se, or cultural constructs of gender ste-
reotypes, in their introduction or analyses of these defenses. Indeed,
the Glen Ridge rape case exemplifies how a defense strategy can back-
fire when attorneys rely too heavily on extreme gender-stereotyping to
give a defense "jury appeal." In light of this conclusion, the next sec-
tion considers whether there are comparably justified asymmetries for
gender-variant or gender-cultural defenses.
2. Gender-variant and Gender-cultural Defenses
A question of asymmetry prompts arguments that may apply to
any of the four gender-based defenses. This Article uses these argu-
ments to support its conclusion that asymmetries should be avoided if
they rely on culturally-created, gender-based, stereotypes. Two ten-
dencies fuel this perspective: (1) a tendency to impose culturally-cre-
ated stereotypes on gender-specific, gender-dominant, and at times,
gender-variant defenses, which rely on genetic or biological differ-
ences between the genders; and (2) a tendency to amplify supposed
biological or psychological gender differences in gender-cultural, and
at times, gender-variant defenses, which focus on sociological and cul-
tural disparities between males and females. Defense attorneys use
these tactics to make these defenses more appealing to the jury. Be-
cause the criminal law presumes that behavior is a consequence of
free will,3 42 attorneys attempt to emphasize biological conditions so
that their clients' behavior seems less controllable. They also provide
cultural explanations for biological conditions, either to elicit sympa-
thy or to convince a jury that their client's environment triggered
their internal disorder.
These tactics have a cost. Typically, they rely on a scientifically
unfounded social construction, which can perpetuate past or existing
gender stereotypes. Also, they may be ineffectual in a particular case
or create a backlash for future cases. If these circumstances exist,
courts should render them irrelevant and inadmissable.
341 See supra notes 279 to 280 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 180 to 197 and accompanying text.
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a. Arguments Against Using Gender-Specific Defenses
Such drawbacks can be more fully understood in light of the ar-
guments raised against using selected defenses. The first argument
concerns the stereotyping of gender-specific defenses. According to
some commentators, the PMS or postpartum defenses are degrading
or prejudicial to women.343 These commentators contend that recog-
nizing a link between PMS and violence, for example, would also pre-
vent women from making further progress in their work because
employers would expect monthly cycles of irritability or miscon-
duct.3 44 But to consider a defense "degrading" because its underlying
condition occurs only to women, and therefore puts them in a weak
or "flawed" light, misses the point. If a condition truly negates respon-
sibility, either totally or impartially as PMS may, the fact that it applies
only to women is irrelevant. Discounting gender-specific conditions
in the name of "equality" operates on the pretense that there are no
gender differences whatsoever in biology or behavior.345 This argu-
ment unnecessarily imputes cultural or social stereotypes on a biologi-
cal condition that would otherwise be compared, favorably or not,
with the numerous other biological conditions (including hormonal
deficiencies, such as hypoglycemia or diabetes) that courts consider
with respect to any defendant's responsibility. The focus should not
be on the gender to which this condition pertains, but whether it truly
negates responsibility.
Curiously, critics of gender-specific defenses for men emphasize
their concerns with causality and dangerousness, and not the fear that
men will be "degraded" or stereotyped. Even the "boys-will-be-boys"
defense used in the Glen Ridge rape case pertained more to the so-
called "Lolita-like" behavior of the victim, rather than the gender-ster-
eotyped behavior of the defendants.346 Attorneys may find ways to
avoid potential stereotyping with gender-specific conditions by includ-
343 See, Dershowitz, supra note 19, at 53-55; Marcia Chambers, Menstrual Stresses as a Legal
Defense, N.Y. TIMEs, May 29, 1982, at 46 (reporting Prof. H. Richard Uviller's criticism of
the defense as "degrading"); see also Nelson, supra note 304, at 649 (noting a district attor-
ney's comment that the postpartum psychosis defense was "demeaning to women, since it
implied that they, as a class, were not 'responsible, accountable, equal human beings be-
cause of hormonal differences from men'").
344 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 19, at 54; Grossman, supra note 306, at 343.
345 As one commentator explained with respect to the legal system's displeasure with the
postpartum psychosis defense:
We are dealing with a type of mental illness that men can't get, and you come into a
legal system that's sort of dominated by men and they don't quite see that this could
be a sort of mental illness. They don't empathize with it. They can't imagine them-
selves in this situation.
Nelson, supra note 304, at 635 (citation omitted).
346 See LAUFER, supra note 264.
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ing them within existing defenses, rather than creating specialized,
gender-based defenses. For example, one attorney recommends treat-
ing postpartum psychosis as simply a "controversial diagnosis" rather
than a "new defense."3 47
Others contend that attorneys can use these defenses to incul-
pate, rather than exculpate.3 48 In Tingen v. Tingen,349 for example,
the claimant unsuccessfully argued that the court should consider his
ex-wife's PMS as a factor for allowing him to receive custody of their
children. 350 Likewise, some commentators have suggested that courts
will ultimately view PMS as an aggravating condition, rather than a
mitigating one. They even believe it will justify a husband's murder of
his PMS-afflicted wife, or a court's conclusion that a PMS-afflicted wo-
man should be able to foresee, and thus prevent, the consequences of
her monthly condition.3 51
But these risks are inherent in any defense based upon a biologi-
cal condition. If society viewed PMS as an aggravating condition, it
could also view a brain tumor or high testosterone level as one. If
society expects an epileptic to foresee the consequences associated
with driving a car,352 it could also expect an individual who theoreti-
cally may have a dangerous gender-related disorder to foresee them.
Although Ann Green was successful with her insanity defense, a court
could have applied a high standard of foreseeability given that, shortly
after the murder of her first child, she had some realization that she
had done something wrong.3 53 The criminal law cannot be expected
to provide a one-sided perspective on any particular condition, even if
it is gender-related, and even if it can also be used as a defense.
b. Gender-variant Defenses
A more difficult issue concerns defenses that do not rely on gen-
der-specific or gender-dominant conditions, but rather on the way
that gender interacts with other biological or environmental factors.
For example, a gender-variant defense based on the results of the Bi-
osocial Project discussed in this Article would raise the finding that:
(1) lead poisoning is a strong and consistent predictor of crime and
behavioral disorders; but that (2) lead poisoning is a significant pre-
dictor only among males. Theoretically, a defense attorney could ar-
347 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 304, at 635-36.
348 See; eg., Hosp, supra note 283, at 445.
349 446 P.2d 185 (Or. 1968).
350 Id.
351 Hosp, supra note 283, at 445.
352 People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799, 803-04 (N.Y. 1956).
353 See Zeldis, supra note 311.
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gue that males are relatively more vulnerable to environmental
influences, such as lead poisoning, which render them more impul-
sive. Therefore, they are less responsible for their actions. Likewise,
females are less responsible if they evidence certain types of neurolog-
ical disorders that render them more impulsive and biologically less
capable of deciding between right and wrong.
These arguments, however, share the same difficulties evidenced
by the less successful gender-specific defenses:354 (1) lead poisoning
and neurological disorders are steady, not temporary conditions; (2)
for this reason, it is likely that other factors in conjunction with these
conditions trigger criminal conduct; and (3) therefore, the causal
connection to crime is uncertain. Moreover, a gender-based standard
for gender-variant conditions would be misleading. Females are also
affected by lead poisoning, but to a lesser degree; males are also af-
fected by neurological disorders. The gender differences described in
the Biosocial Study, for example, indicate average, not absolute, varia-
tions. A gender-variant defense, therefore, would be both over and
under inclusive. The defense could also be open to gender-stereotyp-
ing. Recall that historically, female offenders were characterized as
biologically deficient and therefore not capable of controlling their
behavior.
c. Gender-cultural Defenses
Gender-cultural defenses are somewhat different. A classic exam-
ple is the battered woman syndrome defense.3 55 According to Lenore
Walker, a battered woman is one "in an intimate relationship with a
man who repeatedly subjects... her to forceful physical and/or psy-
chological abuse." 356 Walker defines "repeatedly" as more than once,
and "abuse" as any one of six behaviors, ranging from life-threatening
violence to "extreme verbal harassment and expressing comments of a
derogatory nature with negative value judgments" and "restriction of
her activity through physical or psychological means."35 7
The primary purpose of the defense is not to explain why the
354 See supra notes 198 to 210 and accompanying text.
355 See generally Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379 (1991). For a discussion of the constitu-
tional issues pertaining to cases of domestic violence, see Maria L. Marcus, Conjugal Vio-
lence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1657 (1981).
356 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 203 (1984).
357 Id. As Schulhofer notes, however,
[t] his approach includes as battered women the wife whose husband subjects her to
derogatory comments twice in two years, the spouse who is slapped across the face six
times in six months, and the woman who suffers severe bruises, internal injuries, or
broken bones from severe beatings inflicted every week throughout her marriage.
Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 117.
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woman killed her batterer, but why she did not leave him.3 58
Although the defense includes situational factors to explain why a wo-
man did not leave, such as inadequate finances or the failure of police
intervention, it focuses on a psychological diagnosis of "learned help-
lessness."3 59 This condition is created when abused women experi-
ence a cycle of violence and "loving contrition" which, when
combined with low self-esteem, passivity, and fear, makes escape seem
impossible.3 60 Thus, Walker views the battered woman syndrome as a
"mental health disorder"361 whose sufferers evidence a variety of "cog-
nitive disturbances" 362 that prevent them from seeking avenues of es-
cape, and "motivational" impairments that impede their ability to use
such an avenue when they do find one.363 Even though the empirical
basis for Walker's depictions has been severely critiqued,364 they are
widely used in battered women cases.
This Article considers the battered woman syndrome defense to
be gender-cultural because individuals concerned with providing a
feminist approach to domestic violence created it.365 Certain com-
mentators believe the defense was constructed from the "patriarchal
assumptions" stemming from law and psychology.3 66 They contend
that the defense does more than simply reinforce negative stereotypes
of women; it presumes that women are incapable of choosing a lawful
way to avoid the unlawful conduct of their partners. Therefore, the
defense reaffirms historical stereotypes that women are incapable of
the same kind of rational self-control and self-governance that is ex-
pected from men.3 6 7
Anne Coughlin appropriately recognizes that the provocation de-
fense similarly rests on a gender-cultural stereotype of the uncontrol-
lable male who kills his wife in sight-of-adultery cases. Yet, she notes
that the provocation defense also reinforces the hierarchical nature of
male-female relationships because the wife is still construed to be an
358 Coughlin, supra note 19, at 51.
359 See Lenore E. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NoTRE DAME L.J.
ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 321, 330-32 (1992).
360 WALKER, supra note 356, at 86.
361 See Walker, supra note 359, at 331.
362 See id. at 327-28.
363 See LENoRF E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE 10-11 (1989).
364 See DERsHowrrz, supra note 19, at 33-37; Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 118-22.
365 See Coughlin, supra note 19, at 82; Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 116.
366 Coughlin, supra note 19, at 7; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing:
Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L
REP. 200 (1983) (emphasizing the fear that the defense will promote negative and inaccu-
rate stereotypes about women).
367 See Coughlin, supra note 19, at 4-8.
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object under her husband's control.368 Furthermore, the defense
often succeeds in domestic abuse situations because of the gender-
stereotyping applied to the wife's provoking behavior, rather than her
husband's reaction to it.369
Commentators have critiqued the battered woman syndrome on
various grounds that reinforce this Article's concern with the hazards
of treating as biological, defenses that are culturally-constructed. "By
proving that women suffer from special psychological deficits that
make them incapable of resisting illegal pressures exerted by men,
[the defense] explicitly locates the source of women's subjugation, not
within legal or cultural convention, but within women themselves."370
Given that the defense views women as passive and irrational, Stephen
Schulhofer explains that it is not surprising that the defense has been
relatively quickly adopted.371
The defense is further scorned by those who claim that it masks
"the other side" of statistics on domestic violence that oftentimes get
lost in highly publicized spouse killings, such as the OJ. Simpson inci-
dent.37 2 For example, large scale statistical studies show considerable
symmetry in the gender of perpetrators in spouse killings in the
United States.373 For every one hundred men accused of killing their
wives, about seventy-five women are accused of killing their husbands.
This is an equivalency peculiar to the United States, and does not ap-
pear to be related to the availability of guns or increasing "women's
liberation."374 Yet, critics do not recognize a crucial factor-the gen-
der differences in the motives for killing. A large proportion of wo-
men kill in self-defense, but men almost never do. Also, women rarely
kill in response to the motives that appear to provoke men, such as a
failed relationship, infidelity, or long periods of abuse and assaults. 37 5
In considering the theoretical acceptability of gender-based de-
368 See id. at 5 n.12.
369 See Laurie Taylor, Provoked Reason: Heat of Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self De-
fense, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1679, 1696-97 (1986).
370 Coughlin, supra note 19, at 57.
371 Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 122.
372 See, e.g., DERSHSOWITZ, supra note 19, at 311-12 (noting that "women kill almost as
often as men do in the context of all family murders"); Katherine Dunn, Truth Abuse, 211
NEw REPUBUC, 16 (Aug. 1, 1994) (claiming that the events surrounding the OJ. Simpson
case "are the latest pretext for spreading the anti-male propaganda that passes as socially
responsible concern over domestic violence").
373 See generally MURRAY A. STRAuS & RIcHAnJ. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN
FAMILIES (1990); Margo I. Wilson & Martin Daly, Who Kills Whom in Spouse Killings? On the
Exceptional Sex Ratio of Spousal Homicides in the United States, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 189 (1992).
374 See Wilson & Daly, supra note 373.
375 See id. at 206-07 (noting that this conclusion is countered by other research based on
self report evidence, which has been criticized).
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fenses, then, the four that this Article discusses provide a continuum
based on the degree of their reliance on differences in biology or cul-
ture. Even though gender-specific conditions, such as postpartum
psychosis, are also influenced by psychological, sociological, and cul-
tural factors, such as familial or economic instability,376 they are pri-
marily defined by biology. Further, even though gender-cultural
conditions, such as the battered woman syndrome, also allege certain
"cognitive," motivational, or psychological disorders, 377 they are pri-
marily defined by cultural constructs. The concern here is that the
criminal law support scientifically-based efforts to excuse or mitigate
conduct, not socially-constructed conditions that may merely pander
to a jury's stereotypes.
D. DEFENSES AND THE PROBLEM OF PREDICTION
Irrespective of issues of gender or stereotyping, however, it is not
clear whether any of the conditions underlying these defenses actually
"cause" crime or mitigate responsibility. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to examine the precise causal bases for defenses. Instead, this
Article relies on the Biosocial Study's results to question whether
there are grounds for assuming that any one condition is considerably
more causal or mitigating than another. A "perfect" causal model
would be achieved by predicting 100% of an individual's future behav-
ior. Such a high level of prediction has never been accomplished,
however, and it is unlikely that it will ever be accomplished. In the
-Biosocial Study, fairly comprehensive models of biological and envi-
ronmental variables predicted twenty-five percent of future adult
criminality among males, and nineteen percent of future adult crimi-
nality among females.378 These percentages, which were statistically
significant, provide acceptable levels of prediction, particularly for so-
cial science research. However, seventy-five to eighty percent of be-
havior is left unexplained, suggesting that most of what predicts crime
has not been detected. Furthermore, a higher percentage of female
criminal behavior is left unexplained relative to male criminal
behavior.3 79
These results give some perspective on evaluating the gender-spe-
cific, gender-dominant, or gender-cultural defenses. First, none of
the conditions underlying these defenses has any greater predictive
link to criminal behavior than the factors etamined in the Biosocial
376 See supra notes 269 to 328 and accompanying text.
377 See Coughlin, supra note 19, at 55-58.
378 See Tables 2 and 3.
379 Clinicians are also less able to predict violence in women relative to men. See Charles
W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy ofPredictions of Viwlence to Others, 269 JAMA 1007, 1007-11 (1993).
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Study. A prior section of this Article 380 discussed how courts could
hypothetically view one condition to be more "causal" than another
(e.g., postpartum depression relative to XYY chromosome syndrome),
but there is no empirical evidence to support their assumptions. Tem-
poral proximity (a condition that is close in time to the criminal act)
and impermanence (a condition that is periodic, but not inherent),
could be either necessary but insufficient requirements for causality,
or, they could simply be unnecessary. Currently, researchers cannot
draw firm conclusions.
Second, the Biosocial Study indicated strong biological, sociologi-
cal, and environmental interactions among predictors of crime for
both genders, despite the additional finding of gender differences.
This result comports with research or individual reports indicating
that the conditions underlying the other gender-based defenses also
showed multifactorial effects. For example, postpartum depression
was most apt to have a link to an infant's death when other stressful
conditions, such as marital or financial conflicts, were present.38
Therefore, it is unclear whether any defendant could accurately claim
that postpartum depression "caused" her behavior, or made her less
culpable. Most likely, a constellation of events, biological and socio-
logical or environmental, contributed to her infant's death. Thus, it
may not be proper for courts to accept postpartum depression as a
defense when it may not have a causal effect without the presence of
particular environmental stressors. Similarly, it may not be proper
for courts to accept postpartum depression as a defense, and then re-
ject a defense based on the use of anabolic steroids.
If a roomful of experts in the area of biology and violence ex-
amined these issues, they would agree that these are philosophical,
not legal or factual, inquiries.38 2 This view reflects their recognition
that science has yet to show anything more than mere propensities
toward criminality. In turn, a philosophical determination of what
should or should not be causal or mitigating depends upon whatever
sentencing philosophy is controlling.
An overriding, oftentimes less visible, influence on courts' ame-
nability to certain defenses could be their recognition of individual
differences in the prevalence of crime. In determining future danger-
ousness, for example, courts will most likely consider whether or not
defendants will commit another crime, irrespective of the reasons
given for why they may have committed the last crime. The next sec-
380 See supra part IV.C.1.
381 See supra notes 304 to 309.
382 Denno, supra note 10, at 669.
[Vol. 85
1994] GENDER, CRIME, AND THE CRIMTNAL LAW DEFENSES 153
tion considers whether there should be a gender-based standard re-
flecting the vast gender difference in number of offenses, particularly
in light of the recent "three-strikes-and-you're-out" legislation con-
cerned with repeat offenders.
V. GENDER DIFFERENCES AND PREVALENCE
The Biosocial Study demonstrated large gender differences in the
nature and frequency of offenses. Consistent with prior research,
males commit more violent crime.383 Even though the Biosocial
Study relied only on official statistics, which tend to exaggerate gen-
der differences relative to self report studies, the gender differences
were substantial. Because official statistics indicate that agents of so-
cial control, such as families and the courts, intervene more often in
the behavior of girls than boys,3 8 4 the Biosocial Study may exaggerate
the level of girls' criminality for less serious crimes.3 85
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In light of the gender differences in prevalence, an argument
could be made that the recent "three-strikes-and-you're-out" legisla-
tion should not apply to females. Females are far less apt than males
to be chronic offenders, and their crimes are less serious. Such deter-
rence policies are unnecessary for a group which, on the average, is
not dangerous. Indeed, Myrna Raeder contends that the United
States Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines, which are
gender-neutral,386 inappropriately ignore evidence demonstrating
that females have less serious patterns of offending and more family
responsibilities.38 7 As a result, gender-neutral sentencing, which is
geared toward violent male offenders and drug dealers, dispropor-
383 See supra notes 133 to 153 and accompanying text.
384 See Susan K. Datesman & Mikel Aickin, Offense Specialization and Escalation Among Sta-
tus Offenders, 75 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1246, 1246-75 (1984).
385 In general, research indicates that sentencing for girls in juvenile court is more se-
vere than is sentencing for boys. Girls referred to court for having committed status of-
fenses are detained and institutionalized more frequently, and for longer time periods,
than males who have committed delinquencies. See id. Although, over time, smaller per-
centages of status offenders than delinquent offenders have been incarcerated, data in
1987 indicated still that substantially more females (10.95%) than males (1.1%) were incar-
cerated for status offenses. See Ira M. Schwartz et al., Federal Juvenile justice Policy and the
Incarceration of Girls, 36 CRIME AND DFtUNQ. 503, 503-20 (1990). However, evidence that
patterns of offending for status offenses and minor delinquencies are similar for boys and
girls indicates that prosecutions for such crimes vary by gender. See Datesman & Aickin,
supra note 384.
386 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1992). The Guidelines state that sex is not a relevant factor in
how a sentence is to be determined. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5H1.10 (1992).
387 See Raeder, supra note 18.
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tionately harms nonviolent females who have primary parenting re-
sponsibilities, or who are involved in drugs because of family
relationships.388
However, certain factors support gender-neutrality. First, a policy
of specific deterrence based on generalizations about immutable indi-
vidual characteristics, such as gender, offends society's notions ofjus-
tice. It offends in this proposed context because it would continue to
be overinclusive for males (include those nonviolent males who may
never repeat again), but would be underinclusive for females (exclude
those females who would repeat again and who do not have family
responsibilities). Second, because most female offenders are not dan-
gerous or repeat offenders, the "three-strikes-and-you're-out," or simi-
lar kinds of "get tough" legislation, will apply less often. Third, there
is conflicting evidence on the nature and extent of gender differences
in the treatment of violent offenders in the criminal justice system.
Some research suggests that the system treats violent female offenders
less severely than their male counterparts for pretrial detention and
final conviction decisions; other research shows no gender differences
or suggests that the system treats females more severely.389 These dis-
parities reflect conflicts between how judges view their task. Some
judges are chivalrous and paternalistic toward females, while others
are harsh, punishing females for defying their traditional gender
role.390 Studies of sentencing severity, however, "repeatedly find" that
females are less likely than males to receive prison sentences, and
more likely to receive shorter terms when they are sentenced.391 If
females are treated more leniently, they are less vulnerable to the "get
tough" sanctions.
Some evidence also suggests that such sanctions are less war-
388 See id. at 923.
389 See Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 55-57.
390 See id.; Raeder, supra note 18, at 917-18.
391 See Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 58; see also Ilene H. Nagel &John Hagan, Gender and
Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court Sanctions, in 4 CRIME AND JUsTICE 91, 91-144
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1983). Other research qualifies these results. For
example, one recent study concluded that gender shows "a small-to-moderate effect" on
incarceration decisions, and that females are jailed less frequently because of legally rele-
vant factors (such as a prior record that is nonviolent). Judges' reasons for enforcing less
jail time for females in other cases were based on criteria that, although not strictly "legal,"
could be justified for other reasons (e.g., childcare responsibilities or signs of remorse). In
light of its preview of prior research, this study also concluded that studies with the fewest
controls were more likely to show large gender effects, whereas studies with the most con-
trols were most likely to show slight, or nonexistent, gender effects. See Darrell Steffen-
smeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 435-36 (1993).
Another study on juvenile offenders reported that although female offenders evidenced
greater leniency than their male counterparts overall, they experienced greater punish-
ment when they were repeat offenders committing more serious offenses.
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ranted for females given their lower likelihood of repeat offending.
For example, research has found that males on probation are more
likely than females to be charged with committing new crimes, and
that the new crimes for which females are charged are primarily for
technical violations of probation.392 Moreover, the nature and extent
of involvement in prison violence is considerably lower for females
than for males,3 93 perhaps providing one explanation for why females
have a relatively greater probability of success when released on pa-
role.3 94 Thus, although research suggests that both violent and non-
violent females are treated more leniently than males at the sentenc-
ing phase, there is no evidence to suggest that this differential treat-
ment enhances subsequent violence among females.3 95 "Both during
and after periods of incarceration, women exhibit less violence and
subsequent criminality than men."3 9 6
B. CONCERNS WITH GENDER NEUTRALITY
According to Raeder, the gender-neutral stance of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines has eliminated the prior leniency toward females that
existed before the implementation of the Guidelines. Although the
trend toward sentencing females more harshly began before the
Guidelines, primarily because of mandatory minimums in drug cases,
the sentences of females have increased more than those for males.3 97
Thus, the Guidelines have increased both the rates and the length of
incarceration for female offenders.398
Raeder's own analysis, however, points out counterarguments to
her ultimate recommendation for a "rational sentencing policy con-
cerning women" that would be integrated into the Guidelines.3 99
First, as she notes, all defendants receive relatively longer sentences
under the Sentencing Guidelines. The difference is that, prior to the
Guidelines, females received more lenient sentences than males, and
now they receive sentences that are more comparable.400 Raeder's ar-
gument that the Guidelines treat females more harshly could also
392 See S. Norland & Pricilla J. Mann, Being Troublesome-Women on Probation, 11 CRIm.
JUSTICE & BEHAV. 115, 115-35 (1984).
393 See Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 344-45; see also Candace Kruttschnitt & Sharon
Krompotich, Aggressive Behavior Among Female Inmates: An Exploratoly Study, 7 CRIMINOLOGY
371, 371-85 (1990) (finding that female aggression in prison is most strongly associated
with race and childhood family structure).
394 See Kruttschnitt, supra note 2, at 346.
395 See id.
396 See id. at 345-46.
397 See Raeder, supra note 18, at 925-26.
398 See id. at 929.
399 See id. at 909.
400 See id at 926.
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mean that equity has eliminated the favorable treatment they
received.
Second, irrespective of its gender-neutral stance, the Sentencing
Commission has reported that females still receive more lenient
sentences than males overall, and within the Guideline's intervals. It
appears that the relationship between gender and sentencing no
longer exists when certain offense characteristics are controlled, such
as the presence of a weapon, the amount of drugs used, or the of-
fender's role in a conspiracy.401 Ignoring Raeder's other concerns,
including the effect of sole or primary parenting,40 2 this finding sup-
ports the argument that females will receive more lenient sentences
under the Sentencing Guidelines because they commit less frequent
and less serious offenses than males.
Indeed, Raeder's recommendation for a "sentencing policy con-
cerning women" evokes the same themes of paternalism and passivity
used to support a battered woman syndrome defense. According to
Raeder, female offenders who are themselves the victims of sexual or
physical abuse, and who "tend to have low self-esteem and view the
world pessimistically," may be "propelled' into criminal behavior by
"poverty, racism, and sexual discrimination."40 3 Wives or girlfriends of
male defendants who have fathered their children, "mayfind themselves
involved in criminal activity because of social and cultural
pressures."404
Such characterizations depict women as passive objects under the
dominion and control of men, rather than as free thinking agents.
Indeed, it appears that Raeder believes this. In arguing for downward
departures in the Sentencing Guidelines based on circumstances re-
lated to dominance and psychological abuse, Raeder notes that
" [w] hile it may be stereotypical to assume that men lead women astray,
and therefore women are not fully responsible for their criminal of-
fenses, one federal prison warden has observed, 'Females who make
their way to prison have been socialized more toward dependent rela-
tionships, as opposed to life activities that promote indepen-
dence.' 405 Consequently, Raeder advocates judicial recognition of
the "gendered nature of some female crime" in which a woman who is
dominated by a male, but who does not meet the criteria required for
physical coercion, may be entitled to a departure in culpability for her
401 See id. at 931.
402 See id. at 930-31.
403 See id. at 914 (emphasis added).
404 See id. at 906 (emphasis added).
405 See id. at 972-73.
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criminal acts. 406
Raeder's recommendations, however, would perpetuate what ap-
pears to be an unfortunate gender hierarchy in the criminal justice
system. Moreover, such characterizations ignore the fact that male de-
fendants are also the victims of physical and sexual abuse, poverty,
racism, and dominance. It is difficult to contend that a sentencing
structure should incorporate the socialization and victimization of wo-
men, while ignoring comparable burdens on the lives and behavior of
men.
However, this Article recognizes situations where females may be
unfairly punished because of their unstereotypical roles in particular
crimes. For example, there is considerable evidence that women oft-
entimes receive more severe penalties than their male counterparts
for like crimes, such as the murdering of a mate.407 As noted, re-
search also indicates that judges may treat females more severely for
pretrial detention and final conviction decisions, perhaps because
they view women criminals as defying their traditional gender role.40
A gender neutral sentencing structure should eliminate these kinds of
inequities.
A recommendation for gender neutrality is also not intended to
ignore the seriously neglected issues pertaining to pregnant women,
and sole or primary parents. Although this issue is beyond the scope
of this Article, Raeder correctly critiques the disturbing consequences
of particular Guideline's decisions on the children of the incarcer-
ated. She also provides sound critiques of other aspects of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines that are too punitive for any actor, irrespective of
gender. Yet, not only would a focus on what Raeder calls the
"gendered nature of some female crime" reinforce negative stereo-
types, it would create an unwarranted gender asymmetry.
406 See id,
407 See Coughlin, supra note 19, at 3 & n.4; Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-
Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. Rnv. 393, 454-55 (1988); Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the
Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REv.
545, 561 (1988). See also, ANNJONES, WOMEN WHO KiLL 8-9 (1980) (noting that "for of-
fenses traditionally considered to be 'masculine'-such as armed robbery and felony mur-
der-women tend to receive heavier sentences than men"). This disparity was recently
illustrated by Baltimore Judge Robert E. Cayhill's sentencing of Kenneth Peacock to 18
months in prison for pleading guilty to killing his wife four hours after finding her in bed,
naked, with another man. See State's Attorney for Baltimore County, Press Release, Oct.
20, 1994; Tamar Lewin, What Penalty for a Killing in Passion , N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994, at
A18. A day later, another Baltimore judge gave a three-year sentence to a woman who had
pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter for killing her husband following 11 years of his
abuse. Lewin, supra.
408 See supra notes 389 to 390 and accompanying text.
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C. WOMEN IN PRISON
Women's lesser involvement in crime does not reap rewards for
women prisoners. In 1990, women constituted 5.5% of state prisoners
and 7.6% of federal prisoners. 40 9 Relative to male prisoners, however,
they have less adequate physical facilities, health and medical care,
psychological counseling, drug and alcohol counseling, and recrea-
tional services. 410 They also have fewer work assignments or voca-
tional and educational programs, lower pay for the same job, and
more frequent administration of tranquilizers and other medications
for purposes of social control.411 Men are separated into different fa-
cilities according to the seriousness of their crimes (e.g., minimum,
medium, and maximum security); women are typically housed to-
gether regardless of their classification. 412 Ironically, the reasons
cited for such disparities return, once again, to the differences be-
tween male and female criminals: (1) because the number of female
inmates is small, expenditures for them are relatively large; (2) be-
cause female inmates are less dangerous than their male counterparts,
there is less need to spend money on rehabilitation; and (3) because
female inmates are not as demanding, they are less likely to riot over
inadequate conditions.413
Therefore, gender differences have a further penalizing effect in
prison; the women prisoners are neither "bad enough" nor "woman
enough." As one study concluded, "the primary goal for female pris-
oners is often teaching 'femininity'-how to walk, talk, and carry
themselves. This is related both to the view that female offenders have
'failed' as women and must be retrained for the role."41 4 Yet, females
who attempt to fulfill their "feminine" role are also penalized-partic-
ularly when that role is one of primary parenthood.415
In general, then, the criminal justice system appears to recognize
gender differences in the prevalence of crime. According to most re-
search, it provides more lenient sentencing for females than for
males. This disparity comports with data indicating that females are
relatively less serious and less frequent offenders. Therefore, gender-
neutral sentencing schemes reward females by virtue of their behav-
409 ROBYN L. COHEN, BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 1990 Table 6
at 4 (1991).
410 Fletcher & Moon, supra note 25; Roslyn Muraskin, Disparate Treatment in Correctional
Facilities, in IT'S A CRIME: WOMEN AND JUSTICE 211, 218 (Roslyn Muraskin & Ted Alleman
eds., 1993).
411 Fletcher & Moon, supra note 25, at 12; Muraskin, supra note 410, at 218.
412 Muraskin, supra note 410, at 220.
413 See Fletcher & Moon, supra note 25, at 12.
414 See id (citation omitted).
415 See Raeder, supra note 18, at 906.
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ior, rather than their gender. A departure from this structure can
result in sentencing inequities for men, as well as dangerous stereotyp-
ing for both genders.
A recommendation for equity between the genders, however,
should not result in penalties for those females who are incarcerated,
or their offspring. For this reason, the criminal justice system may
need to implement some exceptions to gender neutral sentencing
structures, such as considerations for the status of sole or primary par-
ent, until gender neutral family norms are more fully achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article's examination of gender differences and crime
reaches three general conclusions. First, relying on the results of the
Biosocial Study, this Article confirmed past research showing gender
differences in the prevalence and prediction of crime and violence.
With respect to prevalence, males commit more crime and violence
than females during both their juvenile and adult years, and they are
more frequent and chronic offenders once they do participate in
crime. With respect to prediction, results confirmed some past re-
search suggesting that biological factors are generally more predictive
of crime among females, whereas environmental factors are generally
more predictive of crime among males. At the same time, biological
and environmental factors interact in predicting the crime and behav-
iors of both genders. This finding further reinforces the need for the
simultaneous examination of many different indicators in multidis-
ciplinary research.
Second, this Article used these results to propose a new "gender-
variant" defense that recognizes the different biological and environ-
mental predictors of male and female crime. It further incorporated
these results into a discussion of whether gender differences in the
prevalence and prediction of crime should affect the application of
four gender-based criminal law defenses which represent a continuum
ranging from the most biologically-oriented to the most culturally-
constructed: gender-specific, gender-dominant, gender-variant, and
gender-cultural. It then critiqued efforts to impose gender-stereo-
typed social constructions of the more biologically-oriented defenses,
as well as tendencies to amplify supposed stereotyped biological and
psychological differences in culturally-constructed defenses.
According to Catharine MacKinnon, "arousing the sexism of the
judge and jury may appear [to be an accused woman's] only chance of
acquittal. A prison term is a big price to pay for principle."416 Yet, the
416 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a FeministJurisprudence 34 STAN. L. REv. 703, 721
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consequences of such sexism may be more complex and damaging
than she recognizes. First, there is no evidence to suggest that the
gender-stereotyped defenses that enhance such sexism have any scien-
tific foundation. For this reason, courts should consider them irrele-
vant and inadmissible. As this Article discusses, a successful gender-
based defense may rest on evidentiary issues or aspects of the particu-
lar crime or defendant that may have little or nothing to do with gen-
der or the stereotypical way in which a defense is applied. Therefore,
it is unclear whether gender-stereotyped defenses actually enhance an
accused's chances of acquittal. Second, as the Glen Ridge rape case
illustrated, a gender-stereotyped defense, if poorly applied, can actu-
ally enhance a defendant's likelihood of conviction. Third, a gender-
stereotyped defense can jeopardize the outcomes of future cases
which legitimately rely on a particular defense, because juries will con-
sider the defense controversial and react negatively towards it.417
Lastly, gender stereotyping can stigmatize individuals or groups, and
thereby perpetuate or revive historical depictions of females as socially
and biologically incapable of legal responsibility.
Erickson and Murray's recent study of gender differences in co-
caine use illustrates the potential for this cyclical effect. 41 8 They
found that, regardless of contradictory scientific evidence, media ac-
counts have portrayed women as particularly susceptible to cocaine
addiction and cocaine-related problems. They concluded that this
perception reflected an earlier view that cocaine-using women were
vulnerable to "sexual corruption." Currently, news media perpetuate
this view in their accounts of the "modern woman's" promiscuity with
sexual partners who provide cocaine. The media's account of the co-
caine-using career woman created an alternative sex role theory that
depicted these women as more highly stressed because they attempted
to engage in "men's work." Because the successful career woman
threatens the traditional female role, the media's message is that co-
caine addiction is the penalty she pays for her deviant occupational
choices. They conclude, then, that in the 1980s a "double standard
has been revived"-cocaine-using women are subject to more negative
stereotyping and social ramifications than men. 41 9 Gender-stereo-
typed defenses may unwittingly further such sex-based depictions.
Third, this Article recommended a gender-neutral criminal jus-
(1982) (reviewing ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL (1980)).
417 See Goldberg, supra note 20, at 42 (discussing the backlash created by the more con-
troversially successful cases which rely on defenses such as the battered woman's
syndrome).
418 See Erickson & Murray, supra note 24, at 135.
419 See id.
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tice system. This recommendation, however, is not intended to ig-
nore the potentially devastating consequences that such a stance may
have on third parties, most particularly the children of sole or primary
caretakers who are incarcerated. Some exceptions may have to be
made for social or cultural conditions that are not yet amenable to
gender neutrality. Also troubling are the more severe penalties fe-
males encounter for either "being bad" by defying an expected gen-
der role, or by not being "bad enough," as is illustrated in the
disadvantages they face in prison.
At the same time, there are drawbacks to focusing too much on
the differences between males and females. This Article discussed the
dangers of oversimplifying, overclalming, masking, or confusing the
relationships and outcomes that researchers try to understand, and of
applying rigid, divisive, categories that have no clear scientific base.420
Gender neutrality should allow society to get beyond such concerns
with difference.421
420 See Rhode, supra note 17, at 3-7.
421 Id.
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APPENDIX A 4 2 2
SELECTED BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES
MEASURES AT BIRTH
1. Prenatal maternal conditions
Number of prenatal examinations
Number of prenatal conditions (a count of 8 items:
mother's heavy cigarette smoking, use of sedatives, single
marital status, presence of diabetes, hypertension, number
of venereal conditions, number of neurological or psychi-
atric conditions, number of infectious diseases)
Poor obstetrical history (number of prior abortions, still
births, premature siblings, or neonatal death of siblings)
Mother's age
Number of prior pregnancies
2. Pregnancy and deliveiy conditions
Number of pregnancy and birth complications (a count of
17 items: placenta previa, abruptio placentae, marginal si-
nus rupture, uterine bleeding during the first, second, or
third trimester, anesthetic shock, other anesthetic acci-
dent, cesarean or breech delivery, prolapsed cord, irregu-
lar fetal heart rate, meconium during labor, use of
oxytocic during labor, loose cord around the neck, tight
cord around the neck, forceps marks at delivery, multiple
birth)
Duration of labor
Apgar at one and five minutes
Gestational age, birth weight
3. Family and social structure
Absence of the father







Total family income (adjusted to 1970 dollars)
Total family per capita income (adjusted to 1970 dollars)
422 DENNO, BIOLOcY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 10, at 34-36.
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MEASURES AT AGE 1
.5. Neurological factors
Hand preference (right, left, or variable)
Abnormal behavioral control




Hand, eye, foot preference (right, left, or variable)
Composite index of hand, eye, and foot preference
MEASURES AT AGE 7
8. Physical growth and development
Height and weight
Ponderal index (height/weight3 )
9. General physical health
Pica
Lead intoxication
Iron deficiency anemia, 5 to 8 gms.
Systolic and diastolic blood pressure
10. Neurological factors
Head shape, head circumference
Ear size, shape, and position
Otoscopic exam
Eye structure
Referral needed for glasses
Abnormal visual acuity
Mental status (clinical impression)
Speech (clinical impression)
Number of neurological abnormalities













Hand, eye, and foot preference (right, left, or variable)
Composite index of hand, eye, and foot preference
13. Intelligence
WISC Verbal IQ
WISC Verbal subscales (information, comprehension, vocab-
ulary, digit span)
WISC Performance IQ
WISC Performance subscales (picture arrangement, block
design, coding)
WISC Performance IQ-Verbal IQ difference
Bender Gestalt Test, Koppitz scoring
Bender Gestalt, time in seconds
Goodenough-Harris drawing test
14. Achievement
Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT) Spelling, Reading,
Arithmetic
15. Family and social structure
Absence of the father
Absence of the father at birth and at age 7
Amount of time the father is unemployed
Mother's religion
Number of changes in mother's marital status (from birth to
age 7)
Mother's marital stability
Number of adults, relatives in household
Total family size
Presence of grandparents in the household
Use of childcare
Foster or adoptive parents, guardian
Number of household moves (from birth to age 7)
16. Socioeconomic status
Education, occupation of household head (Census Bureau
Index)
Additional schooling of the mother since child's birth
Number of persons supported
Total family income (adjusted to 1970 dollars)
Total per capita income (adjusted to 1970 dollars)
MEASURES AT AGES 13-14
17. Achievement
California Achievement Tests (CAT):
total reading (vocabulary, comprehension)
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total math (computation, concepts and problems)
total language (mechanics, usage, and structure)
spelling
18. Discifilinar status
Enrollment in a school program for youths with disciplinary
problems at any time during adolescence
19. Mental retardation
Enrollment in a school program for youths with tested evi-
dence of retardation at any time during adolescence
MEASURES AT AGES 7-17
20. Delinquency and violence
Total number of officially recorded offenses (police contacts
and arrests)
Seriousness of offenses (based on weights derived from a na-
tional survey of crime severity)
Classification of delinquency offenders (nonindex, property,
or violent)
MEASURES AT AGES 18-22
21. Young adult crime and violence
Total number of officially recorded offenses (police contacts
and arrests)
Classification of criminal offenders (nonindex, propertyor
violent)
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STATISTICALLY SCREENED INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT
MEASURES
AGES VARIABLES AND SCALES OF MEASUREMENT
7 Y, WISC Verbal IQ (45-155)
7 Y2  WISC Performance IQ (44-156)
13-14 Y3  Disciplinary problem (0 = absent; > 1 = present)
13-14 Y4  Language achievement (1-99)
13-14 Y5  Mental retardation (0 = absent; > 1 = present)
7-17 Y6  Number of juvenile offenses
7-17 Y7  Seriousness ofjuvenile offenses
Birth X1  Pregnancy and delivery conditions (1-17 items)
Birth X2  Mother's education (number of years)
Birth X3  Father's education (number of years)
Birth X4  Family income (1970 dollars)
Birth X5  Time father unemployed (number of months)
1 X6  Hand preference (0 = right; 1 = left or variable)
4 X7  Stanford-Binet (25-175)
4 X8  Hand preference (0 = right; 1 = left)
4 X9  Eye preference (0 = right; 1 = left)
4 X10  Foot preference (0 = right; 1 = left or variable)
7 X1, Neurological abnormalities (total number)
7 X12  Abnormal movements (0 = absent; 1 = present)
7 X13 Abnormal vision (0 = absent; 1 = present)
7 X14  Lead intoxication (0 = absent; 1 = present)
7 X1; Anemia (0 = absent; 1 = present)
7 X16 Intellectual status (0 = normal; 1 = abnormal)
7 X17  Speech (0 = normal; 1 = abnormal)
7 X18  Foster parents (0 = absent; 1 = present)
Birth-7 X19  Father in household (0 = present; 1 = absent)
Birth-7 X20  Household moves (total number)
7 X21  Persons supported (total number)
7 X2 Family income (1970 dollars)
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TABLEs AND FIGuREs

































































IqTI F I ATEOR B GEDERI
No juvenle or adult arrest
Juvenile arrest only
Adult arrest only












































Figure 1: Type of Offender by Gender
Violent offender
Property offender 7.39% (n=36)
10.47% (n=51)
'TYPE OF OFFENDER- FEMALES
Property offender Violent offender
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Table 4
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN PREDICTORS OF JUVENILE AND ADULT CRIME
(STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT PREDICTORS ONLY FROM TABLES 2 AND 3, IN DECREASING
ORDER OF SIGNIFICANCE)
FACTORS PjiEnOcTIAG NUMBER OF.- ADULT OF-.Evsrs - MfLF-V
Y6  Number ofjuvenile offenses**
X 2  Mother's low education**
Y7  Seriousness of juvenile offenses**
Xs Father's high education*
Y4  Low language achievement*
FACTORS P-oICTIIG NUMBER OF ADULT OFFES SS - FEMALES
Y 7  Seriousness ofjuvenile offenses***
Y3  Disciplinary problem***
Y6  Low number ofjuvenile offenses**
X3  Father's low education**
FA CTORS PICTING N Ra o JU VENI LE OFFENSES -
Y3  Disciplinary problem***
Xs Time father unemployed***
X 14  Lead intoxication***
Y4  Low language achievement*
X 20  Household moves*
X17  Abnormal speech*
FACTORS PE CTWIG NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFIENSES - FE AL
Y3  Disciplinary problem***
X 18  Lack of foster parents***
X12  Abnormal movements***
XII Neurological abnormalities***
X10  Left foot preference***
X19  Father absence**
Y4  Low language achievement*
X 16  Normal intellectual status*
X 9  Right eye preference*
FACTORS PEDICTING DISCPLINARY PROBLEM - ALES
X 14  Lead intoxication**
X 15  Anemia**
X20  Household moves*
X8  Left hand preference*
X 18  Lack of foster parents*
FACTORS PEDICTNG DISC PIINARY POBL.EM - FEMALES
X1 2  Abnormal movements***
X 1 3 Abnormal vision**
FA CTORS PnICTrINo LANGUAG E AcFwIEwEvT - MALzEs
Y1  WISC Verbal IQ***
Y2  WISC Performance IQ***
FA CTORS PREIC'TIG LNGUA GE AcI 'r.itEmE& - F)mALEs
Y2  WISC Performance IQ***
Y1  WISC Verbal IQ***
X 21  Lesser number of persons supported***
X 10  Left foot preference**
X7  Stanford-Binet**
X 19  Father presence**
X4  Family income*
X2 Mother's education*
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